Curry v. Ashley Furniture Indus.

• Decision Date: 12 May 2020
• Docket Number: NO. 2019-WC-01464-COA,2019-WC-01464-COA
• Citation: Curry v. Ashley Furniture Indus., 296 So.3d 193 (Miss. App. 2020)
• Parties: James CURRY, Jr., Appellant v. ASHLEY FURNITURE INDUSTRIES and Trumbull Insurance Company, Appellees
• Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals

296 So.3d 193

James CURRY, Jr., Appellant

v.ASHLEY FURNITURE INDUSTRIES and Trumbull Insurance Company, Appellees

NO. 2019-WC-01464-COA

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

May 12, 2020

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: JAMES CURRY, JR. (PRO SE)

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES: J. ANDREW HUGHES, Tupelo

BEFORE J. WILSON, P.J., WESTBROOKS AND McDONALD, JJ.

J. WILSON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. In 2017, the Workers’ Compensation Commission approved James Curry's request to settle his claim against his former employer, Ashley Furniture Industries, for a lump sum of $2,500. About nine months later, Curry filed a pro se motion asking the Commission to reopen his case and award additional benefits. He essentially alleged that his back injury was worse than he thought when he agreed to settle his claim. The administrative judge denied the motion, finding that Curry had not shown any change in conditions or mistake in a determination of any fact that would warrant reopening his case. The full Commission subsequently affirmed the administrative judge's ruling. We find no abuse of discretion and therefore affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. In February 2016, on his first day of work at Ashley, Curry allegedly injured his back while attempting to attach a spring to a sofa frame. He reported the injury to his supervisor and the plant nurse and went to see Nurse Practitioner Teresa Stanford later that day. Curry returned to work the next day, but he claimed that his back pain worsened progressively. His pain did not respond to conservative treatment, and he saw Stanford again about a month later. She ordered an MRI and put Curry on light-duty work. She later told Curry that his MRI showed a "slipped disc." She then ordered physical therapy and referred him to Columbus Orthopedic Clinic.

¶3. Curry later testified that he told Ashley's "workers’ comp lady" or the plant nurse that he had a "slipped disc." According to Curry, the woman responded that he "already had prior back problems" before the incident.¹ Curry then told the woman that his other injuries occurred "years ago," that this injury was different because it was a "slipped disc," and that he had never had a slipped disc before.

¶4. At Columbus Orthopedic, Physician Assistant Jason Caswell prescribed physical therapy and pain injections, but Curry reported that his back pain continued to worsen. In June or July 2016, Caswell recommended surgery because Curry's injections did not seem to be helping. Curry told Caswell that he was "considering surgery but would like to think about it more and give [Caswell] a call back." Caswell discussed surgery with Curry again later in 2016.

¶5. In the meantime, in May 2016, Curry filed a petition to controvert seeking workers’ compensation benefits for his back injury. Curry was represented by counsel. Ashley² filed an answer denying that Curry had sustained a compensable injury or was disabled because of any work-related injury. In September 2016, Curry's attorney filed a motion to withdraw because Curry had fired him. The administrative judge granted the attorney's motion. In November 2016, a second attorney entered an appearance on behalf of Curry. However, in January 2017, that attorney also filed a motion to withdraw because conflicts had arisen between her and Curry that could not be resolved. The attorney did not assert a lien for attorney's fees, and the administrative judge granted her motion to withdraw.

¶6. On January 17, 2017, Curry and Ashley petitioned the Commission to approve a settlement of Curry's claim for a lump sum of $2,500. On January 25, 2017, the administrative judge approved the settlement. The judge's order noted that Ashley had not paid any medical or disability benefits to Curry because it disputed that he had suffered a compensable injury at work. The judge also noted that Curry was previously represented by two different attorneys and that both attorneys had recommended a settlement. The judge found that Curry knew and understood that the $2,500 payment was a "full compromise settlement" of any claims arising out of his alleged injury at Ashley. The judge also found that the settlement was in Curry's best interest. In a separate order, the judge granted Curry's first attorney's motion to withdraw his attorney's fee lien; thus, no attorney's fees were deducted from Curry's settlement.

¶7. In October 2017, Curry filed a pro se motion asking the Commission to reopen his case and award additional benefits. Curry claimed that he had agreed to settle his claim because he thought his back pain was only the result of a "pulled muscle" or a natural progression of his prior injuries. He alleged that he did not understand the difference between a "pulled muscle" and a "slipped disc." He claimed that a "Dr. Brown," a physician who treated him for back pain while he was incarcerated from July 2017 to April 2018,³ first explained the difference to him. He then filed his motion to reopen his case.

¶8. Shortly after Curry was released from his incarceration, he sought treatment at North Mississippi Medical Center, complaining of "sharp pain" in his back. Curry reported that the pain started "after he was incarcerated [a] few months [earlier] and had to sleep on [a] hard floor with no mat."

¶9. Additional medical records introduced at the hearing on Curry's motion to reopen showed that Curry was also injured in a car wreck about six weeks after his alleged injury at work at Ashley. On April 10, 2016, Curry was taken to the emergency room in Amory by ambulance on a stretcher. He reported neck pain radiating to the left side of his body, pain in the base of his skull radiating down his back, and left arm and leg pain at a level of 8/10. A CT scan showed a bulging degenerative disc at C4-C5, and Curry was diagnosed with acute neck pain, acute headache, epidural hematoma, and cervical disc degeneration. A subsequent neurological consult noted the same herniated disc at L5-S1 that Caswell later diagnosed. The risks and benefits of back surgery were discussed with Curry. However, Curry said he "not interested in surgery at [that] time." Pain medication and physical therapy were prescribed instead. Over the next several months, Curry continued to seek treatment from other healthcare providers—in addition to the treatment from Stanford and Caswell discussed above—for pain related to his April 2016 car wreck.

¶10. Following the hearing on Curry's motion to reopen his case, the administrative judge issued a thorough opinion discussing the procedural history of the case, Curry's medical history, and his present claims. The judge found that Curry's "allegation that [Ashley] ‘brainwashed’ him into minimizing his symptoms or somehow duped him into thinking that his symptoms were a continuation of his prior back strains" was contradicted by Curry's contemporaneous medical records and his own testimony. The judge also found that there was no relevant change in Curry's condition because the medical records did not show that his condition had worsened or that his pain had increased because of his alleged injury at Ashley. Therefore, the judge found that there had been no mistake in a determination of fact or change in condition and denied Curry's motion to reopen his case. Curry petitioned the full Commission for review, and the Commission affirmed the administrative judge's ruling in a one-page order. Curry then appealed.

ANALYSIS

¶11. Mississippi Code Annotated section 71-3-53 (Rev. 2011) authorizes the Commission to reopen a case under certain circumstances:

Upon its own initiative or upon the application of any party in interest on the ground of a change in conditions or because of a mistake in a determination of fact, the commission may, at any time prior to one (1) year after date of the last payment of compensation, whether or not a compensation order has been issued, or at any time prior to one (1) year after the rejection of a claim, review a compensation case ....

¶12. As the statute's language makes clear, "[t]he statute is not mandatory." Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. Gregory , 589 So. 2d 1250, 1254 (Miss. 1991). "Rather, it is discretionary with the [C]ommission whether or not it...