Curtis Builders v. General Floor Service Co., 1519.

• Decision Date: 10 September 1954
• Docket Number: No. 1519.,1519.
• Parties: CURTIS BUILDERS, Inc. v. GENERAL FLOOR SERVICE CO., Inc.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

Page 705

107 A.2d 705

CURTIS BUILDERS, Inc. v. GENERAL FLOOR SERVICE CO., Inc.

No. 1519.

Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.

Argued August 9, 1954.

Decided September 10, 1954.

W. Cameron Burton, Washington, D. C, for appellant.

Arthur V. Sullivan, Jr., Washington, D. C., with whom Robert E. Miller and William T. Stephens, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellee.

Before CAYTON, Chief Judge, and HOOD and QUINN, Associate Judges.

CAYTON, Chief Judge.

A subcontractor sued a contractor for extras furnished on two construction projects, herein referred to as the Bell School job and the Fort Belvoir job. The trial court found for plaintiff, and defendant contractor brings this appeal.

One of the errors assigned is that the trial court should have found that there had been an accord and satisfaction. The evidence revealed a dispute between the parties as to whether parts of the work done on both jobs by plaintiff was extra work, and that after some negotiation plaintiff offered to settle the controversy as to both jobs for, one total amount. Defendant then sent to the plaintiff two checks, one for work on the Fort Belvoir job, the other for the Bell School job, the sum of the two checks being less than plaintiff's specified demand. Defendant sent no message with the checks, so far as the record shows, to the effect that they were intended as a complete satisfaction. Plaintiff deposited both checks and informed defendant that they would be applied to the total claim, and that payment of the balance would be expected.

An accord and satisfaction arises only where there is a mutual agreement to accept a sum less than that demanded.¹ Defendant must intend the amount paid as a liquidation of plaintiff's claim, and the plaintiff in accepting it must understand that it is so intended.² Here there was no express agreement to that effect; nor can it be said that such an agreement must be implied from the facts. Plaintiff offered to settle for one lump sum; defendant sent less than the amount demanded and made no statement indicating an intention to liquidate plaintiff's claim by payment of the lesser sum. On such evidence the trial judge was not compelled to rule that plaintiff should have realized that the payment was intended as a satisfaction; nor that the evidence established that defendant intended his payment to be treated as a full and final payment. He was justified in finding that no accord and satisfaction had been established.

Appellant also argues that there was no evidence as to the reasonable value of the labor and materials furnished by plaintiff. As to the Bell School job, we think there can be no question that the evidence furnished a sufficient basis for the trial court's award. The president of plaintiff company testified that he entered into an oral contract to furnish a quantity of floor covering materials to defendant, that such contract did not call for installation of the materials, and that upon defendant's request he later installed the materials. There was evidence that defendant was told that such installation would cost $150. In the course of installing the floor covering, it was discovered that the quantity of materials previously ordered was not sufficient to cover the entire area, and plaintiff was authorized to supply additional...