Currie v. Cundiff
| Decision Date | 10 May 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 09–cv–866–MJR. |
| Citation | 870 F.Supp.2d 581 |
| Parties | Jaclyn CURRIE, Plaintiff, v. Tom CUNDIFF, Williamson County, Illinois, Unknown Employees and Supervisors of Williamson County Jail, Gary Tyner, David Sweetin, Robert Craig, Dennis Pinkerton, Officer Darren Ferrell, Officer R. Horn, Officer Brandy Milani, Officer C.J. Watts, Health Professionals, Ltd., Doctor Jogendra Chhabra, Marilyn Ann Lynn, and Bennie Vick, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Jon I. Loevy, Tara Elizabeth Thompson, Anand Swaminathan, Arthur Loevy, Russell Ainsworth, Loevy & Loevy, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.
Joseph A. Bleyer, Bleyer & Bleyer, Marion, IL, Douglas R. Heise, Heyl, Royster et al., Edwardsville, IL, for Defendants.
From a practical standpoint, punitive damages appear quite important to the parties' respective strategic positions, and to how this case will be tried. Therefore, in advance of trial, the reasonable likelihood of the availability of punitive damages relative to the remaining claims must be assessed, as well as the proper burden of proof for such damages. All parties have briefed the issues ( see Docs. 163 & 165).
1. The Nature of the Case and Procedural History
In December 2008, Phillip Okoro, who was being held in the Williamson County Jail, died as a result of diabetic ketoacidosis. Plaintiff Jaclyn Currie, as administrator of Okoro's estate, and as the personal representative of his heirs, brought suit on October 14, 2009 (Doc. 2). Plaintiff originally brought suit against Williamson County, Illinois, various jail officials, the contract healthcare providers and their employer, Health Professionals, Ltd. At this juncture, the Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 159) controls, and the only remaining claims are against the contract healthcare providers, Dr. Chhabra and Nurse Reynolds, and their employer, Health Professionals, Ltd. The complaint asserts the following claims:
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¦Counts 1–3: ¦civil rights claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; ¦
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¦ ¦ ¦
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¦Counts 4–6: ¦claims under the Illinois Wrongful Death Act, 740 ILCS¦
¦ ¦180/1; ¦
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¦ ¦ ¦
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¦Counts 7–9: ¦claims under the Illinois Survival Act, 755 ILCS 5/ ¦
¦ ¦27–6; ¦
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¦ ¦ ¦
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¦Counts 10–12: ¦state law claims for intentional infliction of ¦
¦ ¦emotional distress; ¦
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¦ ¦ ¦
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¦Count 13: ¦a state law claim against only Health Professionals, ¦
¦ ¦Ltd., asserting respondeat superior liability; ¦
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¦ ¦ ¦
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¦Counts 14–16: ¦state law claims for willful and wanton conduct. ¦
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2. Plaintiff's Prayer for Relief
A review of the Third Amended Complaint (and the original Complaint) reveals that the claims seek varying damages. For example, the Section 1983 claims seek only “damages,” while the wrongful death claims specify a variety of specific damages. None of the 16 claims include a specific prayer for punitive damages. However, the complaint includes a general “Request for Relief,” which specifically requests punitive damages.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has not decided whether punitive damages must be specifically pled in a complaint, but it has observed that it is the law of the Circuit that “district courts should afford the prevailing party the relief to which it is entitled without regard to errors in the pleadings.” Soltys v. Costello, 520 F.3d 737 742 (7th Cir.2008) (quoting Old Republic Insurance Co. v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 144 F.3d 1077, 1080 (7th Cir.1998)).1 The Court has discretion to award both legal and equitable relief as appropriate. Old Republic Insurance Co., 144 F.3d at 1080;Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(c), Advisory Committee Note to 1937 Adoption, Subdivision (c). With respect to the state law claims, a plaintiff need only plead allegations constituting willful and wanton conduct. See Giles v. General Motors Corp., 344 Ill.App.3d 1191, 280 Ill.Dec. 607, 802 N.E.2d 858, 865–866 (5th Dist.2003).
Given Plaintiff's general prayer for punitive damages, and allegations of intentional, willful, extreme and outrageous conduct and abuse of power, the pleadings sufficiently frame the prayer for relief to warrant further analysis.
3. The Legal Viability of Punitive Damages
Plaintiff persists in claiming a general entitlement to punitive damages relative to the Section 1983 federal claims, and all of the state law claims, based on the alleged behavior of each Defendant. Defendants analyze each claim, addressing both legal and factual considerations. As a matter of law, punitive damages are not available in all of Plaintiff's claims, so those claims for which punitive damages are legally unavailable must be winnowed away.
Punitive damages are recoverable in Section 1983 actions where the defendant had a reckless or callous disregard to the federally protected rights of others. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 35, 51, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983); Woodward v. Correctional Medical Services of Illinois, Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 930 (7th Cir.2004).
Counts 1–3 allege “deliberate indifference,” which equates to the threshold standard necessary for punitive damages. See Woodward, 368 F.3d at 930. The Court has already ruled that, given the decedent Okoro's status as an arrestee who had not had a probable cause hearing, the Fourth Amendment's Due Process Clause provides the standard for evaluating Okoro's conditions of confinement. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 123–125, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975); Lopez v. City of Chicago, 464 F.3d 711, 718–719 (7th Cir.2006); see also Williams v. Rodriguez, 509 F.3d 392, 403 (7th Cir.2007). Therefore, liability will attach if Defendants' behavior was only “objectively unreasonable”—which is a less onerous standard than “deliberate indifference,” the standard necessary for punitive damages. Although Defendants have moved to dismiss Counts 1–3, at this juncture the Court need not delve into whether Counts 1–3 can stand as pled; the Motion to Dismiss will be address by separate order.
Plaintiff has submitted the opinion of Louis H. Philipson, M.D., Ph.D., Professor, Professor and Director of the Kovler Diabetes Center at the University of Chicago (Doc. 163–1). Dr. Philipson opines that the way in which Okoro's diabetes was evaluated and treated fell so far below the minimal guidelines and standard of care as to constitute indifference. Although that is a legal conclusion, the details of the report and the factual underpinnings are sufficient to satisfy the Court that Plaintiff has a reasonably viable claim for punitive damages relative to Counts 1–3, the Section 1983 claims.
In Counts 7–9, Plaintiff invokes the Illinois Survival Act, 755 ILCS 5/27–6, in order to pursue claims for Okoro's pain and suffering prior to death. The Survival Act itself does not create a cause of action; rather, it specifies which tort claims survive the injured person's death. Vincent v. Alden–Park Strathmoor, Inc., 399 Ill.App.3d 1102, 340 Ill.Dec. 396, 928 N.E.2nd 115, 117 (2nd Dist.2010); Raisl v. Elwood Industries, Inc., 134 Ill.App.3d 170, 89 Ill.Dec. 100, 479 N.E.2d 1106 (1st Dist.1985). Also, the Survival Act is silent regarding punitive damages. Id. However, the Supreme Court of Illinois has held that common law punitive damages abate upon death, and the Survival Act does nothing to change that. Vincent v. Alden–Park Strathmoor, Inc., 241 Ill.2d 495, 350 Ill.Dec. 330, 948 N.E.2d 610, 615 (2011). Therefore, in a case where the injured person is deceased, punitive damages are only available if otherwise specifically authorized by statute. Marston v. Walgreen Co., 389 Ill.App.3d 337, 330 Ill.Dec. 38, 907 N.E.2d 851, 857 (1st Dist.2009).2 Consequently, the other state law claims will be analyzed.
Counts 4–6 assert claims under the Illinois Wrongful Death Act, 740 ILCS 180/1. The Act itself does not provide for punitive damages, and (as previously noted) the common law right to seek punitive damages does not survive the death of the injured party; therefore, punitive damages are unavailable relative to Counts 4–6. See generally Vincent v. Alden–Park Strathmoor, Inc., 241 Ill.2d 495, 350 Ill.Dec. 330, 948 N.E.2d 610, 614–616 (2011); see also Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus. Co., 21 Ill.App.3d 46, 313 N.E.2d 496, 502–503 (1974) ();...
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