Curlette v. State

• Court: Alabama Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: SAMFORD, J.
• Citation: Curlette v. State, 25 Ala.App. 179, 142 So. 775 (Ala. App. 1932)
• Decision Date: 14 June 1932
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 232.
• Parties: CURLETTE v. STATE.

142 So. 775

25 Ala.App. 179

CURLETTE v. STATE.

6 Div. 232.

Court of Appeals of Alabama

June 14, 1932

Appeal from Circuit Court, Blount County; Woodson J. Martin, Judge.

Bunnie Curlette, alias B. B. Curlette, was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree, and he appeals.

Reversed and remanded.

C.J. Griffith and W. M. Westbrook, Jr., both of Birmingham, for appellant.

Thos E. Knight, Jr., Atty. Gen., for the State.

SAMFORD J.

The deceased and another were walking along the public road about 9:30 o'clock at night, and deceased was run against and instantly killed by defendant's automobile while being driven by defendant.

The rulings of the court on the admission of testimony were either free from error, or were of such a nature as not to be of injury to defendant's cause.

Refused charge 7 was argumentative. Refused charge 13 ignores a consideration of the evidence. Refused charge 20 is misleading. Refused charge 22 is abstract. Refused charge 23 was covered by the court in his oral charge.

The court in its oral charge properly defined the law both as to manslaughter in the first and second degrees. After charging as to what constitutes manslaughter in the first degree, the court added: "So in this case, if you become satisfied from the testimony beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was operating the automobile which struck the deceased, and that such blow struck by the automobile caused his death, you may apply this legal proposition, if the blow struck by the automobile being driven by the defendant was intentional, or the automobile was being so driven as to evidence a wanton and reckless disregard of human life at the time and place, under the circumstances, the killing would be manslaughter in the first degree. So that, gentlemen addresses itself to you from the testimony in the case, because you are the sole judgment [sic] of the facts in the case, and the natural and reasonable conclusions which you draw from the evidence in the case." The defendant, as to the charge of manslaughter in the first degree, requested the court to give the general charge. If there is evidence tending to show that the blow struck by the automobile being driven by defendant was intentional, or the automobile was being so driven as to evidence a wanton and reckless disregard of human life at the time and place and under the circumstances, the charge of the court would be the law of the case; if on the contrary there is no such evidence, that part of the charge is abstract and the court should have given the general charge as to manslaughter in the first degree, as requested by defendant.

Bearing in mind that the state must prove these incriminatory facts beyond a reasonable doubt, let us see what the facts are as disclosed by the record: The deceased was walking along the highway at night, side by side with a companion; both were on the pavement and in the roadway provided for automobiles and other vehicles; the deceased was walking on the side of his companion next to the center of the roadway. Common prudence would have warned him to be on the alert for the approach of automobiles. The defendant came meeting deceased with headlights burning and at a speed of forty miles per hour, which per se is not a reckless or unusual speed.

The defendant's car at that point was to the left of the center of the road, in violation of the "Rules of the Road" as fixed by statute,...