Curry v. Talladega Hous. Auth.
| Decision Date | 19 September 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 1:15-CV-909-VEH |
| Parties | STANLEY L. CURRY, Plaintiffs, v. TALLADEGA HOUSING AUTHORITY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
This employment discrimination case was filed on June 1, 2015, by the Plaintiff, Stanley G. Curry, against the Defendant, his former employer, the Talladega Housing Authority ("THA"). (Doc. 1). The Complaint alleges that the Plaintiff was terminated, on account of his race, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. ("Title VII") (Count One).
The case comes before the Court on the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 13). For the reasons stated herein, the motion will be GRANTED, and this case will be DISMISSED with prejudice.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) () (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The party requesting summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings or filings that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(e) requires the non-moving party to go beyond the pleadings in answering the movant. Id. at 324. By its own affidavits - or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file - it must designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id.
The underlying substantive law identifies which facts are material and which are irrelevant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). All reasonable doubts about the facts and all justifiable inferences are resolved in favor of the non-movant. Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1023. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude theentry of summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. If the evidence presented by the non-movant to rebut the moving party's evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may still be granted. Id. at 249.
How the movant may satisfy its initial evidentiary burden depends on whether that party bears the burden of proof on the given legal issues at trial. Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). If the movant bears the burden of proof on the given issue or issues at trial, then it can only meet its burden on summary judgment by presenting affirmative evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact - that is, facts that would entitle it to a directed verdict if not controverted at trial. Id. (citation omitted). Once the moving party makes such an affirmative showing, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce "significant, probative evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of fact." Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
For issues on which the movant does not bear the burden of proof at trial, it can satisfy its initial burden on summary judgment in either of two ways. Id. at 1115-16. First, the movant may simply show that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-movant's case on the particular issue at hand. Id. at 1116. In such an instance, thenon-movant must rebut by either (1) showing that the record in fact contains supporting evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion, or (2) proffering evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial based on the alleged evidentiary deficiency. Id. at 1116-17. When responding, the non-movant may no longer rest on mere allegations; instead, it must set forth evidence of specific facts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358 (1996). The second method a movant in this position may use to discharge its burden is to provide affirmative evidence demonstrating that the non-moving party will be unable to prove its case at trial. Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1116. When this occurs, the non-movant must rebut by offering evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict at trial on the material fact sought to be negated. Id.
The Defendant scatters motions to strike throughout its reply brief. The Plaintiff filed a short response to the Defendant's motions to strike which merely stated that he "continues to stand by all previous responses." (Doc. 24 at 1-2). For the reasons stated in this section, the motions to strike will be DENIED.
The Defendant moves to strike certain of the Plaintiff's responses to facts the Defendant has proffered in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 23at 5-7, ¶¶3, 5, 8, 15, 16, 18, 19, 21, 32, 33, 40, 41, 43, and 44). As to paragraphs 3, 18, and 19, the Defendant argues that they are "irrelevant" and "immaterial" "under the provisions of Rules 401 and 403 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." (Doc. 23 at 5-6, ¶3; doc. 23 at 6, ¶¶18, 19) (italics in original). The Court assumes that the Defendant meant to cite to the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence describes circumstances under which relevant evidence may be excluded. The Defendant has failed to explain how either rule applies here. Further, the court will examine the relevance of any particular fact when assessing what should and should not be included in this opinion. Only material facts will be used as a basis for this Court's analysis.
The Defendant moves to strike the remaining responses as allegedly without evidentiary support. The Court points out that, to the extent a proffered fact is not disputed, it is typically included in this opinion.1 To the extent a proffered fact is disputed, the Court examines the evidence offered by both sides to see if the evidence supports a dispute. If so, the fact is cast in the light most favorable to the non-movant. When no evidence is cited to support the dispute of a proffered fact, and the Court is aware of no other evidence establishing a dispute, the proffered fact is typicallyincluded to the extent it has an evidentiary basis. Accordingly, there is no reason to "strike" unsupported responses, and the Court will not do so.
The Defendant has also moved to strike certain of the Plaintiff's facts proffered in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 23 at 1-5, ¶¶ 48, 49, 51, 52, 53, 57, 58, and 62). The Defendant makes the same arguments for striking these facts that the Court addressed in the previous section. For those same reasons, the Court will not strike these proffered facts, but will handle them as explained above.
The Plaintiff, Stanley G. Curry, is an African American male who was hired by THA on February 2, 1990.
On February 8, 2007, the Plaintiff signed a document confirming that it was his responsibility to read and know the contents of the THA employee Safety Policy, and thereafter abide by the policies and procedures therein to the best of his abilities. He also confirmed that he had the right to request clarification as needed to fully understand his responsibilities as set forth in the Safety Policy.
Section II, paragraph 19 of that policy provides: "Possession of firearms or other weapons while on THA property, in THA vehicles, or while conducting THAbusiness is strictly prohibited except for THA Investigative officers who are licensed to carry firearms." (Doc. 14-4 at 4) (original bold omitted). The Plaintiff had never been an investigative officer for THA at any time during his employment. (Doc. 14-3 at 2).
Section VII, N, paragraph 1, of the Safety Policy provides: "In addition to any regulation required by the THA, all drivers of THA vehicles will comply with state law governing said vehicles." (Doc. 14-4 at 15) (original bold omitted). Section VII, N, paragraphs 13b and 13e provides that employees who are required to operate a moving vehicle must "[k]now and obey the applicable federal, state, county, and city laws and regulations [of the area] in which they are driving," and "[c]omply with all posted speed limits, signs and signals, and make a complete stop at all stop signs." (Doc. 14-4 at 16).
On or about January 14, 2013, the Plaintiff confirmed that he received, read and understood the Vehicle Usage Policy of the THA and agreed to abide by the rules and regulations set forth therein. That policy provides in part:
(Doc. 14-6 at 1). The Plaintiff had never been given approval to drive a THA vehicle for personal business by the Board of Commissioners or the Executive Director, Nettie Goodwin. (Doc. 14-3 at 3-4). However, in her deposition, Goodwin stated that it was not a violation of company policy to use a company vehicle to go back and forth from home to work. (Doc. 19 at 3(8)). She also admitted that employees could use a company vehicle to run errands which were "on the way home." (Doc. 19 at 3(8)).
On or about February 8, 2007, the Plaintiff...
To continue reading
Request your trial