Cunningham v. Hiles, No. 3-977A234

• Docket Nº: No. 3-977A234
• Citation: 402 N.E.2d 17
• Case Date: March 25, 1980
• Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana

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402 N.E.2d 17 James D. CUNNINGHAM, Fred M. Lutgen, Jr. and Ross Haller,
Appellants (Plaintiffs),
v.
Doug HILES, Al Gomez, Jr., Arthur C. and Sarah Clouser, Town
of Schererville Plan Commission and Town of
Schererville, Indiana, a Municipal
Corporation, Appellees (Defendants). No. 3-977A234. Court of Appeals of Indiana, Third District. March 25, 1980.

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William J. Muha, Daniel G. Hoebeke, Zandstra, Zandstra & Muha, Highland, for appellants.

Kenneth D. Reed, Abrahamson, Reed & Tanasijevich, Hammond, for Doug Hiles, Al Gomez, Jr., Arthur C. Clouser and Sarah Clouser.

Gilbert F. Blackmun, Leonard M. Holajter, Friedrich, Bomberger, Tweedle & Blackmun, Highland, for Town of Schererville Plan Commission and Town of Schererville, Indiana.

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

STATON, Judge.

Appellee Hiles has requested in his Petition for Rehearing that this Court "vacate and set aside" its disposition of Cunningham's appeal on the basis that a material change in circumstances has rendered the appeal moot. Our opinion, which appears at Cunningham v. Hiles (1979), Ind.App., 395 N.E.2d 851, is concluded with the directive that the Lake County Circuit Court grant a permanent injunction against the construction of the music store proposed by Hiles. Via the information and contentions contained in Hiles' Petition for Rehearing, this Court has for the first time been informed that during the pendency of this appeal, construction of the music store was completed. It is consequently necessary that this Court modify its previous order. Hiles' Petition for Rehearing, however, is in all respects denied. We briefly summarize the chain of events which necessitates our action here.

In 1976, Hiles obtained approval from Schererville, Indiana, zoning authorities to construct a music store on a tract located in a subdivision known as "Lincoln Knolls Estates." The nature of the subdivision's growth, since its inception in 1953, has been governed by a restrictive covenant, which limits the development of lots located therein to residential use.

Cunningham, as well as various other residents of the subdivision (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Homeowners" ¹, filed suit against Hiles seeking to permanently enjoin his construction of the music store. In the trial court, they contended that the construction of the music store would violate the covenant restricting the use of lots within Lincoln Knolls Estates to residential purposes. ² The trial court found that the restrictive covenant was unenforceable and denied Homeowners' request for a permanent injunction.

Homeowners then perfected this appeal. Based on our analysis of the evidence, there was substantial evidence to

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support the trial court's findings regarding changes which had occurred within and around Lincoln Knolls Estates since 1953; we reversed the trial court's determination that the restrictive covenant was unenforceable. This Court found that the changes which had occurred within and around Lincoln Knolls Estates were not so "radical in nature" to have defeated the purpose of the covenant to maintain the residential character of the subdivision and preserve the value of the homes in the residential market. Cunningham v. Hiles, supra, at 854-56, relying on Bob Layne Contractor, Inc. v. Buennagel (1973), 158 Ind.App. 43, 301 N.E.2d 671. Accordingly, we remanded the cause to the trial court with the directive that it should "grant Homeowners' prayer for a permanent injunction against the proposed construction of the music store." ³ Cunningham v. Hiles, supra.

Appellee Hiles then filed his Petition for Rehearing wherein this Court was first placed on notice of the fact that during the pendency of the appeal, the music store had been constructed. Hiles' Petition for Rehearing reads in pertinent part:

"In the meanwhile, the Defendants-Appellees constructed the music store, and it is in existence today. It is respectfully submitted that the appeal became moot prior to the Court's decision in this case. Perhaps one or more of the parties should have called this fact to the attention of the Court of Appeals via a motion to dismiss. However, there does not appear to be any provision in the Appellate Rules for doing that once the briefs are filed, and the record will show that the only other opportunity would have been at oral argument, and the Court denied oral argument by order entered contemporaneously with the decision and opinion in the case. . . ."

We agree that during the pendency of the appeal, the parties should have informed this Court of the fact that the music store had been constructed. We reject outright, however, Hiles' suggestion that he was precluded from informing this Court of the existence of the music store by our denial of Homeowners' request for oral argument.

In fact, our Supreme Court has vigorously emphasized that oral argument is not the appropriate vehicle by which to inform an appellate tribunal of post-judgment events which may affect the outcome of a pending appeal. Snider v. Mt. Vernon Hancock School Bldg. Corp. (1968), 250 Ind. 10, 234 N.E.2d 632, 634. Such an exercise, the Court explained in Snider, would constitute a wasteful expenditure of this Court's most precious commodity time. For this reason, parties have a duty "to place such matters before this Court by proper petitions, motions, or challenges by verified (pleadings)." Id. Among the "petitions, motions, or challenges by verified pleadings" available, a "Motion to Dismiss the Appeal" is one often-used avenue by which to inform an appellate tribunal of a post-judgment change in circumstances which might render a pending appeal moot. Gierhart v. State (1962), 243 Ind. 553, 186 N.E.2d 680; Miller v. Kankakee & Pine Creek Drainage Ass'n (1953), 232 Ind. 412, 112 N.E.2d 852; Fox v. Holman (1933), 95 Ind.App. 598, 184 N.E. 194; Bloom v. Town of Albion (1932), 96 Ind.App. 229, 183 N.E. 325; Johnson v. Paris (1922), 78 Ind.App. 110, 134 N.E. 880; Wiebke v. City of Fort Wayne (1917), 64 Ind.App. 38, 115 N.E. 355.

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On the other hand, it is a basic...