Cupit v. Grant

• Decision Date: 14 May 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-494,85-494
• Citation: 488 So.2d 358
• Parties: Daniel CUPIT, Sr., et al, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Louis Neal GRANT, et al, Defendants-Appellees. 488 So.2d 358
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

Page 358

488 So.2d 358

Daniel CUPIT, Sr., et al, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Louis Neal GRANT, et al, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 85-494.

488 So.2d 358

Court of Appeal of Louisiana Third Circuit.

May 14, 1986.

Broussard, Bolton & Halcomb, Roy S. Halcomb, Jr., Alexandria, for plaintiff-appellant.

Charles S. Norris, Jr., Jonesville, Davenport, Files & Kelly, Thomas W. Davenport, Jr., Monroe, for defendant-appellee.

Before DOMENGEAUX and YELVERTON, JJ., and JACKSON, J. Pro Tem. ^*

ROBERT P. JACKSON, Judge Pro Tem.

This appeal arises out of an automobile accident that occurred on June 21, 1976. A pick-up truck operated by Louis Neal Grant collided head-on with an automobile driven by Edward L. Youngblood. Two of the passengers in Youngblood's car were Terry Dale Cupit, a minor, and his mother, Charlotte Ann Buckles Youngblood. Terry Dale Cupit was injured and his mother killed. Daniel Cupit, Sr., individually and as provisional tutor of the three minor children, Daniel Cupit, Terry Dale Cupit and Sherry Gayle Cupit, filed suit. Recovery is sought for the general and specific damages sustained by Terry Dale and also for the wrongful death of the mother of the three minor Cupit Children.

Made defendants in this suit are Louis Neal Grant, Louisiana Delta Plantation, Morrison Grain Company, Inc. and Morrison-Quirk Grain Corporation. The Aetna Casualty and Surety Company and Edward Youngblood, Sr. Louisiana Delta, Morrison Grain and Morrison-Quirk are alleged employers of Grant and/or engaged in a joint venture with Grant. Aetna was sued as the insurer of all the above defendants except for Edward Youngblood.

The case was initially tried in March, 1982 before a twelve (12) man jury. Morrison Grain Company, Inc., Morrison-Quirk Grain Corporation, Louisiana Delta Plantation and The Aetna Casualty and Surety Company were granted a directed verdict. The trial judge held that an employment relationship did not exist between these three defendants and Grant. The jury found Grant liable for plaintiffs' injuries and returned a verdict of $300,000.00 for the general damages suffered by Terry Dale Cupit and of $15,000.00 per child for the wrongful death of their mother. The parties stipulated to Terry Dale's medical damages.

Plaintiffs appealed the amount of the awards and the directed verdict. This Court ruled on December 22, 1982 that granting the directed verdict was error and increased the award of $15,000.00 per child to $30,000 for the wrongful death of their mother. Cupit v. Grant, et al, 425 So.2d 847 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1982).

The case was then remanded to the trial court for a new trial between plaintiffs and Louisiana Delta, Morrison Grain, Morrison-Quirk and Aetna as defendants. The trial court, by granting a Motion in Limine filed by defendants, restricted the new trial to the issues of insurance coverage and the legal relationship between defendants and Louis Neal Grant. Plaintiffs waived their right to trial by jury. The trial judge ruled in favor of defendants holding that the relationship between Grant and defendants, Louisiana Delta, Morrison Grain, and Morrison-Quirk, was one of lessee--lessor, not of employment. If there is no employment relationship, then the issue of insurance coverage is not reached. Judgment was signed January 25, 1985, which judgment is now appealed.

A personal injury suit was also brought by plaintiffs in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana. Aetna Casualty was not named as defendant. In that action, defendants Morrison Grain and Morrison-Quirk, d/b/a Louisiana Delta Plantation, moved for Summary Judgment as to the employment relationship. That motion was granted, the Federal District Court finding that the relationship was one of lessor--lessee, not employer--employee. See Youngblood v. Morrison Grain Company, Inc., 467 F.Supp. 758 (1978). The Fifth Circuit upheld. Youngblood v. Morrison Grain Company, 591 F.2d 1207 (1979). An Exception of Res Judicata in the case at bar was denied on the basis that a named defendant in the State suit, Aetna Casualty, was not so named in the Federal action.

The issue here, therefore, is one encountered at least twice in prior judicial rulings. Was Grant at the time of the accident an employee of Morrison Grain Company and Morrison-Quirk Grain Corporation, d/b/a Louisiana Delta Plantation, so as to render these three defendants vicariously liable for the injuries suffered by plaintiffs? This Court finds that there was no such relationship.

In an excellent opinion Judge Tom Stagg of the United States Western District of Louisiana addressed the employment issue and ruled against plaintiffs in Youngblood, supra:

"Defendant Louis Neal Grant farms a large tract of land in Catahoula Parish leased from Louisiana Delta Plantation (Delta), a joint venture between defendants Morrison Grain Company, Inc. and Morrison-Quirk Grain Corporation. While running errands related to his farming operation in June 1976, Grant's pickup truck collided with an oncoming car. Plaintiffs represent the occupants of the oncoming car killed or injured in the collision.

"This action is presently before the court on the motion of the defendant corporations for summary judgment on the ground that they are not legally responsible for the torts of Grant, their lessee. Finding that the doctrine of respondeat superior in Louisiana is based on the right to control the conduct of the tortfeasor, and that the defendant corporations lacked any such right with respect to Grant, the motion for summary judgment must be GRANTED.

Is there a genuine issue as to any material fact?

"Plaintiffs contend that summary judgment is inappropriate because there is a dispute over whether Grant was an employee or a mere lessee. Plaintiffs misconceive the function of summary judgment. If there is no dispute as to the factual attributes of the relationship between Grant and the defendant corporations, or at least as to the material attributes, then the fact that the parties disagree over the legal effect of these attributes does not require a trial.

"Plaintiffs correctly maintain that the key to determining whether one party to a relationship is an employee is the extent of the other party's right to control the conduct of the first. Hickman v. Southern Pacific Transport Company, 262 La. 102, 262 So.2d 385, 391 (1972). In this case, unlike most business relationships, the entirety of defendants' right to control Grant's conduct is evidenced by a writing-the lease executed between Grant and Louisiana Delta Plantation on January 1, 1976. It is undisputed that the right to control contained in the lease is greater than the control actually exercised by defendants. Thus, the lease presents the facts in the light most favorable to the parties opposing the motion.

"The lease recites in detail numerous farming practices which Grant must carry out. Should he fail to comply, the lessor reserves the right to enter the premises and take the necessary steps at Grant's expense. Although the lease allows Grant to farm other Land, ¹ it requires him to segregate the crops of the other lands and their proceeds.

"The provision in the lease that is most important here is paragraph 16:

"Lessor retains full supervision and control of the manner and time for plowing, planting, cultivation, fertilizing, poisoning and harvesting of all crops grown, and the failure of Lessee to properly control noxious weeds or to submit to Lessor's supervision and control of the crops grown shall ipso facto terminate this lease and relieve Lessor of any responsibility or liability to Lessee.

It is agreed and understood that nothing contained herein shall have the effect of making lessee an agent or employee of Lessor and nothing herein shall be interpreted to permit Lessor to supervise either Lessee's employees, servants or Lessee in respect to the time and manner in which Lessee's machinery or labor is operated or their duties performed.'

"The lessor has the right to complete control over the selection of farming practices but no right to control the time or physical conduct of those who implement these practices. The lease gives the lessor no control whatsoever over Grant himself. He could fulfill all the terms of the contract without ever setting foot in Louisiana. In fact, Grant did employ others to farm Delta's land, while devoting an indeterminate amount of time to farming land belonging to himself and others.

"While the depositions and answers to interrogatories might be construed to present a question as to the extent of control over Grant actually exercised by the defendants, they raise no questions concerning the right to control. Accordingly, the court must proceed to the second state of the inquiry.

Are defendants entitled to judgment as a matter of law?

"No...