Cunningham v. Smith, 32787.

CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Kansas
Writing for the CourtHARVEY, Justice.
Citation143 Kan. 267,53 P.2d 870
PartiesCUNNINGHAM v. SMITH et al., Board of County Com'rs.
Docket Number32787.
Decision Date25 January 1936

53 P.2d 870

143 Kan. 267

CUNNINGHAM
v.
SMITH et al., Board of County Com'rs.

No. 32787.

Supreme Court of Kansas

January 25, 1936


[53 P.2d 871]

Syllabus by the Court.

Act respecting fees and salaries of county officers and employees held not unconstitutional because it did not specifically repeal previous existing sections of statute relating to fees and salaries, where act was temporary measure and its purpose was temporarily to supersede general statute and not to repeal it (Laws 1933, c. 186; Const. art. 2, § 16).

Chapter 186, Laws 1933, is not invalid on the ground that it violates article 2, section 16, of our Constitution.

Appeal from District Court, Reno County; J. G. Somers, Judge.

Action by Ed. Cunningham against Harry Smith and others, comprising the Board of County Commissioners of Reno County. From an order overruling a demurrer to the petition, defendants appeal.

Reversed, with directions.

Wesley E. Brown, and J. Richards Hunter, both of Hutchinson, for appellants.

Eustace Smith, J. N. Tincher, Clyde Raleigh, and Leaford F. Cushenbery, all of Hutchinson, for appellee.

HARVEY, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order overruling defendants' demurrer to plaintiff's petition. The question involved is the constitutionality of chapter 186 of the Laws 1933. The title and first two sections of this statute read as follows:

"An Act relating to fees and salaries of certain county officers, employees and other persons therein named, for the time, term and emergency herein provided
"Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Kansas:
"Section 1. In lieu of the fees and/or salaries heretofore paid certain county officers and employees during the period commencing April first, 1933, and ending March thirty-first, 1935, there shall be paid to or collected by said officers and employees, the fees and/or salaries set forth and provided for in this act.
"Sec. 2. That all officers herein mentioned in all counties of this state shall receive for their services the compensation herein allowed, and no other fees, mileage, salaries, commissions, perquisites, costs or other things of value of any kind or nature whatsoever unless specifically allowed them by the terms of this act."

These are followed by a number of sections fixing the fees and salaries of county officers, the amount they shall be allowed for deputy hire, and, with respect to sheriffs, the amount they shall charge for the services required by law to be performed by them, and the mileage to be charged by them in the performance of their duty. The act does not purport to amend or repeal prior existing statutes with respect to the fees and salaries of county officers and the amounts to be charged by them for their services. Generally speaking, it reduced the compensation of county officers for the time the act was to be in effect from that provided by the general statutes (R.S. 28--101 et seq., as amended) relating to fees and salaries.

Plaintiff alleged that he was sheriff of Reno county, Kan.; that his salary under the general statutes relating to fees and salaries at the time of the enactment of chapter 186, Laws 1933, was at the rate of $3,499.92 per year, and that he was entitled to mileage at the rate of 10 cents per mile; that for the months of April to December, 1933, defendants refused to pay him salary at that rate, but paid him at the rate of $2,800 per year, and for his mileage at the rate of 5 cents per mile, as provided in chapter 186, Laws 1933; that chapter 188, Laws 1933, is void as being in violation (1) of article 1, section 10, of the Constitution of the United States; (2) of article 15, section 7, of our State Constitution; (3) of article 2, section 14, of our Constitution; and (4) of article 2, section 16, of our Constitution. He sued for $524.94, being the difference in salary under the two statutes for the months from April to December, 1933, and for an additional sum for the difference in mileage.

Defendants demurred to the petition on the ground and for the reason that it does not state facts sufficient to state a cause of action. The trial court overruled the demurrer upon the sole ground that chapter 186, Laws 1933, is in violation of article 2, section 16, of our Constitution.

We shall speak of the parties as they appeared in the trial court. In this court plaintiff does not contend the statute in question should be held void as being in violation of article 1, section 10, of the Federal Constitution, or of article 7, section 15, or of article 2, section 14, of our State Constitution; hence these contentions originally made by plaintiff may be regarded as having been abandoned. Indeed, it is at least tentatively conceded by plaintiff that his original contentions on these points previously have been decided adversely to him. Plaintiff argues, however, that the trial court correctly held the statute to be in violation of article 2, section 16, of our Constitution, which, so far as here pertinent, reads as follows: "And no law shall be revived or amended, unless the new act contain the entire act revived or the section or sections amended, and the section or sections so amended shall be repealed."

It is argued that, since the act in question does not specifically repeal previous existing sections of the statute relating to [53 P.2d 872] fees and salaries, it fails to comply with the above-quoted section of our Constitution, and is therefore invalid. The point is not well taken. Statutes may be repealed by...

To continue reading

Request your trial
5 practice notes
  • Brown v. State Election Bd., No. 39930
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Oklahoma
    • February 13, 1962
    ...when its effectiveness will cease. It may provide a specific date, event, or circumstance for its termination. In Cunningham v. Smith, 143 Kan. 267, 53 P.2d 870, it is 'The time a statute is in force may be limited at the time it is enacted by fixing a date, event, or circumstance for its t......
  • Regulation & Licensing Dep't v. Lujan, 19-318
    • United States
    • New Mexico Court of Appeals of New Mexico
    • March 17, 1999
    ...force and effect as any other law and was intended to suspend but not repeal any contrary statutory sections. See Cunningham v. Smith, 53 P.2d 870, 872 (Kan. 1936); State ex rel. Prater v. State Bd. of Finance, 59 N.M. 121, 124-25, 279 P.2d 1042, 1044 (1955). This Executive Order has not ye......
  • Foster v. Board of Com'rs of Harper County, 32619.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Kansas
    • March 7, 1936
    ...have been repeatedly constrained to do in recent years. In the recent case of Cunningham v. Smith et al., Commissioners of Reno County, 143 Kan. 267, 53 P.2d 870, 873, where the constitutionality of this identical fee and salary act was challenged, this court said: "At the time of the meeti......
  • State ex rel. Carmean v. Board of Ed. of Hardin County, No. 36141
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Ohio
    • March 23, 1960
    ...Law Dict., (Rawle's Third Revision, p. 2887) as 'the abrogation or destruction of a law by a legislative act.' In Cunningham v. Smith, 143 Kan. 267, 53 P.2d 870, 873, the court said that 'when an act expires by its own limitations, the effect is the same as though it had been repealed at th......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
5 cases
  • Brown v. State Election Bd., No. 39930
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Oklahoma
    • February 13, 1962
    ...when its effectiveness will cease. It may provide a specific date, event, or circumstance for its termination. In Cunningham v. Smith, 143 Kan. 267, 53 P.2d 870, it is 'The time a statute is in force may be limited at the time it is enacted by fixing a date, event, or circumstance for its t......
  • Regulation & Licensing Dep't v. Lujan, 19-318
    • United States
    • New Mexico Court of Appeals of New Mexico
    • March 17, 1999
    ...force and effect as any other law and was intended to suspend but not repeal any contrary statutory sections. See Cunningham v. Smith, 53 P.2d 870, 872 (Kan. 1936); State ex rel. Prater v. State Bd. of Finance, 59 N.M. 121, 124-25, 279 P.2d 1042, 1044 (1955). This Executive Order has not ye......
  • Foster v. Board of Com'rs of Harper County, 32619.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Kansas
    • March 7, 1936
    ...have been repeatedly constrained to do in recent years. In the recent case of Cunningham v. Smith et al., Commissioners of Reno County, 143 Kan. 267, 53 P.2d 870, 873, where the constitutionality of this identical fee and salary act was challenged, this court said: "At the time of the meeti......
  • State ex rel. Carmean v. Board of Ed. of Hardin County, No. 36141
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Ohio
    • March 23, 1960
    ...Law Dict., (Rawle's Third Revision, p. 2887) as 'the abrogation or destruction of a law by a legislative act.' In Cunningham v. Smith, 143 Kan. 267, 53 P.2d 870, 873, the court said that 'when an act expires by its own limitations, the effect is the same as though it had been repealed at th......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT