Cunningham v. Dist. of Columbia
| Decision Date | 20 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 16-CT-442,16-CT-442 |
| Citation | 235 A.3d 749 |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
| Parties | James CUNNINGHAM, Appellant, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellee. |
Christopher A. Zampogna, Washington, was on the brief for appellant.
Karl A. Racine, Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General at the time the brief was filed, Rosalyn Calbert Groce, Deputy Solicitor General, and John D. Martorana, Assistant Attorney General, were on the brief for appellee.
Before Glickman, Fisher, and Easterly, Associate Judges.
Appellant James Cunningham asserts that the Superior Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over this prosecution for making a false report to the Metropolitan Police Department ("MPD") because he made the report while located in Maryland. Appellant also argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm.
Appellant Cunningham was employed by the District of Columbia Department of Youth and Rehabilitative Services ("DYRS") and worked as a youth development specialist at the New Beginnings detention facility. Although located in Laurel, Maryland, New Beginnings houses juveniles from the District of Columbia who have been committed to a secure facility.
While working at New Beginnings on June 8, 2014, appellant was left alone with several youths after his partner went to use the bathroom. He noticed two youths engaged in "horseplay" in a room that was off-limits. Appellant claims that when he ordered them to leave the room, one of the youths became angry and threatened to "glass [him] up," or assault him. As appellant walked away and radioed for help, the youth allegedly struck appellant from behind, with a closed fist, on the right side of his head. Appellant claims the blow caused him to fall to the floor and lose consciousness.
Once other New Beginnings employees arrived, appellant told them what had happened and asked for someone to call the police. A coworker then called the MPD. Appellant was initially taken to Patient First and then later to Laurel Regional Hospital where he sought treatment for a head injury
.
Two MPD employees, Officer Bryant Tran and Detective Jeremy Bank, traveled from the District of Columbia to Laurel, Maryland, in response to the call from New Beginnings. Officer Tran spoke with appellant after he was taken to Patient First. Appellant told Officer Tran he was struck by the youth in the face and then fell to the floor unconscious.
Detective Bank interviewed appellant after appellant spoke with Officer Tran. Appellant told Detective Bank that the youth had threatened to "glass [him] up" and when appellant turned his back, the youth punched him in the head.1 At trial, both Officer Tran and Detective Bank testified that they stood close to appellant while he made his report. However, neither of them saw any visible injury or other indication that the youth had hit appellant in the head.
While at New Beginnings, Officer Tran and Detective Bank viewed surveillance video of the area in which appellant claimed he was assaulted. The video depicted events that were contrary to what appellant told the police. At trial, the court viewed the video and noted that it showed one of the youths touch appellant on the shoulder. Officer Tran and Detective Bank testified that appellant then "threw" himself to the floor and lay there as if unconscious. The video never showed the youth strike appellant on the head. Officer Tran and Detective Bank returned to the District of Columbia after interviewing appellant, taking notes, and viewing the surveillance video. The next day, Detective Bank interviewed the youth who allegedly struck appellant.
The government later filed a criminal information charging appellant with making a false or fictitious report to the MPD in violation of D.C. Code § 5-117.05.2 Before trial began, appellant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Because the allegedly false report and the assault itself both occurred in Maryland, appellant argued that the Superior Court of the District of Columbia lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his prosecution.
On the first day of trial, September 2, 2015, the trial court denied appellant's motion to dismiss. It determined that, regardless of where the facility was located, the alleged assault by the youth would be a matter reported to, or investigated by, the MPD. Magistrate Judge Wingo also noted that this case involved District of Columbia employees as well as a District facility that houses District youth. The effects of appellant's actions were felt in the District of Columbia and the only logical place to vindicate the District's interests was in the District's courts. Judge Wingo determined that appellant's case was analogous to Ford v. United States , 616 A.2d 1245 (D.C. 1992), a decision we will discuss later.
After the parties presented their evidence, which included testimony from Officer Tran, Detective Bank, and appellant, the trial court found there was no dispute that appellant made a report of assault to the MPD. The only questions were whether the report was false and whether appellant made the report knowing it was false. The trial court determined that an assault was not committed when the youth touched appellant's shoulder and, even if the touch was an assault, it was not the same conduct appellant reported to the MPD. After "scour[ing] that video over and over," the court found that there was "simply nothing in the video to suggest" appellant was ever punched in the head by the youth.3 The court found appellant guilty of making a false police report and sentenced him to pay a three-hundred-dollar fine.
On October 15, 2015, appellant filed a motion for review of the judgment, arguing for a second time that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that the evidence was insufficient. Judge Cushenberry found that the Superior Court had jurisdiction because appellant's act of reporting the incident to the MPD "demonstrate[d] that he knew at the time that MPD was clothed with the power to investigate the incident." Appellant's false report also wasted District resources and, "had the juvenile been charged with any crime resulting from this incident, he would have been prosecuted in the District of Columbia, not Maryland."
Judge Cushenberry also found that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support appellant's conviction "and the credibility judgments made by the trial court must remain undisturbed because they are not clearly erroneous." On April 18, 2016, he denied appellant's motion for review. Appellant filed a timely appeal.
"Subject matter jurisdiction concerns the court's authority to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the case under consideration." In re J.W ., 837 A.2d 40, 44 (D.C. 2003) (quoting In re R.L. , 590 A.2d 123, 128 (D.C. 1991) ). "Like all questions of law, [this court] review[s] questions concerning the trial court's jurisdiction de novo ." Id.
Appellant's jurisdictional attack rests on two arguments. First, he cites D.C. Code § 11-923(b)(1) (2012 Repl.), which states that "the Superior Court has jurisdiction of any criminal case under any law applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia." Appellant claims that this court has interpreted D.C. Code § 11-923(b)(1) to "limit [the Superior Court's] jurisdiction to criminal violations taking place within the boundaries of the District."
Second, appellant claims that the Superior Court's adjudication of his case violated his constitutional rights. Article III, Section 2, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he Trial of all Crimes ... shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed." The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution states that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a ... trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed." Appellant contends that these provisions of the Constitution were violated because he made the report to the MPD while in Maryland but was tried in the District of Columbia.
As interpreted by this court, D.C. Code § 11-923(b)(1) is "consistent with the requirements of [A]rticle III, [S]ection 2, [C]lause 3, and the [S]ixth [A]mendment to the United States Constitution that criminal offenses be prosecuted in the state or district in which they were committed." United States v. Baish , 460 A.2d 38, 40 (D.C. 1983). This court has determined that a crime is committed and may be tried where any "integral component[ ]" of the offense occurs. Id. at 40, 43. 4 Adair v. United States , 391 A.2d 288, 290 (D.C. 1978) (quoting State v. Ashe , 182 Wash. 598, 48 P.2d 213, 215 (1935) ).5
We reject appellant's arguments asserting a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In United States v. Baish , the government could not prove that the defendant was located within the District when she placed threatening telephone calls. 460 A.2d at 42–43. However, "both the utterance and the communication of the threatening language [were] integral components of the offense of making threats to do bodily harm." Id . at 43. "Proof that either component occurred within the District establishe[d] a basis for prosecution in the Superior Court." Id . This court determined that the Superior Court had jurisdiction because the threat was communicated by telephone to someone located within the District of Columbia. Id.
We further explored when a crime has been committed "within the District of Columbia" in Ford v. United States . 616 A.2d at 1251. In Ford , the appellant claimed...
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