Curd v. City Court of Judsonia, Arkansas
Decision Date | 06 April 1998 |
Docket Number | No. 97-2858,97-2858 |
Citation | 141 F.3d 839 |
Parties | Shirley CURD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY COURT OF JUDSONIA, ARKANSAS; Don Raney, Honorable Judsonia City Judge; Judsonia Police Department, Defendants, Jess Odom, White County Sheriff; City of Judsonia, Arkansas; Defendants-Appellees, State of Arkansas; City of Searcy, Arkansas, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Shirley Curd, Plaintiff-Appellant argued pro se.
David C. Schoen, North Little Rock, AR, argued (Jeanette Denham, North Little Rock, AR, Robert A. Russell, Little Rock, AR, on the brief), for Defendants-Appellees.
Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judge and SACHS, 1 District Judge.
Shirley Curd brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the City of Judsonia, Arkansas ("the City"), and White County, Arkansas, Sheriff Jess Odom. 2 Curd sought damages for alleged excessive force in effecting her arrest, unreasonable search and seizure of fingerprint evidence during the booking process, and unreasonable search of her purse at the station house following her arrest. The district court 3 granted summary judgment in favor of defendants and Curd appeals. We affirm.
Armed with an arrest warrant, City police officers Bobby Hale, the Chief of Police, and Darren Kee went to Curd's residence to arrest her on misdemeanor charges of battery and disorderly conduct. As they were escorting Curd out of the house, the officers initially told Curd that she would be able to drive her own car to the White County detention center (the City does not have a jail), and that she would be allowed to go next door to her office to get bail money. When Curd began to go next door, however, Chief Hale seized her arm, spun her around and told her to get into the police car. She complied.
At the time of Curd's arrest, the officers took her purse. After arriving at the detention center, Curd's purse was removed from her sight. When Curd asked for her purse to be placed in view, Chief Hale, some fifteen minutes after Curd's arrest, searched it. 4 Curd describes the search as taking a couple of minutes and as involving "pull[ing] several things out," "rummag[ing] around with the stuff in the bottom and then ... put[ting the] stuff back in."
During the booking process, Curd was fingerprinted three separate times. Curd expresses uncertainty about whether Chief Hale was involved in the fingerprinting. Chief Hale denied any involvement by himself or any member of the City police force, stating that the fingerprinting was done by a member of the Sheriff's department. Defendants do not offer an explanation for the repeated fingerprinting; Curd contends that harassment motivated the officers.
Curd's son posted bail and, following booking, Curd was released. Twenty days later, on September 5, 1996, Curd filed this action alleging violation of Federal constitutional rights.
We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standards as the district court. Mayard v. Hopwood, 105 F.3d 1226, 1227 (8th Cir.1997). Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
Curd first claims that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on her excessive force claim. We disagree. Fourth Amendment excessive force claims are evaluated under a standard of "objective reasonableness." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1871, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989); Greiner v. City of Champlin, 27 F.3d 1346, 1354 (8th Cir.1994). Even if seizing Curd's arm and turning her body was unnecessary to effect the arrest, we can not conclude that thislimited amount of force was objectively unreasonable. 5 See, e.g., Joos v. Ratliff, 97 F.3d 1125, 1126 (8th Cir.1996) (per curiam) ( ). "The right to make an arrest ... necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion" and thus "not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers violates the fourth amendment." Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. at 1872. See also Haberthur v. City of Raymore, 119 F.3d 720, 723 (8th Cir.1997) (). Our conclusion is bolstered by the fact that Curd does not allege, and there is no evidence, that she was injured or experienced physical pain as a result of Hale's actions. See, e.g., Dawkins v. Graham, 50 F.3d 532, 535 (8th Cir.1995) ( ). 6 The conduct of Chief Hale in arresting Curd was not so egregious that we can find a constitutional violation.
Curd next claims that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on her claim that fingerprinting her three times constituted an unreasonable search and seizure. We again disagree. The custodial fingerprinting of Curd during the booking process was routine; a complaint regarding multiple prints (like a complaint regarding several allegedly unnecessary photographs) following a valid arrest is also simply too minor to rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See, e.g., United States v. Weir, 657 F.2d 1005, 1007 (8th Cir.1983) ( ); United States v. Williams, 902 F.2d 678, 680-81 (8th Cir.1990) ( ). Moreover, Curd expresses considerable uncertainty as to whether the City's officers conducted the fingerprinting, and Chief Hale expressly denies that any member of the City police department was involved.
We are aware of a remark in Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 1397-98, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969), that "the police need only one set of each person's prints." Even if the comment could pose a limitation on law enforcement rights when there is simply a "fingerprint detention," as discussed in Davis, we are satisfied that the ruling does not mean that an arrestee's Fourth Amendment rights are violated by taking several sets of fingerprints.
Curd finally claims that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on her claim that defendants unconstitutionally searched her purse after she asked that the purse be placed where she could see it. The district court concluded that the search constituted a valid inventory search. We need not decide whether this conclusion was correct, 7 because we conclude that the search was valid incident to Curd's arrest. See Cooksey v. Delo, 94 F.3d 1214, 1218 (8th Cir.1996) (, )cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 624, 139 L.Ed.2d 605 (1997). We also find nothing in the separate claim against Sheriff Odom that merits discussion.
Warrantless searches incident to a custodial arrest are "justified by the reasonableness of searching for weapons, instruments of escape, and evidence of crime when a person is taken into official custody and lawfully detained." United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 802-03, 94 S.Ct. 1234, 1236-37, 39 L.Ed.2d 771 (1974) (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973)). 8 The search must be of objects within the arrestee's area of "immediate control" and must be "contemporaneous" with the arrest. United States v. Morales, 923 F.2d 621, 627 (8th Cir.1991). Curd's purse qualified as an object within her area of "immediate control." 9
The timeliness requirement is also satisfied. The search took place at the station house about fifteen minutes after Curd was arrested. This delay could be fatal if, for example, a large piece of luggage were opened and inspected without a warrant. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2486, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) ( ); United States v. $639,558 in U.S. Currency, 955 F.2d 712, 715-16 (D.C.Cir.1992) ( ). The timeliness requirement for "luggage or other personal property not immediately associated with the person of the arrestee" is, in other words, constitutionally fairly strict. See, e.g., Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 15, 97 S.Ct. at 2486.
On the other hand, searches of the person and articles "immediately associated with the person of the arrestee," are measured with a different, more flexible constitutional time clock. Compare Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 15, 97 S.Ct. at 2486, and United States v. Schleis, 582 F.2d 1166, 1170 (8th Cir.1978) (en banc) ( ); with Edwards, 415 U.S. at 803, 94 S.Ct. at 1237 ( ), and United States v. Phillips, 607 F.2d 808, 809-10 (8th Cir.1979) ( ). Searches of the person and those articles "immediately associated" with the person may be made either at the time of arrest or when the accused arrives at the place of detention. Edwards, 415 U.S. at 803, 94 S.Ct. at 1237. Unlike luggage, courts considering the question have generally concluded that a purse, like a wallet, is an object "immediately associated" with the person....
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