Cunningham v. Com.

• Decision Date: 20 May 1986
• Docket Number: No. 0476-85,0476-85
• Citation: 344 S.E.2d 389,2 Va.App. 358
• Parties: Leroy CUNNINGHAM v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia Record
• Court: Virginia Court of Appeals

Page 389

344 S.E.2d 389

2 Va.App. 358

Leroy CUNNINGHAM v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia

Record No. 0476-85.

Court of Appeals of Virginia.

May 20, 1986.

Joseph W. Kaestner (Bell & Kaestner, Richmond, on brief), for appellant.

Russell Williams, Asst. Atty. Gen. (William G. Broaddus, Atty. Gen., on brief), for appellee.

Present: BENTON, DUFF and COLE, JJ.

COLE, Judge.

This appeal raises two issues: (1) whether the prosecutor's persistence in questioning a witness after he had invoked his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination denied appellant a fair trial; and (2) whether the trial court erred by unfairly examining defense witnesses. Finding no error, we affirm.

Upon his trial by jury, the appellant, Leroy Cunningham ("Cunningham"), was convicted of robbery, malicious wounding and use of a firearm in the commission of a crime. He received sentences of seventeen years in the state penitentiary.

The Commonwealth's evidence showed that on April 12, 1984, Horace Monroe, the sixty-two year old victim, was walking home from the grocery store when he noticed a man leave the Baker Street School playground and position himself on the sidewalk ahead of him. Monroe stated that he watched the man carefully as he passed within two feet of him on the sidewalk because of his peculiar behavior. Immediately after passing the man, Monroe testified that he heard a gunshot from behind him. As he turned instinctively to look back, a second shot pierced his right eye and passed through his nose. Monroe fell to his knees, and although he was bleeding from his right eye, he testified that he could see clearly through his left eye. Monroe stated that he again observed the face of his assailant who was now within six inches of him searching for Monroe's wallet. After a brief struggle, Monroe surrendered his wallet, containing fifty-two dollars in cash, and his assailant fled on foot to meet two other men. All three men ran from the area. Monroe could not identify the two other individuals, but he described the man who shot him as an 18 year old black male, having a medium dark complexion and a thin mustache, and wearing a blue gym suit with white stripes down the arm and leg. He later identified Cunningham as his assailant from a photographic spread and testified at trial that there was no question in his mind that Cunningham was the perpetrator.

I.

The Commonwealth called as a witness Leroy "Weasel" Clements who, according to the Commonwealth's theory of the case, was one of the two individuals who fled the area with Cunningham following the shooting. Clements, although not charged with any crime in connection with the shooting, was represented by counsel. As his defense, Cunningham attempted to show that Clements was actually the gunman who shot Monroe. On advice of counsel, Clements answered five preliminary questions. He then invoked the fifth amendment and refused to answer the following questions propounded by the Commonwealth:

Were you out on Baker Street School playground on April 12, 1984?

Did you shoot Horace Monroe?

Isn't it true, sir, that you, in fact, saw the shooting of Horace Monroe?

Did you and James Rome and this man, were you all involved in that shooting?

Isn't it true that you and James Rome and this man were all together, and he said he was going to go over and rob the little old man coming over the bridge; isn't that true?

Didn't you and James Rome run off after this man was shot?

On cross-examination, Clements continued to refuse to answer any questions. Counsel for Cunningham asked the court to direct Clements to answer his questions, but the court declined to do so. Cunningham's counsel asked the following questions, to which Clements pled the fifth amendment:

Do you recall telling Douglas Cunningham that you were the man who shot Horace Monroe?

Mr. Clements, do you recall meeting with James Rome on the evening of April 12, the date of the robbery?

Do you recall telling James Rome at that time that you were the man who shot Horace Monroe?

Do you recall meeting with the defendant on the sidewalk and James Rome at that time telling the defendant that you were the person who shot the old man?

Mr. Clements, if you were not involved in this, why would it incriminate you to tell this jury what you were doing and what you saw?

Cunningham contends that by continuing to question Clements after a fifth amendment privilege claim had been made, the prosecutor unfairly implanted his guilt in the minds of the jury, thereby prejudicing his defense. Cunningham contends that he was deprived of his constitutional right to confront the witness.

The fifth amendment does not provide a blanket right to refuse to answer any questions. Once a witness asserts his fifth amendment right, some investigative questioning must be allowed, for it is well settled that the "prosecutor need not accept at face value every asserted claim of privilege, no matter how frivolous." Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179, 188, 83 S.Ct. 1151, 1155, 10 L.Ed.2d 278 (1963). By its language, the fifth amendment privilege pertains only to situations where an individual is compelled to become "a witness against himself." The Constitution of Virginia likewise confers a right to a witness to be free from being compelled "to give evidence against himself." Va. Const., art. I, § 8.

The question whether the privilege is properly invoked is one for the trial court. As stated by the Supreme Court in Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 71 S.Ct. 814, 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951):

The witness is not exonerated from answering merely because he declares that in so doing he would incriminate himself--his say-so does not of itself establish the hazard of incrimination. It is for the court to say whether his silence is justified, ... and to require him to answer if 'it clearly appears to the court that he is mistaken.'

Id. at 486, 71 S.Ct. at 818 (citations omitted).

The Commonwealth's theory of the case was that Clements possessed nonprivileged information that could properly be used to corroborate its case. This theory was that Clements saw Cunningham shoot Monroe. The trial court acted correctly in allowing the prosecutor and Cunningham's counsel to attempt to elicit the nonprivileged information. In fact, it turned out that self-incrimination was not Clement's primary concern:

The Commonwealth: Isn't it true, sir, have you told me and your lawyer as well that the reason you are not testifying is because you are scared of his brother, not because you are afraid of incriminating yourself?

A: Yes.

Cunningham's counsel specifically requested during cross-examination that Clements be compelled to testify. The Commonwealth had already made the same request. At first the trial court refused, adding that it would consider later Clements' potential testimony in camera.

Upon completion of all the evidence the trial court invoked Code § 19.2-270, called Clements as a court witness, and ordered him to testify. Clements stated that Cunningham shot Monroe. Cunningham's counsel then conducted a vigorous and thorough cross-examination of Clements, unfettered by any claim of privilege. Cunningham's assertion that the trial court denied his right to effectively confront and cross-examine Clements is refuted by the record.

Code § 19.2-270 benefits both the witness-in-jeopardy and the accused by immunizing the witness. Benefit to the witness from use of immunity is manifest. The benefit to the accused lies in taking away the obstacle to confrontation posed by the witness' continued assertion of the fifth amendment privilege. A third, and equally important, benefit accrues to the truthfinding process. As the trial judge stated: "The reason behind this statute ... is obvious. There is a search for justice and we must have the truth." Since the error of which Cunningham complains only results where "inferences from a witness' refusal to answer added critical weight to the prosecution's case in a form not subject to cross-examination," Namet, 373 U.S. at 187, 83 S.Ct. at 1155, any such infirmity at Cunningham's trial was cured by his extensive cross-examination pursuant to Code § 19.2-270. After Clements was compelled to testify under the grant of immunity, the "critical weight" came not from Clements' earlier invocation of privilege, but rather from his testimony that he had seen Cunningham shoot Monroe.

Immunization of the witness to protect Cunningham, Clements and the Commonwealth distinguishes the case at bar from all the cases on which Cunningham relies to support his prosecutorial misconduct contention. Cf. Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179, 83 S.Ct. 1151, 10 L.Ed.2d 278 (1963); United States v. Mayes, 512 F.2d 637 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1008, 95 S.Ct. 2629, 45 L.Ed.2d 670 (1975); United States v. Maloney, 262 F.2d 535 (2d Cir.1959); State v. Corrales, 138 Ariz. 583, 676 P.2d 615 (1983); People v. Berg, 59 N.Y.2d 294, 464 N.Y.S.2d 703, 451 N.E.2d 450 (1983); People v. Malphurs, 111 App.Div.2d 266, 489 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1985); West v. State, 74 Wis.2d 390, 246 N.W.2d 675 (1976). Although no Virginia cases on point can be found, immunization has been held in other jurisdictions to cure any possible prejudice, because the defendant is enabled to cross-examine. See Annot., 19 A.L.R.4th 368, 416-418 (1983).

In sum, Cunningham's confrontation rights and Clements' rights against self-incrimination were adequately protected by the trial court. In addition, Clements' important testimony, which corroborated the victim's eyewitness account, was put before the jury. Cunningham has shown no error.

II.

Cunningham claims that the trial court unfairly projected itself into the examination of the defense witnesses. A review of the record discloses a number of specific complaints.

Cunningham claims that the trial court prevented him from establishing why the witness, Linda Diane Cunningham, remembered the clothing he was wearing at the time of the crime and in...