Curry v. Civil Service Com'n of City of Bridgeport

• Decision Date: 05 April 1939
• Citation: 125 Conn. 344,5 A.2d 846
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: CURRY v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF CITY OF BRIDGEPORT.

5 A.2d 846

125 Conn. 344

CURRY v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF CITY OF BRIDGEPORT.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

April 5, 1939

Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Kenneth Wynne, Judge.

James C. Shannon, Frank L. Wilder, and Henry E Shannon, all of Bridgeport, for plaintiff.

John V. Donnelly, of Bridgeport, for defendant.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HINMAN, AVERY, BROWN, and JENNINGS JJ.

MALTBIE, Chief Justice.

Proceeding by John P. Curry against the Civil Service Commission of the City of Bridgeport. From the action of defendant in denying plaintiff's appeal to it from an alleged reduction in plaintiff's grade from detective sergeant to sergeant, plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court where a motion to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction was denied, and issues were tried to the judge and judgment was rendered dismissing plaintiff's appeal. The defendant filed a plea in abatement, which was dismissed.^[1] From the Superior Court's judgment, both parties appeal.

Judgment set aside and case remanded with direction.

An ordinance of the city of Bridgeport enacted in 1920 established the rank of detective sergeant in the police department. In 1926 a further ordinance provided for the appointment of members of the detective division as ‘ permanent detective sergeants.’ The plaintiff was thereupon appointed to that rank and his position has always borne the designation of ‘ detective sergeant.’ In 1935 the charter of the city was amended to establish a civil service and the civil service commission was given power to adopt a classification of employees, subject to a majority vote of the common council and the approval of the mayor. 22 Special Laws 1935, p. 262, § 4. A classification was adopted which provided for ‘ police sergeants' but not ‘ detective sergeants.’ Under the provision of the charter the plaintiff appealed to the commission, seeking a reconsideration of this classification to provide for the grade of detective sergeant and upon denial of relief to him appealed to a judge of the Superior Court who also denied him relief.

The plaintiff claimed that the classification of ‘ police sergeant’ without any classification of ‘ detective sergeant’ in effect abolished the latter rank and that to classify him as a police sergeant was a demotion. A provision of the charter of the city provides that its common council shall not abolish any existing office or reduce the rank or salary of any officer, unless the office becomes vacant or an officer is removed for cause. 19 Special Laws 1923, p. 36. The amendment to the charter concerning civil service contains a provision: ‘ Each person holding an office created by ordinance and serving for a stipulated term shall continue in such office until the expiration of such term, at which time such office shall be filled, pursuant to the provisions of this act.’ 22 Special Laws 1935, p. 263, § 6. If the effect of the classification made was to abolish the office of detective sergeant it would certainly be of questionable validity under these provisions.

At the argument before us counsel for both the plaintiff and the defendant were in agreement that this was not the effect of the classification and that the trial court was correct in its conclusion stated in the finding: ‘ The position of the plaintiff in the police department remained the same after the allocation of his position to the classification plan, as it had been before such allocation, and the plaintiff continued to be possessed of whatever rights were incident to his position by reason of the circumstances of his appointment thereto.’ Counsel also agree that had this conclusion been embodied in the judgment file, which as drawn, merely finds the issues for the defendant, it would have correctly expressed the true legal situation. If the trial judge had been requested while the matter was still before him to insert this conclusion in the judgment he would, no doubt, have done so. Under the circumstances the only way now to set the record straight is for us to remand the case to him with direction to include this conclusion in the judgment in addition to the general finding of the issues for the defendant.

The judgment is therefore set aside and the case remanded with direction to enter a judgment modified in accordance with this opinion.

In this opinion the other Judges concurred.

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Notes:

^[1] Per Curiam. This case came into the Superior Court as an appeal by the plaintiff under the provisions of § 21 of the Civil Service Law of the city of Bridgeport. The trial court dismissed the appeal and from its judgment the plaintiff has filed an appeal to this court. The defendant has filed a plea in abatement.

In 1935 the charter of Bridgeport was amended to establish a civil service in the city. 22 Special Laws 1935 p. 261. Section 21 of the act provides for an appeal from the commission to any judge of the Superior Court ‘ in the manner prescribed by section eighty-seven of the charter except that such appeal shall be served, as therein directed on the chairman of the commission.’ Section 87 of the charter deals with the dismissal of members of the police and fire departments and others holding positions in the city government to which they were appointed for a fixed term or on good behavior and it provides: ‘ Any such member or person so dismissed may appeal from the order of dismissal to any judge of the superior court, which appeal shall be made returnable not less than three nor more than six days from the date of dismissal, and shall be served on the official or on the clerk of the common council or board which ordered the dismissal, or at his usual place of abode, at least two days before the time fixed for the hearing of such appeal; and said judge, having given such further notice as may be deemed necessary, shall forthwith hear said case de novo, and shall dismiss or retain said appellant as he may deem proper, and may award costs at his...