Curtis v. Boyd
| Decision Date | 29 March 2023 |
| Docket Number | 3:20-cv-00559 |
| Parties | DOUGLAS W. CURTIS, Petitioner, v. BERT C. BOYD, Warden, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Petitioner Douglas W. Curtis, an inmate of the Northeast Correctional Complex in Mountain City, Tennessee, filed a pro se petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his 2016 conviction on four counts of rape of a child in Lewis County, Tennessee, for which he currently is serving a term of eighty years' imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. (Doc. No. 1). Respondent filed an Answer to the habeas petition in which he asks the Court to dismiss the petition. (Doc. No. 28). Petitioner filed a Reply to the Answer. (Doc. No. 41).
Also pending before the Court are the following pro se motions filed by Petitioner: Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. No. 49); Motion to Request Permission to Exceed Page Limit (Doc. No. 51); Motion to Request the Habeas Court to Take Judicial Notice under Fed.R.Evid. 201 (Doc. No. 52); Motion to Request District Court to Rehear Second Motion to Request Leave for Discovery (Doc. No. 55); and Motion to Request Permission to Amend Habeas Corpus Petition with Recent Decision from the Sixth Circuit. (Doc. No. 56). Respondent has not responded to any of these motions. As explained herein, Petitioner's motions will be denied, with the exception of his Motion to Request the Habeas Court to Take Judicial Notice under Fed.R.Evid 201 (Doc. No. 52), which will be denied in part and granted in part.
The petition is ripe for review, and this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d). Having fully considered the record, the Court finds that an evidentiary hearing is not needed, and Petitioner is not entitled to relief. See Christian v. Hoffner, No. 17-2105, 2018 WL 4489140, at *2 (6th Cir. May 8, 2018) () (quoting Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007))). The petition therefore will be denied, and this action will be dismissed.
First, although Petitioner titled his motion “Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Appointment of Counsel” (Doc. No. 49), Petitioner makes no request for the appointment of counsel within his fourteen-page motion. To the extent that Petitioner intends for the title of his motion alone to request the appointment of counsel, his request will be denied. In any event, Petitioner has filed numerous lengthy pro se motions after filing his initial petition, evidencing his ability to represent himself.
Next, Petitioner contends that because Respondent did not respond to Petitioner's Second Motion for Leave to Conduct Discovery (Doc. No. 42), Petitioner is entitled to partial summary judgment as a matter of law. Middle District of Tennessee Local Rule 56.01 provides that, “[i]n order to assist the Court in ascertaining whether there are any material facts in dispute, any motion for summary judgment made pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 must be accompanied by a separate, concise statement of the material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue of material fact.” Rule 56.01 continues:
Each fact must be set forth in a separate, numbered paragraph. Each fact must be supported by specific citation to the record. After each paragraph, the word “response” must be inserted and a blank space provided that is reasonably calculated to allow the non-moving party sufficient space to respond to the assertion that the fact is undisputed. A copy of the statement of undisputed material facts must also be provided to opposing counsel in an editable electronic format. The requirement that a statement of undisputed material facts in the described format must accompany any motion for summary judgment applies to pro se parties. Pro se parties are excused from providing a copy of the statement of undisputed material facts to opposing counsel in an editable electronic format.
M.D. Tenn. Local Rule 56.01(b).
Along with his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Petitioner submitted a Memorandum in support of his motion (Doc. No. 50) and a “Motion to Request Permission to Exceed Page Limit Concerning Memorandum of Law.” (Doc. No. 51). Petitioner did not, however, submit the required statement of undisputed facts in the format required by the Local Rules. Per Local Rule 56.01(b), Petitioner is not exempt from this requirement merely because he is proceeding pro se. Petitioner's failure to comply with Local Rule 56.01(b) renders his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment unreviewable by the Court. Accordingly, the motion (Doc. No. 49) will be denied, and the Motion to Request Permission to Exceed Page Limit (Doc. No. 51) will be denied as moot.
True, Respondent did not respond to Petitioner's Second Motion for Leave to Conduct Discovery. Local Rule 7.01(3)(a) provides that, excluding motions for reconsideration, “any party opposing a motion must serve and file a memorandum of law in response, and, if necessary to support assertions of fact, affidavits and depositions, not later than fourteen (14) days after service of the motion . . . unless otherwise directed by the Court.” M.D. Tenn. Local Rule 7.01(a)(3) (emphasis added). The Rule further provides that, “[i]f a timely response is not filed, the motion shall be deemed to be unopposed, except for motions for reconsideration . . . .” Id.
In the Court's Order entered on January 24, 2022, the Court directed the Clerk to refile Petitioner's Second Motion for Leave to Conduct Discovery, which was originally docketed as Doc. No. 42, in its entirety as a pending motion with Addenda A-D and Attachments. (Doc. No. 47 at PageID# 4090). The Court specifically ordered, “Respondent may, but is not required, to respond to the Motion within 45 days” (id.) (emphasis added), therefore exempting Respondent from Rule 7.01(3)'s strict requirement to respond to Petitioner's motion. Thus, even if Petitioner had complied with Local Rule 56.01(b), Petitioner would not have prevailed on his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment simply because no response was filed by Respondent to Petitioner's Second Motion for Leave to Conduct Discovery.
By Order and accompanying Memorandum Opinion entered on September 28, 2022, the Court denied Petitioner's Second Motion to Request Leave for Discovery. (Doc. Nos. 53 and 54). Petitioner asks the Court to “rehear” or reconsider that motion. (Doc. No. 55).
There is no federal procedural rule permitting motions for reconsideration. While the Federal Rules do not explicitly permit motions to reconsider, Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure gives district courts broad discretion to revise interlocutory orders (like the Court's challenged Order of September 28, 2022) under certain circumstances. See Rodriguez v. Tenn. Laborers Health & Welfare Fund, 89 Fed.Appx. 949, 959 (6th Cir. 2004). “This authority allows district courts ‘to afford such relief from [interlocutory orders] as justice requires.'” Id. (quoting Citibank N.A. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 857 F.Supp. 976, 981 (D.D.C. 1994)). “Traditionally, courts will find justification for reconsidering interlocutory orders when there is (1) an intervening change of controlling law; (2) new evidence available; or (3) a need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Rodriguez, 89 Fed.Appx. at 959. “This standard obviously vests significant discretion in district courts.” Id. at 959 n.7. The Court will construe Plaintiff's motion (Doc. No. 55) as a motion under Rule 54(b) to revise the Court's September 28, 2022 Order and accompanying Memorandum Opinion.
Petitioner does not allege that there has been an interviewing change of controlling law[1] or new evidence available. Rather, he alleges that the Court erred in denying his discovery motion, specifically that the Court considered the wrong motion submitted by Petitioner. He contends that the Court “cited to the original denial of discovery and the content of the original motion for discovery that was submitted by petitioner with his writ of habeas corpus petition” instead of Petitioner's Second Motion for Leave to Conduct Discovery (Doc. No. 55 at PageID# 4315). Petitioner references the Court's language in footnote 2 of its Memorandum Opinion to support his contention. In the referenced footnote, the Court observes that Petitioner filed a non-substantive amendment to his original habeas corpus petition. (Doc. No. 53 at PageID# 4273 n.2). Footnote 2 reads as follows, in its entirety:
Because the Motion to Amend did not make substantive changes to the initial habeas petition (Doc. No. 12 at PageID# 254) and because Respondent cites to the original petition in his filings (see, e.g., Doc. No. 28 at PageID# 3105), the Court will cite to the original petition for ease of reference.
Id. Contrary to Petitioner's assertion in his motion for reconsideration, the language of footnote 2 does not demonstrate that the Court “cited to the original denial of discovery and the content of the original motion for discovery that was submitted by petitioner with his writ of habeas corpus petition.” (Doc. No. 55 at PageID# 4315). Instead, the language demonstrates that, in ruling on Petitioner's Second Motion to Request Leave for Discovery, the Court cited to Petitioner's original habeas petition (see Doc. No. 53 at PageID# 4273 n.2), as did Respondent (see, e.g., Doc. No. 28 at...
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