Curtis v. Costco Wholesale Corp.

• Decision Date: 24 November 2015
• Docket Number: No. 14–3354.,14–3354.
• Citation: 807 F.3d 215
• Parties: Keith CURTIS, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. COSTCO WHOLESALE CORPORATION, et al., Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

807 F.3d 215

Keith CURTIS, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.COSTCO WHOLESALE CORPORATION, et al., Defendants–Appellees.

No. 14–3354.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued Sept. 25, 2015.

Decided Nov. 24, 2015.

Timothy J. Coffey, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

William F. Dugan, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendants–Appellees.

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant, Keith Curtis ("Curtis"), appeals the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees, Costco Wholesale Corporation ("Costco") and Gail Hinds ("Hinds"), on all of Curtis's causes of action. These include retaliation in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. , ("FMLA"), a FMLA interference claim, discrimination based on a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. , ("ADA"), and a claim for failure to accommodate under the ADA. For the following reasons, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Costco hired Curtis in 2001. Curtis was promoted to optical manager by Hinds, the general warehouse manager at Costco's Orland Park location, in 2008. In 2011, Curtis was still working as an optical manager under the supervision of Hinds. Hinds and Costco's assistant warehouse manager, Leslie Ingram, counseled Curtis in March and May 2011, regarding customer complaints about him. Because of these complaints, Hinds began monitoring the optical department more carefully and determined that Curtis was failing to sufficiently schedule workers within his department, as was Curtis's duty as optical manager.

In September 2011, Curtis requested and was given a medical leave under the FMLA due to stress and anxiety. Curtis returned to work on November 1, 2011, but his work performance did not improve. Costco management counseled Curtis numerous times over the next six months about the insufficient scheduling of optical department employees and other Costco policy violations. Due to these performance issues, Curtis was placed on a 90–day performance improvement plan ("PIP") in April 2012.

In early May 2012, Jan Jalowiec ("Jalowiec"), an employee working under Curtis in the optical department, informed the Costco managerial staff that she was concerned that Curtis was going to "scam" the company. She said Curtis told her he intended to take a medical leave to secure his managerial rate of pay and position in the event of demotion. Costco determined that, by this comment, Curtis had violated its Manager Standard of Ethics. On May 19, 2012, Curtis was demoted from optical manager to cashier. Two days later, Curtis requested and was given a second FMLA leave.

On June 6, 2012, Curtis submitted a request to be transferred to the Merrillville, Indiana, Costco store. Costco refused to transfer Curtis while he was on his FMLA leave. In January 2013, Curtis gave notice that he was released to work by his doctor, but only to a store other than the one in Orland Park. In July 2013, an optical position became available at the Costco in Merrillville, Indiana, and Curtis was given the position. He currently works in that position at that location.

In his complaint filed May 7, 2013, Curtis alleges four causes of action against Costco and Hinds: retaliation and interference, both in violation of the FMLA, and discrimination based upon a disability and failure to accommodate, both in violation of the ADA. Costco and Hinds moved for summary judgment on all of Curtis's causes of action. The district court granted the motion. The district court found that Curtis had failed to comply with Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 56.1 by submitting an insufficient response to Costco's separate statement of material facts.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Local Rule 56.1

We first determine whether the district court erred in finding Curtis failed to comply with the requirements of Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 56.1. The rule requires the party moving for summary judgment to file and serve a "statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue and that entitle the moving party to a judgment as a matter of law." N.D. Ill. R. 56.1(a)(3). Further, the party opposing the motion for summary judgment is required to file and serve "a concise response to the movant's statement that shall contain ... a response to each numbered paragraph in the moving party's statement, including, in the case of any disagreement, specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon." N.D. Ill. R. 56.1(b)(3)(B).

"When a responding party's statement fails to dispute the facts set forth in the moving party's statement in the manner dictated by the rule, those facts are deemed admitted for purposes of the motion." Cracco v. Vitran Express, Inc., 559 F.3d 625, 632 (7th Cir.2009) (citation omitted). The non-moving party's failure to admit or deny facts as presented in the moving party's statement or to cite to any admissible evidence to support facts presented in response by the non-moving party render the facts presented by the moving party as undisputed. Ammons v. Aramark Unif. Servs., 368 F.3d 809, 818 (7th Cir.2004).

Compliance with local rules like Rule 56.1 ensures the facts material to the issues in the case and the evidence supporting such facts are clearly organized and presented for the court's summary judgment determination.

We review a trial court's decisions regarding compliance with local rules only for an abuse of discretion. Cracco, 559 F.3d at 630 ; Koszola v. Bd. of Educ., 385 F.3d 1104, 1108 (7th Cir.2004). We have routinely upheld the district court's discretion in requiring parties to comply strictly with local rule requirements. Cracco, 559 F.3d at 632 (citations omitted).

A review of Curtis's responsive separate statement shows the district court did not abuse its discretion. Curtis failed to admit or deny facts and provided only boilerplate objections, such as "relevance" and "vague and ambiguous." The district court did not abuse its discretion in deeming these facts admitted. Ammons, 368 F.3d at 818 ; Cracco, 559 F.3d at 632.

Most importantly, Curtis failed to provide citation to any admissible evidence in support of his denials. Curtis argues that his references to other paragraphs within his responsive statement or his additional separate statement are sufficient to meet the requirement that he cite to "specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon" to support his denials. N.D. Ill. R. 56.1(b)(3)(B). We disagree with Curtis for two reasons. First, in this case, Curtis's additional separate statement is procedurally flawed: it is replete with legal arguments, rather than presenting clear, undisputed material facts supported by admissible evidence. Reference to legal arguments to support a denial of a material fact is not contemplated by the rule. Second, and perhaps more importantly, if we were to accept Curtis's reasoning, we would undermine our established precedent that district courts are not required to "wade through improper denials and legal argument in search of a genuinely disputed fact." Bordelon v. Chicago Sch. Reform Bd., 233 F.3d 524, 529 (7th Cir.2000).

The purpose of Rule 56.1 is to have the litigants present to the district court a clear, concise list of material facts that are central to the summary judgment determination. It is the litigants' duty to clearly identify material facts in dispute and provide the admissible evidence that tends to prove or disprove the proffered fact. A litigant who denies a material fact is required to provide the admissible evidence that supports his denial in a clear, concise, and obvious fashion, for quick reference of the court. The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding Curtis failed to comply with Rule 56.1 requirements.

We likewise reject Curtis's contention that the district court should have delineated a ruling on each material fact indicating each fact as undisputed or disputed in its order on the motion. We cannot find any legal authority to support or impose such a duty on the district court and we decline to establish such a duty here.

B. FMLA Claims

Turning to Curtis's substantive claims, we review the district court's granting of the motion for summary judgment de novo and construe all facts and reasonable inferences in Curtis's favor. Cracco, 559 F.3d at 633 (citation omitted). Summary judgment is proper when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(a).

Curtis argues that Costco violated the FMLA when it demoted him and prohibited him from returning to work upon his request in retaliation for "engag[ing] in FMLA-protected activity." Curtis further argues that the "FMLA-protected activity" was his comment to his subordinate, Jalowiec, that he was contemplating a second medical leave.

A plaintiff alleging a retaliation claim under the FMLA may proceed under the direct method of proof or the indirect method of proof. Cracco, 559 F.3d at 633–34. See also, e.g., Scruggs v. Carrier Corp., 688 F.3d 821, 826 (7th Cir.2012) ; Smith v. Hope Sch., 560 F.3d 694, 702 (7th Cir.2009). Curtis addresses only the direct method of proof in his opening brief. Under the direct method of proof, Curtis was required to show: "(1) [Curtis] engaged in a protected activity; (2) [Costco] took adverse employment action against him; and (3) there is a causal connection between [Curtis's] protected activity and [Costco's] adverse employment action." Cracco, 559 F.3d at 633.

We must determine whether Curtis's comment to Jalowiec constitutes sufficient notice under the FMLA, and whether the comment qualifies as protected activity. The FMLA requires employees to give notice "at least 30 days in advance" when the need for the leave is "foreseeab...