Curtis v. Everette, 72-1935.
Citation | 489 F.2d 516 |
Decision Date | 17 December 1973 |
Docket Number | No. 72-1935.,72-1935. |
Parties | Warren CURTIS, Appellant, v. Angus Russell EVERETTE et al. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit) |
James G. Gavin, Community Legal Services, Inc., Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant.
Hermann Rosenberger, II, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee.
Before McLAUGHLIN, VAN DUSEN and ROSENN, Circuit Judges.
Finally, paragraphs 14 and 21-f allege that these three defendants had actual knowledge of the dangerous nature and propensity of Everette.
These allegations were made in a complaint signed by a member of the Bar of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which signature constitutes a certification by such attorney that, to the best of her knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground to support such complaint.3 Furthermore, such allegations assert intentional conduct within the rule stated by Judge Aldisert in Howell v. Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272, 281 (3d Cir. 1972), as follows:
" \'
See also Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 81 (3d Cir. 1965).
In view of the requirement that the allegations of the complaint and all reasonable inferences therefrom must be considered as true on a motion to dismiss,4 we have concluded that, at this stage of the litigation, plaintiff may prove a set of facts constituting a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1032-1033 (2d Cir. 1973), and cases there cited; cf. Kish v. County of Milwaukee, 441 F.2d 901, 904 (7th Cir. 1971). The plaintiff's reliance on his alleged constitutional "right to be secure in his person" (see note 2 above) and on the proposition that the "Fourteenth Amendment is the constitutional basis for 42 U.S.C. § 1983" (page 17 of his brief) makes applicable the principle of Glick (481 F.2d p. 1032) that a prisoner may not be deprived "of liberty without due process of law." Applying the language of the Supreme Court in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172, 72 S.Ct. 205, 209, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952), the alleged activities of these three state officials Again, at pages 173-174, 72 S.Ct. at page 210, Mr. Justice Frankfurter said:
As stated in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957):
"In appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of course, the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."
In view of the above reliance on the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is not necessary to discuss the possible application of the equal protection clause of that Amendment or of the language concerning cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth Amendment. See, for example, Kish v. County of Milwaukee, supra.
The fact finder may well be enlightened rather than confused by having Everette's connection with, and responsibility for, the alleged assault presented in the same trial. See Nelson v. Keefer, 451 F.2d 289, 291 (3d Cir. 1971); Jacobson v. Atlantic City Hospital, 392 F.2d 149, 153-155 (3d Cir. 1968); Wilson v. American Chain & Cable Co., 364 F.2d 558, 564 (3d Cir. 1966).7 The Supreme Court recently noted that the trend of decisions throughout the courts of appeals since Gibbs has been to recognize the existence of judicial power to hear pendent claims involving pendent parties where "the entire action before the court comprises but one constitutional `case'," as defined above. See Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 711-715 and n. 28, 93 S.Ct. 1785, 36 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973). Pendent jurisdiction of a claim similar to the claim against Everette has recently been approved by the Second Circuit. See Leather's Best, Inc. v. S. S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800, 809-811 (2d Cir. 1971) (Friendly, Chief Judge).8 Mr. Justice Brennan has recently stated in Moor, supra, 411 U.S. at 716, 93 S.Ct. 1785, that "broad discretion" should be given to the district court "in evaluating such matters," but the district court in this case never considered the possible exercise of discretion since it dismissed the action against all defendants except Everette on the ground that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We have concluded that the complaint against Everette should be remanded to the district court so that it may consider the exercise of "the substantial element of discretion inherent in the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction." See Moor, supra at 716-717 n. 36, 93 S. Ct. 1799.9
For the foregoing reasons, the district court order will be vacated, and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, insofar as it dismisses the complaint against Everette.
There were also named as defendants Arthur T. Prasse, Commissioner of Corrections of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and Harry E. Russell, Superintendent of the Huntingdon Correctional Institute. Plaintiff's brief states its claim against these defendants as follows:
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