Currier v. Grossman's of N. H., Inc.

Decision Date29 April 1966
Citation107 N.H. 159,219 A.2d 273
CourtNew Hampshire Supreme Court
PartiesRichard G. CURRIER v. GROSSMAN'S OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, INC.

Batchelder & Murphy, Plymouth (Mr. William F. Batchelder, Plymouth, orally), for plaintiff.

Cotton, Tesreau, Stebbins & Johnson and David Bradley, Lebanon, for defendant.

BLANDIN, Justice.

The accident happened on a clear morning on August 3, 1959, in Campton, New Hampshire. The defendant's truck, traveling northerly, was showing down preparing to make a left turn when the plaintiff, in his Volkswagen truck, coming up behind the defendant, attempted to pass. After the plaintiff pulled out to do so, he saw cars coming in the opposite direction, and in order to avoid a head-on collision, he swung back to his right, colliding with the defendant's truck. The plaintiff claimed that he could not see the cars approaching from the north until he started to pass and that he relied upon a hand signal given by the defendant's driver, who is admitted to be the defendant's agent, that the way ahead was clear. The defendant's operator, denying this, claimed that he gave no hand signals, but that his directional light was on, indicating that he was about to make a left turn. The plaintiff, in turning to his left, could be found to have crossed over an unbroken yellow line. In regard to this, RSA 263:32 provides: 'When the single center line highway marking method is used, no operator of a motor vehicle shall, while proceeding along a highway, drive any part of such vehicle to the left of nor across an unbroken painted line marked on the highway * * * except as herein otherwise provided, * * * (3) in case such operator has an unobstructed view and can see the end of the said unbroken painted line.'

The plaintiff excepts because the Court did not charge the jury that if the violation of section 32 was induced by the defendant's hand signal, upon which the plaintiff reasonably relied, then the plaintiff would not be barred from recovery. On this phase of the case, the Court charged that '* * * if you find there was a violation of the statute and it was causal, then it could be a basis for a finding of contributory negligence. * * * And, of course, if you find that a passing signal was given and the ordinary person of average prudence would have relied on it and acted in accordance with what the plaintiff did, then it would not be a basis for a finding of contributory negligence.'

We believe that the Court stated the law accurately and that in the light of the entire course of the trial, it is reasonably certain that the jury understood it. This is sufficient. Davis v. State, 94 N.H. 321, 323, 52 A.2d 793. It was not necessary that the requests be given verbatim (Lynch v. Sprague, 95 N.H. 485, 490, 66 A.2d 697), or that a principle once correctly expressed be restated in different phraseology. Sigel v. Boston & M. Railroad, 107 N.H. ---, 216 A.2d 794 (decided January 31, 1966). Such procedures often serve to confuse rather than to clarify the law to the jury.

The plaintiff's exception to the Court's charge, on the grounds that it did not cover the effect of the alleged passing signal with reference to any violation of RSA 263:32, is therefore overruled.

Another contention advanced by the plaintiff is that the admission of the investigating officer's opinion of the cause of the accident, given by his oral testimony at the trial was error. The qualification of the witness, who had been a member of the State Police force for some twenty-five years prior to the accident, and who in line of duty and investigated many such occurrences, is not open to serious question. Walker v. Walker, 106 N.H. 282, 210 A.2d 468. The plaintiff maintains that the opinion was inadmissible, citing in support Concord Railroad v. Greely, 23 N.H. 237. This case merely holds that in...

To continue reading

Request your trial
12 cases
  • Stanley v. Board of Ed. of City of Chicago
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • January 22, 1973
    ...41 Cal.2d 252, 260, 260 P.2d 8; George v. Bekins Van & Storage Company, 33 Cal.2d 834, 843, 205 P.2d 1037; Currier v. Grossman's of New Hampshire, 107 N.H. 159, 219 A.2d 273. We think, therefore, the better rule would give a trial judge a wide area of discretion in permitting expert testimo......
  • Cormier v. Conduff
    • United States
    • New Hampshire Supreme Court
    • April 30, 1968
    ...matters of common knowledge the cases have uniformly upheld the Trial Court's admission of opinion evidence. Currier v. Grossman's of New Hampshire, Inc., 107 N.H. 159, 219 A.2d 273; Zellers v. Chase, 105 N.H. 266, 197 A.2d i06; Walker v. Walker, 106 N.H. 282, 210 A.2d 468. Consistency in t......
  • Jones v. Jones
    • United States
    • New Hampshire Supreme Court
    • October 31, 1973
    ...of impact, reaction time, or the angle of the cars on impact. Walker v. Walker, 106 N.H. 282, 210 A.2d 468 (1965); Currier v. Grossman's, 107 N.H. 159, 219 A.2d 273 (1966). Nor was it an improper limitation on cross-examination to exclude questions to the officer as to the meaning of a repo......
  • Williams v. O'Brien
    • United States
    • New Hampshire Supreme Court
    • December 29, 1995
    ...Previously, we implicitly found a duty of care on the part of a signaling motorist in Currier v. Grossman's of New Hampshire, Inc., 107 N.H. 159, 161, 219 A.2d 273, 274 (1966). There, we determined that the trial court had "stated the law accurately" when giving a jury instruction that reas......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT