Currin v. Williams

• Decision Date: 19 March 1958
• Docket Number: No. 253,253
• Citation: 102 S.E.2d 455,248 N.C. 32
• Parties: Walter CURRIN v. Ernest L. WILLIAMS, Richard A. Williams, a Minor, and Ernest L. Williams, Guardian ad litem for Richard A. Williams, a Minor.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 455

102 S.E.2d 455

248 N.C. 32

Walter CURRIN v. Ernest L. WILLIAMS, Richard A. Williams, a Minor, and Ernest L. Williams, Guardian ad litem for Richard A Williams, a Minor.

No. 253

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 19, 1958

Valentine & Valentine, Nashville, for plaintiff, appellee.

Dupree & Weaver, David R. Cockman and Walter Lee Horton, Jr., Raleigh, for defendant, appellant.

BOBBITT, Justice.

No question is raised as to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding that defendant was guilty of actionable negligence; but defendant stresses his contention that the evidence, considered in the light most favorable to plaintiff, established that plaintiff, as a matter of law, was guilty of contributory negligence. On this ground, he insists that the court erred in denying his motion for judgment of involuntary nonsuit.

Plaintiff was driving south on Grace Street. Defendant, accompanied by his wife, was driving west on Western Avenue. Thus, defendant approached the intersection from plaintiff's left.

On May 10, 1956, the City of Rocky Mount, as authorized by G.S. § 20-169, adopted an ordinance providing for the regulation of traffic at this intersection by automatic traffic control signals. The automatic traffic control signal device was installed and in operation prior to and at the time of the collision.

Section 2 of the ordinance, in pertinent part, provided: '(c) When a green signal light is shown traffic shall proceed on that street; when the amber signal light appears all vehicles which have not yet reached the street intersection shall stop at the intersecting street as marked by the police department. Vehicles which have crossed the street line at the time the amber light appears shall proceed across the intersection. When a red or amber light is shown no vehicle shall cross the street line as marked in the street by the police department. (d) When the green light is shown vehicles shall immediately proceed across the street in the direction indicated by said light.'

The ordinance provided that 'it shall be unlawful for any person to disobey such a signal.'

'Since the ordinance is designed to guard the safety of persons using the public streets of the municipality, a motorist is negligent as a matter of law if he fails to stop in obedience to a red traffic light as required by the ordinance, and his negligence in that particular is actionable if it proximately causes the death or injury of another. ' Cox v. Hennis Freight Lines, 236 N.C. 72, 72 S.E.2d 25, 29; Troxler v. Central Motor Lines, 240 N.C. 420, 82 S.E. 2d 342.

There was no evidence (1) as to where, if at all, the police had marked the line(s) at which vehicles should stop, and (2) no evidence that either motorist was confronted by an amber light.

There was plenary evidence to the effect that, as plaintiff approached and entered the intersection, the signal light was green for traffic on Grace Street and red for traffic on Western Avenue. Indeed, defendant frankly testified that he started into the intersection when the signal light facing him was red.

Other features of the factual situation are as follows:

The collision occurred on a fair, sunshiny morning, in a residential district. The intersecting streets, each paved and thirty feet wide, were straight, level and dry. There was nothing on the northeast corner to obstruct plaintiff's view of westbound traffic on Western Avenue or to obstruct defendant's view of southbound traffic on Grace Street. Both drivers, on account of past use thereof, were familiar with the intersection.

The cars collided approximately in the center of the intersection. As plaintiff expressed it, 'it was pretty much in the main cross where I was struck at. ' Defendant crossed directly in front of plaintiff. The impact was between the front of plaintiff's car and the right side of defendant's car. After the impact, both drivers lost control. Plaintiff's car went 76 feet, stopping in the yard of the house located on the southwest corner. Defendant's car went a total distance of 176 feet first striking the south curb of Western Avenue, west of the intersection, and thereafter coming to rest on the north side of Western Avenue.

The only evidence as to the speed of the cars was as follows: Plaintiff testified that he 'was not going very fast--not over 15 or 20. ' Defendant testified that, as he approached and entered the intersection, he 'was going about 20 miles per hour, maybe a little more.'

Plaintiff testified: 'I was going south on Grace Street under a green light and I observed the broadness of a street ahead view and I saw nobody coming anywhere * * *' Also: 'I was looking ahead of me as I entered that intersection. My range of vision extended the breadth of the street and there was no one in my range of vision at that time. ' Also: 'I had not seen this other car at all until I was hit.'

Defendant testified: 'I did not see Mr. Currin's car before this collision.'

These excerpts from plaintiff's testimony elicited on cross-examination, are emphasized by defendant: 'At the speed I was going I could have stopped my car in ten feet. If I had seen the man coming I could have. I did not see him coming. I was looking down the road, but my cross-view would have given me some distance. ' Also: 'Q. You did not look to your left nor your right? A. No. I didn't look sideways. I was looking forward.'

Judgment of involuntary nonsuit on the ground of contributory negligence should be granted when, and only when, the undisputed evidence, taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff, establishes plaintiff's contributory negligence so clearly that no other reasonable inference or conclusion may be drawn therefrom. Wright v. Pegram, 244 N.C. 45, 92 S.E.2d 416; Dennis v. City of Albemarle, 243 N.C. 221, 90 S.E.2d 532.

In Wright v. Pegram, supra [244 N.C. 45, 92 S.E.2d 419], Higgins, J., states the rule as established by prior decisions as follows: '* * * a motorist facing a green light as he approaches and enters an intersection is under the continuing obligation to maintain a proper lookout,...