Currier v. Entergy Servs., Inc.
| Decision Date | 10 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 11-2208 SECTION "F" |
| Parties | ROSEANNE M. CURRIER v. ENTERGY SERVICES, INC., ET AL. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
Before the Court is Steven Griffith's motion for judgment on the pleadings. For the reasons that follow, the motion is DENIED.
This litigation arises out of a corporate jet pilot's claims that her employer, in retaliation for her stance on aviation safety, grounded her without good cause, launched a sham "independent" investigation into a decades-old minor injury, and after FAA-certified physicians once again gave her a clean bill of health, contrived a mental health issue that left her grounded permanently.
On September 2, 2011 Roseanne Currier sued Entergy Services, Inc. (her former employer) and Oliver Trowbridge (Entergy's corporate aviation manager), asserting claims for Title VII and ADA violations, retaliation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and abuse of right. Currier later added Steven Griffith (the attorney Entergy hired to independently investigate and report on Currier's internal complaints) as a defendant, allegingintentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud, invasion of privacy, and civil conspiracy.1 The alleged facts of this case are more completely set forth in this Court's March 14, 2014 Order and Reasons, in which the Court granted in part and denied in part Steven Griffith's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Currier v. Entergy Services, Inc., No. 11-2208, 2014 WL 1093687 (E.D.La. Mar. 14, 2014). In granting the motion in part, the Court dismissed the plaintiff's claims against Griffith for intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud, negligent misrepresentation,2 and invasion of privacy. The Court denied the motion with respect to the plaintiff's civil conspiracy theory of recovery. Griffith now seeks judgment as a matter of law dismissing the civil conspiracy theory of recovery.
Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows aparty to seek judgment on the pleadings "[a]fter the pleadings are closed - but early enough not to delay trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). A Rule 12(c) motion "is designed to dispose of cases where the material facts are not in dispute and a judgment on the merits can be rendered by looking to the substance of the pleadings and any judicially noticed facts." Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2002)(citations omitted).
The standard for deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is the same as the one for deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(6). Gentilello v. Rege, 627 F.3d 540, 543-44 (5th Cir. 2010). "'[T]he central issue [in deciding a motion to dismiss] is whether, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the complaint states a valid claim for relief.'" Id. (citation omitted). To survive a Rule 12 motion to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009)(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009))(internal quotation marks omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. "We do not accept as true conclusory allegations,unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions." Plotkin v. IP Axess Inc., 407 F.3d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 2005)(citation omitted).
Griffith (again) seeks dismissal of Currier's solidary liability theory predicated on civil conspiracy. Previously, Griffith targeted the sufficiency of the factual allegations concerning the alleged agreement between him and Entergy. This time, Griffith contends that -- because the Court dismissed all intentional tort claims against him -- Griffith can have no conspiratorial liability as a matter of Louisiana law. Alternatively, Griffith contends that his status as Entergy's agent precludes a theory of personal misconduct necessary to establish a civil conspiracy. The plaintiff counters that Louisiana law does not require that Griffith commit each element of an underlying intentional tort in order to have conspiracy liability. As to Griffith's alternative argument that he was an agent of Entergy such that he could not conspire with Entergy under the single entity doctrine, Currier points out that Griffith's briefing does nothing to clarify the unclear state of Louisiana law on this point. And the Entergy defendants, for their part, do not oppose Griffith's motion "provided that the Court does not ... render any finding that would impair [their] defenses, including without limitation that: (1) they are not vicariously liable for the actsof Mr. Griffith and his acts cannot be imputed to Entergy and (2) they relied on Mr. Griffith's investigation of Plaintiff's complaints in making employment decisions."3
Louisiana Civil Code Article 2324 provides that "[h]e who conspires with another person to commit an intentional or willful act is answerable, in solido, with that person, for the damage caused by such act." The Louisiana Supreme Court has explained that Article 2324 "does not by itself impose liability for a civil conspiracy," for "'[t]he actionable element in a claim under this Article is not the conspiracy itself, but rather the tort which the conspirators agreed to perpetrate and which they actually commit in whole or in part.'"; Ross v. Conoco, Inc., 828 So. 2d 546, 552 (La. 2002)(quoting Butz v. Lynch, 710 So.2d 1171, 1174 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1998)) (emphasis added).4
Griffith submits that, because Louisiana does not recognize an independent cause of action for civil conspiracy and no independent tort claims remain against him, he cannot have conspiratorial liability as a matter of law. Currier counters that nothing in the text of Article 2324 requires that the entirety of the actionable element of civil conspiracy, the intentional tort, must be committed by each co-conspirator for solidary liability to attach. The Court agrees.
Embracing Griffith's reading of Article 2324 would betray the text of the code article and would render meaningless the Louisiana Supreme Court's carefully chosen words relative to conspiratorial liability. To be sure, Article 2324 is not itself the source of liability; it is undisputed that an agreement to commit a tort, without more, is not actionable in Louisiana. Rather, the predicate for assigning solidary liability among those who conspire to commit intentional torts is the underlying intentional tort that co-conspirators agree to perpetrate and actually commit in whole orin part causing the plaintiff's injury. In other words, the Louisiana Supreme Court simply explained what is logically intuitive: to be liable, in solido, for civil conspiracy, it is not sufficient to prove a mere agreement among co-conspirators to commit an intentional tort. Something more is required: an intentional tort must actually be committed by the co-conspirators, who perpetuate the intentional tort by participating in some act or acts in furtherance ("in whole or in part"). Most fundamental to resolving the present dispute, nothing in Article 2324 or the case literature requires that each co-conspirator equally participate in, let alone wholly commit, each element of the underlying intentional tort.
The Court's understanding of Article 2324 is bolstered by Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Whitney Nat. Bank, 51 F.3d 553, 557 (5th Cir. 1995). There, at trial it was stipulated that the car franchise, Toyota of Jefferson, and its owner, Louis Normand, were liable for conversion of the proceeds of new car sales owed to the floor plan finance company, Chrysler Credit Corp. Id. And the jury had returned a verdict that Whitney Bank conspired with Toyota of Jefferson to convert the proceeds of Toyota's new car sales. Id.5 Notably, because it was undisputed that TOJ was liable forthe intentional tort of conversion, the Fifth Circuit determined that it "need not consider whether Whitney is also liable for conversion." Id. "Instead," the Fifth Circuit noted that it "must uphold the jury verdict, in toto, if we find that the evidence is sufficient to support its determination that Whitney conspired with TOJ to convert the proceeds." Id. at 557. Applying Article 2324, the Fifth Circuit held that a reasonable jury could conclude that Whitney assisted or encouraged TOJ to commit the tort of conversion. Id. at 560-61. In short, the Fifth Circuit upheld Whitney Bank's liability for conspiracy to commit conversion and, based on the stipulation that TOJ was liable for conversion, there was no need to consider whether Whitney also was independently liable for the intentional tort of conversion (or any other intentional tort).
Applying this interpretation of civil conspiracy in Louisiana, Griffith's second attempt to dismiss this theory of liability must fail. Griffith's take on civil conspiracy is too cramped and overlooks the intentional tort claims that remain pending.6Currier's intentional tort claims as alleged against Griffith have been dismissed, but it does not follow that the civil conspiracy theory of solidary liability likewise fails where, as here, it is alleged that Griffith conspired with the remaining defendants to commit the intentional torts that remain viable as alleged against his co-conspirators. Stated another way, it is sufficient that Currier has alleged that Griffith conspired to commit intentional torts (such as abuse of rights) and acted, in whole or (here) in part, with the remaining defendants in perpetuating the actionable element of the conspiracy, which is the alleged intentional tort.
Just like Whitney Bank, if it is proved or stipulated at trial that Entergy is liable for...
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