Curley v. Beryllium Dev. Corp.

• Decision Date: 04 October 1937
• Docket Number: Motion No. 493.
• Parties: CURLEY v. BERYLLIUM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION et al.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

281 Mich. 554

275 N.W. 246

CURLEY

v.BERYLLIUM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION et al.

Motion No. 493.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Oct. 4, 1937.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Clarence V. Curley, claimant, opposed by the Beryllium Development Corporation and others. From a decision of the Department of Labor and Industry denying compensation, claimant appealed and sought a writ of mandamus directing the Department of Labor and Industry to grant him a delayed review of the holding of a deputy commissioner. Writ denied.Appeal from Department of Labor and Industry.

Argued before the Entire Bench.

Clark C. Coulter, of Detriot, for appellant.

Frederick J. Ward, of Detroit, for appellees.

WIEST, Justice.

Plaintiff seeks our writ of mandamus, directing the Department of Labor and Industry to grant him a delayed review of the holding of a deputy commissioner, denying him compensation on the 7th day of April, 1932. July 7, 1932, plaintiff filed with the department claim of review and set up, as grounds for the delay, that he had no attorney at the hearing and was not cognizant of the rules of the commission requiring an appeal within a limited time, and petitioned for extension of time within which to claim review. He also set up the usual grounds for an appeal.

The time within which to appeal is fixed by statute and not by rules of the commission. The statute, Comp.Laws 1929, § 8447, provides: ‘Unless a claim for a review is filed by either party within ten (10) days, the decision shall stand as the decision of the industrial accident board: Provided, That said industrial accident board may, for sufficient cause shown, grant further time in which to claim such review.’

His application was considered by the board and the following ruling made:

‘The reason set forth in the petition is that the plaintiff: ‘was not cognizant of the rules of the Commission requiring an appeal within a limited time.’

‘It is not a rule of the commission. It is a rule of law. It is a maxim of the law that ‘ignorance excuses no one.’ We cannot grant an extension of time in which to appeal and thus nullify the provisions of the statute on the allegation that the appealing party did not know that such was the provision of the law. If that were a justifiable reason, then the provisions of the statute could be easily set aside and made a nullity, as such allegation might very easily be alleged in any case.'

Under the statute the question of granting the delayed application for review was addressed to the discretion of the board, and we are not permitted to substitute our discretion for that of the board and thereby compel the board to exercise and enforce our discretion.

The board exercised the discretion vested by statute and gave reason for denial of the application, and the sufficiency of the excuse for failure to act within the statutory period was addressed to the board and connot come before us for consideration in the absence of a finding of an abuse of discretion. This is a mandamus proceeding and not a hearing de novo. Much of interest on the general subject of the power of this court in mandamus proceedings, involving review of exercised discretion, may be found in Detroit Tug & Wrecking Co. v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 75 Mich. 360, 42 N.W. 968.

The commission recognized the power, in case of good and sufficient grounds, to exercise discretion...