Currituck Cnty. v. Letendre
| Decision Date | 16 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:19-CV-27-BO,2:19-CV-27-BO |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina |
| Parties | CURRITUCK COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA, Plaintiff, v. ELIZABETH E. LETENDRE, Defendant. |
This cause comes before the Court on defendant's motion for preliminary injunction and the parties' cross-motions for partial summary judgment. Also pending is a motion by Marie and Michael Long to intervene for a limited purpose as well as defendant's motion to quash subpoenas. The appropriate responses and replies have been filed, or the time for doing so has expired, and a hearing was held before the undersigned on October 8, 2020, at Greenville, North Carolina. In this posture, the motions are ripe for ruling and, for the reasons that follow, the motion to intervene is granted, defendant's motion for partial summary judgment is granted, plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment is denied, defendant's motion for preliminary injunction is denied as moot, and defendant's motion to quash is denied as moot.
This case arises out of a dispute over a building project constructed on a 3.67-acre lot at 1441 Ocean Pearl Road in Currituck County, North Carolina. Defendant, LeTendre, who owns the 1441 Ocean Pearl Road lot, has constructed an approximately fifteen thousand square-foot home on the property. The proposed intervenors, Marie and Michael Long, are LeTendre's neighbors. The history and details of the dispute have been recounted in this Court's order entered February 12, 2020, which the Court incorporates by reference as if fully set forth herein.
The material facts are not seriously in dispute, and the following facts are comprised primarily of the undisputed material facts relied upon by LeTendre in her motion for partial summary judgment,1 as well as other undisputed facts in record and the orders of the North Carolina Court of Appeals. LeTendre's Ocean Pearl Road lot has a Single Family Residential Outer Banks Remote zoning classification assigned by Currituck County. Developments which are permitted in this type of zoning district include single-family detached dwellings as that term is defined by Currituck County's Unified Development Ordinance (UDO). Plaintiff, Currituck County, approved LeTendre's plans to build a large home comprised of a three story main building and two, two-story side buildings, finding that the project satisfied the UDO's definition of a single-family detached dwelling. The Longs appealed the approval of LeTendre's plans, and in 2016 the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that LeTendre's project did not meet the UDO's definition of a single-family detached dwelling. Long v. Currituck Cty., 248 N.C. App. 55 (2016). Specifically, the Long court determined that LeTendre's plans called for construction of three buildings, none of which were subordinate in use, and therefore conflicted with the UDO's single-family detached dwelling definition which applies to "a building." Id. at 64.
In 2015, the North Carolina Building Code Council (Building Code Council) reviewed LeTendre's plans to determine whether they complied with the definition of a "one familydwelling" as that term is defined by the North Carolina Building Code (Building Code). The Building Code Council reviewed LeTendre's plans after she appealed a determination by the North Carolina Department of Insurance that her project's proposed occupancy more closely resembled a hotel, and that if it was to be used as a vacation rental it would need to be constructed in accordance with the North Carolina Building Code as opposed to the North Carolina Residential Building Code. [DE 70-1]; see also Letendre v. Currituck Cty., 259 N.C. App. 512, 551 (2018). The Building Code Council reversed the Department of Insurance's decision and determined that LeTendre's project satisfied the definition of a "one family dwelling not more than three stories above grade plane in height with a separate means of egress, as required in NCRC section R101.2." [DE 70-1]. This decision was not appealed.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals considered the Building Code Council's decision in its 2018 opinion in Letendre v. Currituck County, but concluded that "the determination by the North Carolina Building Code Council does not in any way control [Currituck County's] application of its UDO." 259 N.C. App. at 552. On July 11, 2019, the governor of North Carolina signed into law Senate Bill 355, entitled "An Act to Clarify and Make Changes to the Land-Use Regulatory Laws of the State." S.L. 2019-111. Senate Bill 355 clarified the provisions of section 153A-346(b) of the North Carolina General Statutes by amending it to state as follows: "a county may not use a definition of building, dwelling, dwelling unit, bedroom, or sleeping unit that is inconsistent with any definition of the same in another statute or in a rule adopted by a State agency, including the State Building Code Council."
The Longs have moved to intervene in this matter for the limited purpose of (1) contesting and opposing LeTendre's motion for preliminary injunction and (2) participating and supporting with Currituck County in filing, briefing, and arguing a motion for partial summary judgment as to LeTendre's counterclaim for a declaratory judgment that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-346(b) compels Currituck County to consider her home a single-family detached dwelling. The Longs argue that they are entitled to intervene as of right pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) and alternatively that they should be permitted to intervene pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b).
Currituck County supports the Longs' motion to intervene, and LeTendre does not oppose the Longs' intervention for the limited purpose of opposing LeTendre's motion for preliminary injunction. As discussed below, the motion for preliminary injunction is now moot in light of LeTendre's motion for partial summary judgment, and thus the Court construes the Longs' request as seeking to intervene for the purpose of supporting Currituck County's motion for partial summary judgment and opposing LeTendre's motion for partial summary judgment. The Court agrees that the Longs have an interest in this litigation and that their request to intervene for a limited purpose is appropriate. See, e.g., Wolpe v. Poretsky, 144 F.2d 505, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1944). The motion to intervene for a limited purpose is therefore granted.2
A motion for summary judgment may not be granted unless there are no genuine issues of material fact for trial and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If that burden has been met, the non-moving party must then come forward and establish the specific material facts in dispute to survive summary judgment. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial, a trial court views the evidence and the inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). However, "[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" in support of the nonmoving party's position is not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). "A dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. . . . and [a] fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Libertarian Party of Virginia v. Judd, 718 F.3d 308, 313 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Speculative or conclusory allegations will not suffice. Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002). When deciding cross-motions for summary judgment, a court considers each motion separately and resolves all factual disputes and competing inferences in the light most favorable to the opposing party. Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th Cir. 2003).
As LeTendre argued at the hearing and as noted above, the material facts in this case are not in dispute and the issue before this Court is a legal one. Having considered the record and the parties' arguments, the Court determines that the North Carolina General Assembly's clarifying amendment to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-346(b) has the effect of rendering LeTendre's project a single-family detached dwelling for purposes of Currituck County's UDO and LeTendre is entitled to a declaratory judgment of the same.
The North Carolina State Building Code (State Building Code) is divided into two classifications: the Residential Code for One-and-Two Family Dwellings (Residential Building Code) and the Building Code which applies to all other structures. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-136.
The North Carolina State Building Code, as adopted by the Building Code Council, may include reasonable and suitable classifications of buildings and structures, both as to use and occupancy; general building restrictions as to location, height, and floor areas; ... and such other reasonable rules pertaining to the construction of buildings and structures and the installation of particular facilities therein as may be found reasonably necessary for the protection of the occupants of the building or structure, its neighbors, and members of the public at large.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-138. The Residential Building Code defines the term "dwelling" as "any building that contains one or two dwelling units used, intended, or designed to be built, used, rented, leased, let or hired out to be occupied, or that are occupied for living purposes." [DE 69-2]. The term "building" is defined by the Residential Building Code as "any one-and-two family dwelling or portion thereof, . . . that is used, or...
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