Cunnius v. Reading School Dist.

• Decision Date: 09 July 1903
• Docket Number: 351
• Citation: 206 Pa. 469,56 A. 16
• Parties: Cunnius v. Reading School District, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

56 A. 16

206 Pa. 469

Cunnius v. Reading School District, Appellant

No. 351

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

July 9, 1903

Argued March 2, 1903

Appeal, No. 351, Jan. T., 1902, by defendant, from judgment of Superior Court, Oct. T., 1901, No. 48, affirming judgment of C.P. Berks Co., Aug. T., 1899, No. 64, in case of Margaret Cunnius, now Margaret Smith, v, Reading School District. Reversed.

Appeal from Superior Court.

The facts appear by the opinion of the Supreme Court and by the report of the case, 21 Pa.Super. 340.

Error assigned was the judgment of the Superior Court.

Judgment reversed and record remitted to the court of common pleas with directions to enter judgment for the defendant non obstante veredicto.

Frederick W. Nicolls, for appellant.

Caleb J. Bieber, for appellee.

Before MITCHELL, DEAN, BROWN, MESTREZAT and POTTER, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE MITCHELL,:

The regulation of the title and devolution of property within its limits is within the control and jurisdiction of the state.

The rules of evidence for the judicial ascertainment of facts in its courts, and as a corollary, the establishment of legal presumptions, are also within the control and jurisdiction of the state.

Bearing these two axioms in mind let us examine the act of 1885 which is involved in the present case. It provides that whenever application shall be made for letters of administration on the estate of any person supposed to be dead on account of absence for seven or more years, the register of wills shall certify the application to the orphans' court, and that court, if satisfied that the applicant would be entitled to such letters were the supposed decedent in fact dead, shall cause advertisement to be made of the application, and on the day fixed shall "hear evidence concerning the alleged absence of the supposed decedent, and the circumstances and duration thereof." If upon such hearing the court shall be satisfied that the legal presumption of death is made out it shall so decree, and forthwith cause notice to be published in a newspaper of the proper county "and also when practicable in a newspaper published at or near the place beyond the commonwealth where when last heard from, the supposed decedent had his residence." At the end of twelve weeks from the last insertion of this notice, if no contrary evidence be forthcoming, the court may order the register to issue the letters of administration "and the said letters until revoked, and all acts done in pursuance thereof, and in reliance thereupon, shall be as valid as if the supposed decedent were really dead." It is further provided that the Orphans' Court may at any time revoke the letters on proof that the supposed decedent is in fact alive, whereupon the administrator shall file his account and turn over the property to the owner, who may also recover any moneys or property received by any person as widow, or next of kin, or heir. And for protection of the owner as to such persons it is required that no distribution shall be made to them until security is given approved by the court, for refunding with interest in case the supposed decedent shall in fact be alive, and in case of inability to give such security the money shall be invested under the control of the court, and the interest only paid to the distributee. Section 6 cotains provisions as to suits by or against the administrator, and the substitution of the supposed decedent after revocation of the letters. This section will be referred to later on.

From this summary it appears that the act establishes a system, carefully wrought out with due regard to all rights involved, for the administration of estates or property whose owner is legally presumed to be dead, but whose death cannot at the time be proved with absolute certainty. It is a wise and just statute of sequestration and conservation of property which is without a known owner, whether the late owner has abandoned it (as in the present case) or the title has devolved upon others by his death, not being presently ascertainable. The statute steps in to provide a caretaker and to vest the present benefit in those who appear to be the owners, with as complete provision as is practicable for the re-establishment of the rights and possession of the absentee on his reappearance. That the state must have some such power is manifest. The property is within its jurisdiction and under its protection. It is not in the interests of order or good government that property should lie ownerless or open to conflicting claims. If the absentee be really dead it is conceded that the proceeding is unimpeachable. But if he be dead, so far as can be learned, though death be not absolutely proved, yet the effect to the state is the same, there is property in its charge without a recognized owner. It must have power to meet such a case or one of its chief functions as a government must go unperformed.

The consequences of a different view are too serious to be disregarded. If an intruder enters on land of the absentee and holds open and hostile possession for twenty-one years, the absentee's title will be gone. So as to personal property of which another holds or acquires wrongful possession for six years. And in the meantime how is the heir or the next of kin, who so far as can be known is the real owner, to assert his right or prevent his title from slipping away before his eyes, unless he may rely upon the presumption? Unless the state can appoint a representative of the unknown owner, whether called administrator, curator or other name is immaterial, such owner's interests must go unprotected. And in appointing such representative the state must be allowed to act upon the presumption, for that is all that can be had in the case. Unless the statute in giving such authority clearly violates rights or transgresses constitutional restrictions, it is our duty to sustain it.

The Superior Court held the act unconstitutional as depriving plaintiff of her property without due process of law, under the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States. In so holding the court felt itself bound by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Scott v. McNeal, 154 U.S. 34. ^[*] If that case really governs the present we must, of course, render willing obedience to its supreme authority. But we do not so regard it. The exact point there decided was that a sale by an administrator appointed under a state law for a person who had been absent, unheard of, for seven years, but who was in fact alive, passed no title even to an innocent purchaser. The ground of the decision was that the probate court had no jurisdiction to appoint an administrator for a person who was alive, and there being no jurisdiction over the subject-matter, the appointment of an administrator and all the acts done under such appointment were void. This is in entire accord with our own decision in Devlin v. Commonwealth, 101 Pa. 273, which is cited approvingly by Mr. Justice GRAY in his opinion. "The estate of a person supposed to be dead is not seized or taken into custody of the court of probate upon the filing of a petition for administration, but only after and under the order granting that petition; and the adjudication of that court is not upon the question whether he be living or dead, but only upon the question whether and to whom letters of administration shall issue. The local law on the subject . . . does not appear to us to warrant the conclusion that the probate court is authorized to conclusively decide, as against a living person, that he is dead, and his estate, therefore, subject to be administered and disposed of by the probate court. On the contrary, that law, in its very terms, appears to us to recognize and assume the death of the owner to be a fundamental condition and prerequisite to the exercise by the probate court of jurisdiction to grant letters testamentary or of administration upon his estate." Id. p. 47. "Under such a statute, according to the overwhelming weight of authority as shown by the cases cited in the earlier part of this opinion, the jurisdiction of the court to which is committed the control and management of the estates of deceased persons, by whatever name it is called, ecclesiastical court, probate court, orphans' court, or court of the ordinary or surrogate, does not exist or take effect before death. All proceedings of such courts in the probate of wills and the granting of administrations depend upon the fact that he is dead, and are null and void if he is alive:" Id. 48. The cases referred to in this extract are numerous, but are founded on the same view that the essential jurisdictional fact for the action of the probate court is the death of the party whose estate is in question. This, as already said, is in exact conformity with our own case of Devlin v. Commonwealth, and with it we have no question.

But our act of 1885 is wholly different in intent and effect. It was passed less than three years after the decision in Devlin v Commonwealth and is an effort to supply the remedy that such a state of facts as the present requires. Its primary purpose as appears from the preceding summary of its provisions, is not distribution, but conservation of the estate, through the medium of an officer clothed with authority to protect and enforce the rights of the unknown owner, the absentee if alive, his legal successors if he be dead. The statute did not create the presumption of...