Cunningham v. Albright Coll., 5:20-cv-01429

• Decision Date: 23 December 2020
• Docket Number: No. 5:20-cv-01429,5:20-cv-01429
• Parties: JOSEPH CUNNINGHAM, Plaintiff, v. ALBRIGHT COLLEGE, JACQUELYN FETROW, KAREN CAMPBELL and MARY MCGEE, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

JOSEPH CUNNINGHAM, Plaintiff, v. ALBRIGHT COLLEGE, JACQUELYN FETROW, KAREN CAMPBELLand MARY MCGEE, Defendants.

No. 5:20-cv-01429

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

December 23, 2020

OPINION

Partial Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, ECF No. 11 - Granted

Joseph F. Leeson, Jr. United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Joseph Cunningham filed suit against Defendant Albright College, its President, Provost, and Vice President of Academic Affairs,¹ alleging claims including sex and age discrimination, violation of the Equal Pay Act, and breach of contract. Defendants filed the present partial Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. See Mot., ECF No. 11. Cunningham timely responded. See Resp., ECF No. 13.

Defendants' partial motion to dismiss is granted. Cunningham's Title VII claim, Count IV, and ADEA claim, Count V, are dismissed without prejudice as to Albright College as untimely. The Title VII claim and ADEA claim are dismissed with prejudice as to Defendants Jacquelyn Fetrow, Karen Campbell, and Mary McGee as a matter of law.

Cunningham's Equal Pay Act claim, Count III, is dismissed without prejudice as to Defendants Jacquelyn Fetrow, Karen Campbell, and Mary McGee for failure to state a claim. The Equal Pay Act claim, to the extent it seeks to recover for paychecks issued prior to February 28, 2018, is dismissed without prejudice as to Albright College as untimely. The claim may proceed against Albright College to the extent it seeks to recover for disparate paychecks after February 28, 2018.

Counts I, II, and VI are dismissed without prejudice as to all Defendants for failure to state a claim. Cunningham's breach of contract claim, Count VII, is dismissed without prejudice as to all Defendants for failure to state a claim.

As a result of Defendants' motion, all claims against Defendants Jacquelyn Fetrow, Karen Campbell and Mary McGee are dismissed, in part with and in part without prejudice. The only surviving claim against Albright is Cunningham's Equal Pay Act claim (Count III). This claim survives only to the extent that the claim seeks compensation for disparate paychecks between February 28, 2018, and the date of Cunningham's final paycheck. Cunningham is granted leave to amend those claims dismissed without prejudice.

II. BACKGROUND²

Albright, a non-profit college in Reading, Pennsylvania, first employed Cunningham as an Assistant Professor of Accounting for the 2013-2014 academic year. See Compl. ¶ 18, ECF No. 1. Cunningham's employment was renewed for each subsequent academic year via annual contracts. See id. at ¶ 19. In the 2016-2017 academic year, his continued employment with Albright was conditioned on his completion of tenure qualifications. See id. Cunningham filedthe requisite application for tenure in October 2016. See id. On December 26, 2016, the Rank and Tenure Committee at Albright denied Cunningham's application for tenure.³ See Mot. at Ex. B 2, ECF No. 11-3. That denial letter also specified that Cunningham would be offered a terminal contract for the 2017-2018 academic year. See id. at 2. Cunningham contends that the Tenure Committee, including Mary McGee, deviated from the tenure procedure detailed in the Albright Employee Handbook. See Compl. ¶ 27.

In fall 2017, during his terminal year, Cunningham became aware that a female colleague in his department with less seniority and experience was being paid more than him. See id. at ¶ 22. Cunningham brought this pay disparity to Albright's attention during his fall 2017 salary review. See id. at ¶ 24. In December 2017, Cunningham received an extra $5,000 in pay, part of which constituted a general wage increase to all employees. See id. at ¶ 25.

Following the conclusion of the 2018 academic year, Cunningham was terminated, and he contends he was replaced by a "younger individual in the accounting department with less experience and qualifications" than him. See id. at ¶ 28. Upon his exit, Cunningham requested acertificate for his five years of service, and his request was denied. See id. at ¶ 30. Cunningham states that his last day of work was August 15, 2018. See id. at ¶ 19.

On October 10, 2018, Cunningham filed a charge of discrimination with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (PHRC) and dually filed it with the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission (EEOC). See id. at ¶ 32. The EEOC closed the claim on November 29, 2019, and issued a Notice of Right to Sue to Cunningham. See id. at ¶ 33.

On February 28, 2020, following receipt of the Notice of Right to Sue, Cunningham instituted the present action. He alleges the following claims against the Defendants:

(1) "Discrimination Based on 'Age' in Violation of Civil Rights;"

(2) "Discrimination Based on Retaliation and Harassment;"

(3) "Discrimination Retaliation Based on Violation of Equal Pay Act;"

(4) "Discrimination Based on Sex;"

(5) "Age Discrimination in Employment Act;"

(6) "Retaliatory Discharge & Pendant State Claim;" and

(7) "Breach of Contract & Pendant State Claim."

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Review of Motion to Dismiss

In rendering a decision on a motion to dismiss, this Court must "accept all factual allegations as true [and] construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Only if "the '[f]actual allegations . . . raise a right to relief above the speculative level'" has the plaintiff stated a plausible claim. Id. at 234 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555(2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). However, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Id. (explaining that determining "whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense"). The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991)).

B. Title VII Sex Discrimination and Age Discrimination in Employment Act

Disparate treatment claims brought under Title VII and the ADEA are analyzed using the framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Rabinowitz v. AmeriGas Partners, L.P., 252 F. App'x 524, 527 (3d Cir. 2007). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must allege:

(1) He is a member of a protected class;

(2) He is otherwise qualified for the position at issue;

(3) He suffered an adverse employment action; and

(4) That adverse action occurred under circumstances that give rise to an inference of discrimination.

See Jones v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 796 F.3d 323, 327 (3d Cir. 2015); see also McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 792.

Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then "shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse employment decision." Fasoldv. Justice, 409 F.3d 178, 184 (3d Cir. 2005). "If the employer articulates one or more such reasons, the aggrieved employee must then proffer evidence that is sufficient to allow a reasonable finder of fact to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer's proffered reasons are false or pretextual." See id.

Notwithstanding, prior to filing a Title VII claim in district court, "a plaintiff must exhaust all required administrative remedies . . . ." See Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 1020 (3d Cir. 1997). "Title VII requires aggrieved persons to file a complaint with the EEOC 'within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.'" See Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 257 (1980) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)). Alternatively, where a plaintiff initiates proceedings for relief with a state or local agency, the "charge shall be filed . . . within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). A plaintiff's timely filing with the EEOC is a "prerequisite to maintaining an action in the district court." See Rogan v. Giant Eagle, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 777, 790 (W.D. Pa. 2000). In cases where denial of tenure is the alleged discriminatory act, the clock for filing with the appropriate agency begins to run when the decision to deny tenure was made and communicated to the plaintiff. See Ricks, 449 U.S. 258-59.

To state a claim for age discrimination, a plaintiff must allege:

(1) He is over forty;

(2) He is qualified for the position in question;

(3) He suffered from an adverse employment decision; and

(4) His replacement was sufficiently younger to permit a reasonable inference of age discrimination.

Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 247 (3d Cir. 2006). Alternatively, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of age discrimination by showing that younger employees were treated more favorably. See Steinagel v. Valley Oral Surgery, No. 12-cv-05645, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141146, at *19-20 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2013). Like Title VII claims, ADEA claims require that the aggrieved party file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 300 days after the alleged unlawful practice. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1)(B).⁴

C. Title VII Retaliation

To make out a prima facie case of Title VII retaliation, a plaintiff must allege:

(1) He "engaged in a protected activity;"

(2) "[A]dverse action by the employer either after or contemporaneous with the employees protected

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