Curtis v. Albritton

• Citation: 132 So. 677,101 Fla. 853
• Parties: CURTIS et al. v. ALBRITTON, Circuit Judge.
• Decision Date: 11 February 1931
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Florida

132 So. 677

101 Fla. 853

CURTIS et al. v. ALBRITTON, Circuit Judge.

Florida Supreme Court

February 11, 1931

Commissioners' Decision.

Original proceeding in the Supreme Court for writ of prohibition by Gertrude A. Curtis, a widow, and another, as the executors of the last will and testament of A. E. Curtis, deceased against Paul G. Albritton, as Circuit Judge for the Twenty-Seventh Judicial Circuit. On petitioner's rule to show cause and respondent's motion to quash the rule and demurrer to the petition

Demurrer to suggestion for the writ sustained, rule to show cause discharged, and peremptory writ denied.

Syllabus by the Court.

SYLLABUS

The writ of prohibition is that process by which a superior court prevents an inferior court from exceeding its jurisdiction or usurping a jurisdiction with which it has not been vested by law.

Prohibition lies only to restrain inferior courts from acting without authority of law, or from exceeding their powers, and even then only when damage is likely to follow such action.

The remedy by interpleader is an equitable one, and is based upon the theory that conflicting claimants should litigate their claims among themselves without involving the stakeholder in their dispute.

The purpose of the remedy by interpleader is to protect one against conflicting claims and double vexation in regard to one liability.

The power to stay proceedings at law for the purpose of exercising equitable control over the parties and proceedings, to the end that justice may be promoted, seems to be inherent in courts of general equitable jurisdiction.

A court of equity in interpleader proceedings may enjoin an action at law in order to draw the entire litigation into one principal action.

A court having jurisdiction over the granting of injunctions will not be restrained by prohibition from proceeding with a cause in which it has granted an injunction, upon the ground that it had no jurisdiction in the particular case, when the defendants enjoined have a complete remedy by appeal.

The general rule is that, where a court of general jurisdiction has jurisdiction of the subject-matter, it must decide the sufficiency of the process and service by which it acquires jurisdiction of the person, and error in this must be reviewed by writ of error or appeal.

Jurisdiction of the subject-matter means the power of the court, whose jurisdiction has been lawfully invoked, to adjudicate the class of cases to which the particular case belongs.

Prohibition is to be resorted to only when the ordinary remedies are inadequate to give redress, and the writ will not issue in every case of irregularity in the proceeding.

Where in an ordinary action in an inferior court of record, the jurisdiction of the court over the parties is questioned, the proper procedure is to get the decision of the court upon that question and review such decision upon an appeal from the judgment.

Prohibition is not designed to perform the functions of an appeal or writ of error.

The writ of prohibition is the counterpart of mandamus in the manner in which it operates, being negative while mandamus is positive in its commands.

The circuit courts of this state are superior courts of general jurisdiction, and nothing is intended to be out of the jurisdiction of such courts, except that which specially appears so to be.

Every court of general jurisdiction has power to hear and determine the question of its own jurisdiction as to parties, and necessarily does so by proceeding in the cause.

To assume that a court of general jurisdiction has proceeded to hear a controversy before determining that it had jurisdiction over the parties to the controversy would involve the presumption that the court had failed to do its duty, and such a presumption is never indulged.

Where in rendering decree, a court of general jurisdiction considered question of its jurisdiction over the parties correctness of ruling thereon may not be passed upon in prohibition proceedings, as petitioners have an adequate remedy by appeal for the relief sought.

Appeal will lie from an interlocutory decree in equity.

COUNSEL

Marion B. Jennings, of Sarasota, for petitioners.

Evans & Glenn, of Sarasota, for respondent.

OPINION

MATHEWS C.

This is a proceeding in prohibition, a case of original jurisdiction.

It appears from the verified suggestion and certified transcript thereto attached that petitioners are residents of New York, and, as plaintiffs, they commenced a common-law action in the circuit court of Sarasota county against Ringling Trust & Savings Bank for recovery from defendant bank of certain moneys claimed to be due. Defendant bank appeared in the common-law action, and filed pleas therein, and, upon such action being brought to issue, filed its bill of interpleader upon the chancery side of the court wherein the common-law action was pending and against petitioners and another, alleging, among other things, that the debt or sum sued for by plaintiffs in the common-law action was claimed by plaintiffs and the other named defendant; that complainant was a mere stakeholder, and ignorant of the rights of claimants. The bank in interpleader proceedings offered to pay the amount sued for in the common-law action into the registry of the court. The bill prayed that the common-law action be stayed; that complainant bank be discharged, and claimants ordered to interplead.

The court below set a date for hearing of the interpleader proceeding, notice whereof was given to the attorney of record for plaintiffs in the common-law action, and, after hearing had, decree was entered by the court below reciting:

'* * * And the/attorney of record in said law action * * * having been given due notice * * * and * * * having only appeared amicus curiae, and the same having been argued by counsel and duly considered by the court.'

It was thereupon decreed that the common-law action be enjoined; that complainant pay the moneys offered into the registry of the court, and that defendants do interplead.

Upon making above decree, petitioners filed suggestion in this Court praying for writ of prohibition directed to the Honorable Paul C. Albritton, as judge, prohibiting him from proceeding further in the interpleader proceeding. Rule was issued directing respondent judge to show cause why the writ of prohibition should not issue as prayed. Respondent has moved to quash the rule, and demurred to the petition.

The writ of prohibition is that process by which a superior court prevents an inferior court from exceeding its jurisdiction or usurping a jurisdiction with which it has not been vested by law. Crill v. State Road Dept., 96 Fla. 110, 117 So. 795; Spelling on Injunctions and other Extraordinary Remedies (2d Ed.) § 1723. Its office is limited to that of restraining inferior courts from acting without authority of law, or from exceeding their powers, and even then only when damage is likely to follow such action. Crandall's Fla. Common-law Practice, 662; 16 Ency. Pl. & Pr. 1133; Spelling on Injunctions and other Extraordinary Remedies (2d Ed.) § 1725.

The remedy by interpleader is an equitable one, and is based upon the theory that conflicting claimants should litigate their claims among themselves without involving the stakeholder in their dispute. Its office is to protect one against conflicting claims and double vexation in regard to one liability. Jax Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. South Fla. Farms Co., 91 Fla. 593, 109 So. 212, 48 A. L. R. 957.

The power to stay proceedings at law for the purpose of exercising equitable control over the parties and proceedings, to the end that justice may be promoted, seems to be inherent in courts of general jurisdiction (20 Ency. Pl. & Pr. 1252; 4 Barbour's Chancery Practice 124), and a court of equity in interpleader proceedings may enjoin an action at law in order to draw the entire litigation into one principal action (High on Injunctions, § 53; Connor v. Elliott, 59 Fla. 227, 52 So. 729). A court having jurisdiction over the granting of injunctions will not be restrained by prohibition from proceeding with a cause in which it has granted an injunction, upon the ground that it had no jurisdiction in the particular case, when the defendants enjoined have a complete remedy by appeal. High on Extraordinary Legal Remedies, § 771. It is said there is an important distinction between a want of jurisdiction as to the subject-matter of the suit and the want of jurisdiction as to the locality of parties to the suit (Shortt, Informations, Mandamus and Prohibition, 439), but the general rule is that, where the court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter, it must decide the sufficiency of the process and service by which it acquires jurisdiction of the person, and error in this must be reviewed by writ of error or appeal. Crandall's Fla. Common-law Practice, 663.

Jurisdiction of the subject-matter means the power of the court to adjudicate the class of cases to which the particular case belongs. Crill v. State Road Dept., supra.

Like all other extraordinary remedies, prohibition is to be resorted to only when the ordinary remedies are inadequate to give redress (Crandall's Fla. Common-law Practice, 662) and the writ will not issue in every case of irregularity in the proceeding (Spelling, Injunctions and other Extraordinary Remedies [2d Ed.] § 1724). Where, in an ordinary action in an inferior court of record, it is alleged the court has not jurisdiction over the person, the proper remedy is to get the decision of the court upon that question and review such decision upon an appeal from the judgment. Spelling, Injunctions and other Extraordinary Legal Remedies (2d Ed.) § 1724; Crandall's Fla. Common-law Practice,...