Curtis v. Corbin
Decision Date | 16 July 1919 |
Parties | CURTIS v. CORBIN, Tax Com'r. |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Case Reserved from Superior Court, New Haven County; Donald T Warner, Judge.
Appeal by William E. Curtis, executor, against William H. Corbin Tax Commissioner, from a decree of the court of probate for the district of Watertown determining the succession tax upon the estate of Mary A. Curtis, deceased taken to the superior court for Litchfield county, and thence by stipulation transferred to the superior court for New Haven county at Waterbury, and reserved by said court Warner, J., upon a demurrer filed by the Tax Commissioner to the substituted and more specific reasons of appeal, for the advice of this court. Judgment advised in favor of the Tax Commissioner.
This is a reservation to determine the construction of section 6 of chapter 332 of the Public Acts of 1915, now section 1264, General Statutes. The estate of Mary A. Curtis is in settlement in the probate court for the district of Watertown. No estate passed to class A under said section. The bulk of the estate passed to members of class B. The total taxable estate passing to class B was $528,931.98. This amount, less the exemption of $3,000, gave $525,931.98 as the net taxable estate of class B. The court, as part of the decree, computed the tax as follows:
That the amount of tax due from class B on $22,000 at 3 per cent. is $660.
That the amount of tax due from class B on $25,000 at 5 per cent. is $1,250.
That the amount of tax due from class B on $200,000 at 6 per cent. is $12,000.
That the amount of tax due from class B on $278,931.98 at 7 per cent. is $19,525.86.
That the total amount of the tax due from class B is $33,435.86.
The court, in ascertaining the tax due from each member of the class, prorated the entire tax of $33,435.86 assessed on the total property passing to the class, charging each beneficiary with such percentage of the entire tax as his share was of the entire property passing to said class as shown in the following table:
Memorandum, Computation Inheritance Tax, Class B. |
Amt. to class | Amt. of share | Whole tax | Share of tax | Name |
528,931.98 | 263,399.31 | 33,435.86 | 16,650.50 | Wm. E. Curtis |
528,931.98 | 265,032.67 | 33,435.86 | 16,753.78 | Elizabeth Curtis |
528,931.98 | 125.00 | 33,435.86 | 7.90 | Marjorie Curtis |
528,931.98 | 225.00 | 33,435.86 | 14.22 | Helen Curtis |
528,931.98 | 150.00 | 33,435.86 | 9.48 | Cornelia Curtis |
The executor appealed from this decree determining the succession tax. His reasons of appeal set out the doings of the probate court as to each beneficiary of class B, and in the more specific reasons of appeal the errors complained of were set out as follows:
The reasons of appeal were demurred to on the ground, in substance, that the court did not err in any of the particulars alleged, and the appeal was reserved for the advice of this court.
Nathaniel R. Bronson and Charles E. Hart, Jr., both of Waterbury, for plaintiff.
George E. Hinman, of Willimantic, Arthur E. Howard, Jr., of Hartford, and Frank E. Healy, Atty. Gen., for defendant.
This reservation raises two questions with reference to the meaning of section 6 of chapter 332 of the Succession and Inheritance Tax Act of 1915, section 1264, General Statutes 1918, specifically as relating to class B. The first relates to the determination of the amounts subject to the progressive rates of taxation prescribed by the act for class B, and the second question is whether those successive amounts shall be determined with reference to net estate going to class B as a whole or with reference to the amounts going to the individual beneficiaries, respectively, designated as belonging to class B. For convenience, we here state that part of section 6 more immediately under examination:
While (a) of the more specific reasons of appeal technically limits the question to the place of the exemption of $3,000, as related to the $25,000, in determining the ascertainment of the amount subject to a 3 per centum tax, the matter was discussed as applying the language used with reference to the $3,000 to the interpretation of the descriptive language determining the subsequent amounts subject to progressive rates. If the principle applied in ascertaining what is meant by the statement in ascertaining the first amount of $25,000 also applies, as we think it does, to the subsequently determined amounts of $50,000, $250,000, etc., the question technically stated as relating to the $3,000 is more freely stated in the language above used with regard to the first question.
The first question, then, is this: Is the first $25,000 named in the statute inclusive or exclusive of the $3,000 not taxed; that is, does the 3 per cent. tax apply to $25,000 or to $22,000? We think that the $3,000 is included in the $25,000, and that the 3 per cent. rate applies to $22,000.
A reading of the statute very clearly leaves the impression that the intent of the act is to make the division of the amounts, to be subject to the progressive rates, dependent upon the size of the net estate passing to the class, and that the first division is based upon a total net estate not exceeding $25,000; the second, a total net estate not exceeding $50,000, but more than $25,000; the third, a total net estate not exceeding $250,000, but more than $50,000; and so on. Out of the $25,000 at 3 per cent. is excepted $3,000 as not taxed at all; out of the $50,000 at 4 per cent. is excepted $25,000 as covered in part by the exemption and in part by the 3 per cent. rate; out of the $250,000 at 5 per cent. is excepted the $50,000 as covered in part by the 4 per cent. rate and in part by the rate on the first $25,000; and so on. The language of the first part of the statute means so much of a net estate of not over $25,000 as exceeds $3,000 shall be taxed at 3 per cent. and the second class means so much of a net estate of not over $50,000 as exceeds $25,000, and so on. And this furnishes the key to the construction of the rest. That the true construction is that the total amount taxed and...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Darnall v. Connor
...U. S. 611, 629, 25 S. Ct. 345, 351, 49 L. Ed. 619. In re Detroit & Windsor Ferry Co., 227 Mich. 143, 146, 198 N. W. 725; Curtis v. Corbin, 93 Conn. 648, 107 A. 506; State v. Bazille, 97 Minn. 11, 14, 106 N. W. 93, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 732, 7 Ann. Cas. 1056. In re Fulham's Estate, 96 Vt. 308, ......
-
Caulfield v. Noble
...answer to the plaintiff's argument in this respect may be found by referring to the source of the above quotation; Curtis v. Corbin, 93 Conn. 648, 657, 107 A. 506, 509 (1919); in which this court stated that any judicial presumption in favor of a taxpayer's suit is limited to cases of clear......
-
Key Air v. Commissioner of Revenue Services
...substantially leaves the statute equally open to different interpretations" [internal quotation marks omitted]); Curtis v. Corbin, 93 Conn. 648, 657, 107 A. 506 (1919) (same). In the present case there is no clear ambiguity associated with the "in connection with" language of § 12-407(a)(37......
-
Consolidated Diesel Elec. Corp. v. City of Stamford
...ambiguities are resolved in favor of the taxpayer. Connelly v. Waterbury National Bank, 136 Conn. 503, 510, 72 A.2d 645; Curtis v. Corbin, 93 Conn. 648, 656, 107 A. 506.' Security Mills, Inc. v. Town of Norwich, 145 Conn. 375, 377, 143 A.2d 451, 453. With these general principles in mind, t......