Cunningham v. Lawrence
| Citation | 16 Ill.2d 201,157 N.E.2d 50 |
| Decision Date | 20 March 1959 |
| Docket Number | No. 35021,35021 |
| Parties | Luetha CUNNINGHAM, Trustee, Appellee, v. George W. LAWRENCE, Appellant. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Bernard M. Kaplan and Philip R. Davis, Chicago, for appellant.
Charles Leviton & Jerome H. Leviton & Keane, Lancaster, Keane, Gomberg, & Bolton, Chicago, for appellee.
This is an appeal from a decree of the superior court of Cook County sustaining plaintiff's motion to strike defendant's second amended answer and counterclaim and entering judgment on the pleadings in favor of the plaintiff. A freehold is involved.
The defendant, George W. Lawrence, entered into a written property settlement agreement with his wife, Pauline. The agreement, in addition to settling matters concerning ownership of household goods, responsibility for a mortgage, expenses and incidental matters, provided that in the event the court granted the wife a divorce, an improved property at 383-38 South Parkway in Chicago, including household goods, would be conveyed to the husband, and a three-story, six-apartment building at 6019-21 South Parkway and a three-story, three-apartment building at 424 East Forty-sixth Street, including household goods, would be conveyed to the wife; that the parties would sign necessary papers to effectuate the agreement; that all the conveyances were to be deposited in escrow and, upon entry of any decree of divorce, delivered to the respective parties. The agreement further provided that the conveyances were in lieu of all rights either party had against the other; that eash party waived and was divested of all rights in the property of the other and the wife waived and was divested of all rights to alimony; and that the agreement was to be made a part of any decree for divorce entered in favor of the wife. On the date of the agreement all of the property stood in the joint names of the parties.
In conjunction with the execution of this agreement, each party signed a quitclaim deed conveying the respective property to the other party but the deeds were neither dated nor acknowledged. The deed signed by the defendant in favor of his wife described an entire block of real estate which included the 6019-21 South Parkway property as well as 45 lots not included in their agreement. The two deeds were deposited in escrow under a written agreement requiring the escrowee to retain the deeds until advised in writing that the divorce decree had been entered, and the escrowee was then charged with delivering the deeds to the respective grantees.
Subsequently, the wife obtained a divorce from the defendant by a decree entered on October 5, 1951. The decree found the defendant guilty of desertion, that the parties had settled their property rights and that each was to convey the respective property agreed upon to the other; that each party was to sign any and all documents necessary to effectuate the provisions of the decree. It further ordered that the conveyances deposited with the escrowee were to be delivered upon the entry of the decree; that each party was to bear their own expenses and costs; that each was to have the household goods mentioned in the property settlement and that the defendant was to vacate the apartment he held at 6019-21 South Parkway. It also barred the wife from claiming and alimony and barred each party from any interest in the property of the other.
The escrowee was never advised in writing to deliver the deeds deposited under the escrow agreement and they were retained by the escrowee until after the filing of the present action.
On November 17, 1956, Pauline Lawrence died intestate. Plaintiff herein was subsequently appointed administrator of her estate and Prince C. Hugger was found to be the sole heir of the decedent. On January 21, 1957, Hugger conveyed the 6019-21 South Parkway and 424 East Forty-sixth Street properties to the plaintiff, as trustee under a trust agreement naming himself as a beneficiary thereof.
On February 4, 1957, the plaintiff filed a verified complaint in chancery alleging the facts related above; that the defendant was claiming title to the 6019-21 South Parkway and 424 East Forty-sixth Street properties and was collecting, through his agents, the rents and profits therefrom; that written notice of the entry of the decree had not been given to the entry of the decree required by the property settlement agreement but such notice was formal in nature and was not required by the divorce decree; that the divorce decree was final and binding upon the parties thereto and that the plaintiff should be declared the owner of the property in question. The complaint concluded with a prayer for a decree finding the plaintiff to be the owner of the property and asks for an accounting of rents and for an injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the property. The decree of divorce, and the property settlement and escrow agreement were attached as exhibits. By amendment, the plaintiff added the prayer that the court order the escrowee to deliver to the plaintiff the quitclaim deed executed by the defendant in favor of his former wife.
The escrowee was permitted to intervene and deposit the deeds with the clerk of the court who was ordered to hold them pending final determination of this cause.
Defendant's answer, in substance, claims that, since the deeds were never in fact physically handed over to the respective grantees by the escrowee, the defendant and his former wife remained owners as joint tenants of the 6019-21 South Parkway property and at her death he became sole owner by right of survivorship. His answer admits the property settlement and escrow agreements and the execution of the deeds pursuant thereto but avers that the deed executed by him was not the deed contemplated by the agreement in that it contained other property than that which was agreed upon; that the secrow agreement was never completed; and that no notice of the entry of the divorce decree nor a demand for delivery of the deeds was given to the secrowee. The answer also admits that the decree for divorce is final and binding but asserts that the parties waived the provisions of the decree requiring performance of any acts by the parties thereto; that they rescinded and abandoned...
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Sondin v. Bernstein
...death. Each party has been entitled to enforce the agreement at all times since the entry of the judgment. (See Cunningham v. Lawrence (1959), 16 Ill.2d 201, 157 N.E.2d 50.) The language of the agreement unambiguously stated that "in the event of the sale ... the parties share equally in an......
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Midwest Bank & Trust Co. v. Roderick
...paid more than his share of the joint indebtedness or would be liable to the original plaintiff for the debt. (Cunningham v. Lawrence (1959), 16 Ill.2d 201, 157 N.E.2d 50; see also, Roberts v. Heilgeist (1984), 124 Ill.App.3d 1082, 80 Ill.Dec. 546, 465 N.E.2d 658.) Thus, even if we were to ......
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Estate of Bresler, Matter of
...N.E.2d 1173; In re Marriage of Dowty (1986), 146 Ill.App.3d 675, 678-79, 100 Ill.Dec. 187, 496 N.E.2d 1252; see Cunningham v. Lawrence (1959), 16 Ill.2d 201, 207, 157 N.E.2d 50.) Clear and unambiguous contract terms must be given their ordinary and natural meaning (Susmano v. Associated Int......
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Coleman's Estate, Matter of
...volition, and each of them have been entitled to its enforcement at all times since the entry of the decree. (See Cunningham v. Lawrence (1959), 16 Ill.2d 201, 157 N.E.2d 50; see also Vinci v. Vinci (1970), 131 Ill.App.2d 496, 266 N.E.2d 379.) Thus the property settlement agreement defined ......