Curry v. United States

Decision Date20 January 1954
Docket NumberCiv. A. 1370.
Citation129 F. Supp. 38
CourtU.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
PartiesClark W. CURRY v. The UNITED STATES of America.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Price & Poag, Leatherwood, Walker, Todd & Mann, Greenville, S. C., for plaintiff.

John C. Williams, U. S. Atty., Chester D. Ward, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Greenville, S. C., for defendant.

WILLIAMS, District Judge.

In this action plaintiff seeks to recover Fifty Thousand ($50,000) Dollars from the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2674, for damages to his automobile and injuries to himself resulting from a collision with a diesel-electric locomotive of the defendant at a place where the highway crosses defendant's railroad.

After hearing the testimony, with the consent and in the presence of counsel for both parties, I viewed the scene of the accident and the approaches to it at the same time of night the accident was alleged to have occurred.

In compliance with Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., I find the facts specially and state my conclusions of law thereon as follows:

Findings of Fact

On the evening of October 29, 1951, at about 8:30 plaintiff was driving along U. S. Highway No. 25 in his 1950 Studebaker automobile approximately seven miles south of Greenville, S. C. in the direction of Greenwood, S. C. This highway, commonly referred to as Augusta Road, is a heavily traveled public highway of the State of South Carolina. Plaintiff had just applied his brakes at an intersection and as he came through the intersection he proceeded up a small hill and around a slight curve. By the time his car had straightened out of the curve, it was going at a speed of 40 to 50 miles per hour.

At a point in this highway some 1,000 feet from where the road straightens out, a spur railroad track owned and operated by the defendant crosses it at approximately right angles. Defendant's track runs from its railhead at the Donaldson Air Force Base to Gantt Station, a junction point with a line of the Southern Railway Company.

Plaintiff, a resident of Greenwood, S. C. and a traveling salesman, was returning home from a business trip in the Greenville area. He was familiar with this road and the fact that defendant's spur track crosses it at this point, since he had made the trip between Greenwood and Greenville on many occasions during both the day and night. He also knew that on occasions the defendant used this spur track, for while traveling this highway at night he had been forced to halt his car twice to permit the train to pass through the intersection. At these times, fusees were placed on the highway to warn of the passage of the train across the highway and these fusees had provided sufficient light to notify the plaintiff, even before he had rounded the curve, that a train was crossing. On the evening in question, plaintiff did not see any fusees or lights to warn him of a train crossing the highway.

On the right side of the highway about 50 feet from the road approximately 160 feet north of the crossing there is a filling station and lunch counter. It is very brightly lighted at night by strings of electric lights. As the plaintiff came out of the curve the lights from his automobile blended with the bright lights from the station, making it almost impossible for him to see anything crossing the highway beyond the station.

On the night of October 29, 1951, a train of twelve empty black gondola cars and one diesel locomotive left Donaldson Air Force Base for the Gantt Station early in the evening. The engine was pushing the line of cars. The train crew was composed of three men (an engineer and two brakemen), all enlisted men of the United States Air Force. This train proceeded west until it was within about 80 feet of the Augusta Road crossing. There it stopped, the train crew dismounted, left the train, crossed the Augusta Road and went into the service station mentioned above where they ate supper and stayed for about thirty minutes. They then left the eating place and returned to the train. The engineer walked about 500 feet down the track to the locomotive and the two brakemen boarded the lead car of the train, after having signalled the engineer with their flashlights to come ahead. The engineer gave the customary signal that he was starting the train, two short blasts on his diesel horn, and blew the horn intermittently until three or four cars of the train were over the crossing. The posted speed at the place of the accident is 55 miles per hour.

Although there is some testimony to the contrary, I find that the defendant did not place a fusee on the highway prior to the departure of the train across the intersection. The whistle or diesel horn was not blowing at the time of this collision and it had not been blowing since the third or fourth car crossed the highway. The bell was not ringing.

The train crew was grossly negligent, reckless and wilful in failing to protect this crossing on the night of October 29, 1951, by putting out a fusee as the standing operating instructions required, or by any other means, and such gross negligence, recklessness and wilfulness was the proximate cause of the injuries to plaintiff and his consequent damage. The plaintiff was not operating his car at an excessive rate of speed or at a speed which was greater than was reasonable at the time and place and under the circumstances. The plaintiff was not guilty of gross contributory negligence, recklessness or wilfulness; nor, for that matter, was he guilty of simple contributory negligence.

The plaintiff's wages were One Hundred ($100) Dollars a week prior to the collision and his loss in wages due to this collision is Thirty-eight ($3,800) Dollars. His medical expenses, including doctors' and hospital bills, were One Thousand and Six & 50/100 ($1,006.50) Dollars. His 1950 automobile was damaged to the extent of Twelve Hundred and Five ($1,205) Dollars. As a result of the injuries to his person and damages to his property, the plaintiff should be awarded the sum of Twelve Thousand, Seven Hundred and Fifty ($12,750) Dollars.

The plaintiff received payments under the South Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act (Code 1952, § 72-1 et seq.) of Four Thousand, Four Hundred and Twenty & 94/100 ($4,420.94) Dollars which was paid by General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation, Lt., and this company is subrogated in that amount to any recovery in this suit.

Conclusions of Law

Section 2674 of Title 28 U.S. C.A., the Federal Tort Claims Act, removes the sovereign immunity of the United States in tort actions and applies to the United States the same measure of liability as is applied under the law of the state where the tort occurred to a private individual or corporation. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152. Since the United States of America admittedly owned the track upon which this train was operating and the locomotive propelling the train, under the established law of South Carolina, it is responsible for any damages arising out of the negligent operation of the train. Seay v. Southern Ry. Co., 208 S.C. 171, 37 S.E. 2d 535.

The action of the train crew in driving a train of twelve black gondola cars along this spur track across the heavily traveled U. S. Highway No. 25 (Augusta Road) in the night so as to block the highway without protecting the crossing by fusees or flagmen in direct violation of known operating instructions, constitutes not only negligence but gross negligence, recklessness and wilfulness. Kneece v. Southern Ry. Co., 187 S.C. 195, 197 S.E. 673; Brown v. Powell, 198 S.C. 403, 18 S.E.2d 212; Myers v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 172 S.C. 236, 173 S.E. 812; Bober v. Southern Ry. Co., 151 S.C. 459, 149 S.E. 257; Pinckney v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 147 S.C. 227, 145 S.E. 135; Miller v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 140 S.C. 123, 138 S.E. 675, 687.

In the Miller case, supra, the court said:

"* * * The situation was such that both companies owed the duty to the public of whatever would be reasonably adequate to protect this crossing, with the increased danger which they had caused.
"There was no light provided by the town or either railroad. There was no flagman there. * * * the public has a right to be protected where a highway crosses a railroad track."

The defendant expressly recognized by its operating instructions that the only way this crossing could be adequately protected was by a flagman in the day-time and fusees at night.

This case closely resembles the case of Bober v. Southern Ry. Co., supra, 151 S.C. 459, 149 S.E. 260 where the court said:

"* * * There are a number of facts surrounding this case which the jury might well have taken into consideration in determining the question of negligence. The road in question is one of the most heavily traveled roads in South Carolina. The track in question was not one which was constantly used; it is not a main line or a regular side track. It was used only at intervals to transfer trains and cars from a set of tracks on one side of Meeting street to a set of tracks on the other side of Meeting street. When the crossing is to be occupied by a train is not known by the public in general but is known to the railroad company. Under the admitted facts in this case, the crossing in question would have been blocked for a period of several minutes with this train of
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3 cases
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    ...engine ... has crossed such highway." The signal must be sounded continuously until the engine passes the crossing, Curry v. United States, 129 F.Supp. 38 (D.S.C.1954), and violation of this section is negligence per se, Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Owen Steel Co., 348 F.Supp. 1363 (D.S.C.19......
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