Curlee v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
| Decision Date | 14 September 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 243,No. 92-1652,243,92-1652 |
| Citation | 7 F.3d 232 |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
| Parties | NOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Sixth Circuit. James CURLEE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SEARS, ROEBUCK & CO., & Local Unionof the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Warehousemen, Chauffeurs, & Helpers of America, Defendants-Appellees. |
Before: NELSON and SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judges, and CELEBREZZE, Senior Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff, James Curlee, a Sears employee, appeals a summary judgment awarded to defendants, Sears, Roebuck and Company ("the employer") and Local Union No. 243 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Warehousemen, Chauffeurs and Helpers of America ("the union"). Plaintiff sued his employer for a purported breach of the collective bargaining agreement and the union for an alleged breach of its duty of fair representation.
The instant suit arose from plaintiff's unsuccessful pursuit of a posted job opening for the position of leadperson/outside in 1990. 1 At the time he applied for the job, plaintiff already held the position of leadperson/inside. 2 The employer, pursuant to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement between the employer and union, invoked the Promotion Review Committee to rule on the job bids for the vacant position. The Promotion Review Committee consisted of equal representation from the employer and union, with representatives from each side co-chairing the proceedings. The Promotion Review Committee in the instant case, after a unanimous vote, awarded the position to another employee with less seniority than the plaintiff, but with more expertise and experience.
Plaintiff's complaint charged that: 1) his seniority entitled him to the job pursuant to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement; 2) the employer breached the collective bargaining agreement by awarding the job to another employee with less seniority; and 3) the union breached its duty of fair representation by failing to enforce the collective bargaining agreement on behalf of the plaintiff.
The plaintiff argues that he should have been awarded the position because he had the most seniority of the qualified applicants and because he was already a leadperson. Plaintiff asserts that he sought a lateral transfer to a comparable position and not a promotion requiring convention of the Promotion Review Committee. Plaintiff also claims that his bid on the new position was rejected in retaliation for his success in prevailing over the union in a 1985 law suit. The union sued plaintiff over plaintiff's refusal to pay union dues. The court in that case upheld plaintiff's refusal. Plaintiff charges that union officials refered to him as a "scab" and prevented him from obtaining the new position because of his legal victory and his general anti-union activism. Plaintiff further alleges that the union breached its duty of fair representation by discriminating against him on the basis of his anti-union activism and by failing to process his grievances.
In their motions for summary judgment, the union and employer controvert plaintiff's claims, arguing that: 1) all leadperson openings must be filled by the Promotion Review Committee pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement; and 2) the Promotion Review Committee, pursuant to the mandates of the collective bargaining agreement, selected the best qualified candidate. The district court concluded plaintiff had exhibited no genuine issue of material fact and granted defendants' separate summary judgment motions.
Plaintiff now appeals the district court's summary judgment, asserting that summary judgment was improvidently granted because: 1) there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the employer's and union's violations of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement; and 2) there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the union's breach of its duty of fair representation.
An appellate court must review de novo a grant of summary judgment. Pinney Dock & Transp. Co. v. Penn. Central Corp., 838 F.2d 1445, 1472 (6th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 880 (1988). In a de novo review of the propriety of the district court's ruling, the court must consider the merits of the motion in their entirety. Choctow Nation v. United States, 119 U.S. 1, 30 (1886). Summary judgment is deemed appropriate where all of the pleadings, depositions, etc., show there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Shelby County Health Care Corp. v. American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, Local 1733, 967 F.2d 1091, 1094 (6th Cir.1992); Canderm Pharmacal, Ltd. v. Elder Parmaceuticals, Inc., 862 F.2d 597, 601 (6th Cir.1988). All inferences must be construed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Davidson & Jones Dev. Co. v. Elmore Dev. Co., Inc., 921 F.2d 1343, 1349 (6th Cir.1991).
To bring an action pursuant to § 301 of the LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, a plaintiff must demonstrate "... the employer's action violated the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement and that the union breached its duty of fair representation." Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 564 (1989); DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 163-164 (1983); Perry v. Million Air, 943 F.2d 616, 619 (6th Cir.1991). Because plaintiff failed to create a genuine issue of material fact with regard to either area, this court finds the district court properly granted summary judgment to both defendants.
Plaintiff alleges there were genuine issues of material fact regarding purported violations of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Plaintiff first argues the employer improperly convened a Promotion Review Committee to determine his candidacy for the position of leadperson/outside. Plaintiff posits that, because he held the position of leadperson/inside, the new leadperson/outside position he sought would be a lateral transfer and not a promotion. Thus, plaintiff contends that the employer should not have convened the Promotion Review Committee, pursuant to Article III, § 12(a) of the collective bargaining agreement, to determine his candidacy. The plaintiff, instead, insists that the general Article III, § 2 provision should govern.
Article III, § 2 sets forth:
Job postings will be filled first by full time associates by seniority and/or currently holding the classification, if no full timers bid. Then part time to part-time by seniority. [sic]. Service Person postings shall be handled as described below.
Article III, § 2 nowhere states that a committee or official other than the Promotion Review Committee is designated to rule on job bids. The plain language of Article III, § 12(a), in fact, further refutes plaintiff's position:
A Promotion Review Committee will be established and shall consist of equal representation from the Company and the Union. A representative of the Union and a representative of the Company will act as co-chairpersons.
(a) The Promotion Review Committee will rule on job bids for the following classifications:...
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