Curtis v. Canyon Highway Dist. No. 4

• Decision Date: 22 April 1992
• Docket Number: No. 18986,18986
• Citation: Curtis v. Canyon Highway Dist. No. 4, 831 P.2d 541, 122 Idaho 73 (Idaho 1992)
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Parties: Marlene CURTIS, Individually, and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Jon Curtis, and as Natural Parent and Legal Guardian of their Minor Children, Kellie Michelle Curtis and Zane Anthony Curtis, Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross Respondents, v. CANYON HIGHWAY DISTRICT NO. 4, an Independent Political Subdivision of the State of Idaho, Defendant-Respondent-Cross Appellant. Boise, February 1992 Term

Page 541

831 P.2d 541

122 Idaho 73

Marlene CURTIS, Individually, and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Jon Curtis, and as Natural Parent and Legal Guardian of their Minor Children, Kellie Michelle Curtis and Zane Anthony Curtis, Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross Respondents, v. CANYON HIGHWAY DISTRICT NO. 4, an Independent Political Subdivision of the State of Idaho, Defendant-Respondent-Cross Appellant.

No. 18986.

Supreme Court of Idaho,

Boise, February 1992 Term.

April 22, 1992.

Comstock & Bush, Boise, for plaintiffs-appellants-cross respondents. John A. Bush argued.

Saetrum & Day, Boise, for defendant-respondent-cross appellant. David E. Day argued.

McDEVITT, Justice.

Background

This case arises from the death of appellant-cross-respondent's (Marlene Curtis) husband, Mr. Jon Curtis, on February 16, 1988. Mr. Curtis was killed when the vehicle he was driving collided with a Union Pacific train at a crossing maintained by respondent-cross appellant, Canyon Highway District No. 4. Appellant commenced wrongful death actions against Union Pacific Railroad and respondent.

Prior Proceedings

Appellant's action against Union Pacific was tried in the United States District Court. Prior to the submission of the case to the jury, appellant and Union Pacific reached a settlement. The terms of the settlement required Union Pacific to pay $310,000.00 to appellant. This settlement was written and executed in December of 1989.

The action against respondent was filed in the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, on March 20, 1989. In her complaint, appellant listed three causes of action; Count One, respondent was negligent in failing to adequately repair or remedy the condition of the crossing, Count Two, respondent was negligent per se because I.C. § 49-672 requires stop signs at crossings, and, Count Three, respondent was negligent in failing to comply with the guidelines, regulations, or policies of the Idaho Department of Transportation. Appellant also requested attorney fees and prayed for damages for loss of consortium, lost future earnings, and medical and funeral expenses.

Respondent filed its answer on April 5, 1989. In the answer, respondent listed a series of affirmative defenses, including contributory negligence.

Following motions for summary judgment and motions in limine, the matter proceeded to a jury trial on July 2, 1990. After the testimony and argument, the jury returned a special verdict on July 12, 1990. In the special verdict, the jury found respondent, Union Pacific, and decedent to be negligent, that each party's negligence was a proximate cause of the accident, and that total economic damages were $395,000.00, while total non-economic damages were $100,000.00. Specifically, the jury found the decedent to be 25% at fault, Union Pacific to be 30% at fault, and respondent to be 45% at fault.

The district court entered its order on August 23, 1990. In relevant part, the order stated:

Prior to trial in this case the [appellants] settled with the Union Pacific Railroad for the total amount of $310,000.00. [Appellants] contends that the [respondent] highway district is not entitled to offset this settlement against the award notwithstanding the provisions of § 6-805, Idaho Code.

While the [appellant] makes some strong arguments based primarily upon New Mexico case law which discuss policy questions; this court cannot find that the Idaho Legislature intended to do away with offsets when it repealed the contribution amount joint tortfeasors law but left § 6-805 intact.

Accordingly the court finds that after applying 75% of the causative negligence found by the jury to be attributed to the [respondent] and the Union Pacific Railroad to the total damage verdict, or 75% of $495,000.00 ($371,250.00), that the settlement of $310,000.00 must be offset against that amount and that judgment should enter against the [respondent] in the amount of $61,250.00.

On August 30, 1990, appellant filed an affidavit and memorandum of costs, disbursements and attorney fees. Appellant represented her total costs and disbursements to be $39,290.07, and her attorney fees to be $85,216.50. On September 13, 1990, respondent moved the court to disallow these costs, disbursements, and attorney fees.

On September 17, 1990, the district court entered its judgment upon verdict. In the September 17 judgment, the court awarded appellant $61,250.00.

On October 18, 1990, the district court entered its order on the costs memorandum. In the October 18 order, the court found appellant's total allowable costs to be $4,866.90. Subsequently, appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of the order on costs. The motion was filed pursuant to I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B) and 54(d)(1)(D), and it was supported by an affidavit from appellant's attorney. This motion was denied by order dated March 12, 1991.

On October 25, 1990, the district court entered its first amended judgment. In the first amended judgment, the court awarded appellant $66,116.90--$61,250.00 representing the amount specified in the August 23rd order, and $4,866.90 representing the amount specified in the October 18th order.

Appellant filed her notice of appeal on October 29, 1990. She appealed pursuant to I.A.R. 11(a)(1) "from the Judgment filed September 17, 1990." ¹ Respondent filed its notice of cross-appeal on November 9, 1990. It cross-appealed "from the Judgment Upon Verdict, entered September 17, 1990, and the First Amended Judgment, entered October 25, 1990."

On January 9, 1991, respondent filed a notice of payment of judgment. In the notice of payment of judgment, respondent stated that it had tendered a check for $66,116.90 to appellant immediately upon receipt of the first amended judgment, and that appellant had refused to accept the check. The payment was made pursuant to I.C. § 10-1115, and the respondent requested the clerk to release and satisfy the first amended judgment. The clerk acknowledged receipt of the check and deposited it in a non-interest-bearing trust account.

On January 10, 1991, appellant objected to respondent's notice of payment of judgment. Appellant's objection was that "the proposed payment and Release and Satisfaction does not include interest from the date of judgment as set forth in Idaho Code section 28-22-104."

Respondent filed a response to the objection on January 14, 1991. Respondent asserted that I.C. § 10-1115 governs the procedure, that "tender of payment precludes accrual of interest on the Judgment," and that the "Clerk of the Court is, therefore, required by statute to release and satisfy the Judgment."

On February 12, 1991, the parties stipulated to the deposit of the check proceeds into an interest-bearing account. On February 13, 1991, the district court entered an order carrying out this stipulation. The order directed the clerk to deposit the check into an interest-bearing account "without prejudice to either party with regard to the pending appeals, and further without prejudice to either party with regard to Plaintiff's Objection to Notice of Payment of Judgment and Defendant's Response thereto on file herein."

The issues on appeal are:

Appellant Curtis asks:

I. Did the district court err when it reduced the total jury verdict, less the amount representing decedent's negligence, by the amount of the Union Pacific settlement?

II. If the district court was correct, did it then err by not adding the attorney fees and costs incurred in reaching the Union Pacific settlement?

III. Did the district court err in disallowing certain costs claimed by appellant?

IV. Is respondent required to pay statutory interest on the judgment during the pendency of this appeal?

Cross-Appellant Canyon Highway District asks:

V. Did the district court err by instructing the jury that respondent was required to place a stop sign at the crossing?

VI. Did the district court err by giving negligence per se instructions with respect to pavement markings, stop ahead signs, and portable stop signs?

VII. Did the district court err by not allowing the Union Pacific complaint to be used as evidence of prior admissions and for impeachment purposes?

VIII. Did the district court err by excluding evidence of the Union Pacific settlement?

IX. Did the district court err by excluding evidence of appellant's mitigation of economic damages?

X. Is respondent entitled to attorney fees, pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 and I.A.R. 41, for having to defend this appeal?

I. Did The District Court Err When It Reduced The Total Jury Verdict, Less the Amount Representing Decedent's Negligence, By The Amount Of The Union Pacific Settlement?

The thrust of appellant's argument is that when the Idaho legislature abolished joint and several liability in 1987 ², as it would have applied to this action, I.C. § 6-805, as it existed then ³, was impliedly repealed. In support of her argument, appellant cites from New Mexico and Pennsylvania. The New Mexico and Pennsylvania courts held that the prior abolition of the doctrine of joint and several liability also eliminated the type of contribution enunciated in former I.C. § 6-805. Wilson v. Galt, 100 N.M. 227, 668 P.2d 1104 (Ct.App.1983), cert. quashed, 100 N.M. 192, 668 P.2d 308; Charles v. Giant Eagle Markets, 513 Pa. 474, 522 A.2d 1 (1987). Appellant urges that her argument would further the public policy favoring amicable settlement of litigation. See Lomas & Nettleton Co. v. Tiger Enter., Inc., 99 Idaho 539, 542, 585 P.2d 949, 952 (1978).

Respondent contends that former I.C. § 6-805 is clear and unambiguous and was not impliedly repealed by the 1987 limited abolition of joint and several liability. Respondent cites several cases it argues support the district court's method of arriving at appellant's damage award, in particular, the Idaho cases of Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 727 P.2d 1187 (1986), and Tucker v. Union Oil Co. of...