Curtis v. Guaranty Trust Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 13 November 1989
• Docket Number: No. 88-238,88-238
• Citation: 566 A.2d 176,132 N.H. 337
• Parties: , 57 Ed. Law Rep. 168 Richard CURTIS and Cheryle Guerin, Parents and Next Friends of Jennifer Curtis v. GUARANTY TRUST LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Page 176

566 A.2d 176

132 N.H. 337, 57 Ed. Law Rep. 168

Richard CURTIS and Cheryle Guerin, Parents and Next Friends of Jennifer Curtis v. GUARANTY TRUST LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY.

No. 88-238.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Nov. 13, 1989.

Upton, Sanders & Smith, Concord (John K. McDonald, on the brief and orally), for plaintiffs.

Gallagher, Callahan & Gartrell P.A., Concord (Mark T. Broth, on the brief and orally), for defendant.

THAYER, Justice.

This action to recover insurance proceeds is before us on appeal from an order of the Superior Court (Manias, J.) granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment and denying that of the plaintiffs. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

On September 14, 1985, Richard Curtis and Cheryle Guerin purchased insurance coverage for their daughter, Jennifer. The parties agree that the plaintiffs paid the requisite premium for Plan One, Twenty-four Hour Accident Coverage, which was offered through the Concord School District by the defendant, Guaranty Trust Life Insurance Company (Guaranty Trust). Roughly one year later, on September 1, 1986, nine-year-old Jennifer Curtis was injured when struck by an unattended car, which initially had been parked at the top of the family driveway. Evidently, the car's braking mechanism failed and the slope of the driveway, in conjunction with the forces of gravity, caused the vehicle to roll down the incline of the driveway where it hit and injured Jennifer. The car's engine was not running at the time of the accident.

Richard Curtis submitted a claim for Jennifer's medical expenses to Guaranty Trust, which subsequently denied coverage based on the belief, as stated in its form letter, that her "policy exclude[d] benefit for expense resulting from: injuries sustained as a result of ... being struck by any conveyance or vehicle propelled by an engine or motor." (Emphasis in original.) Dissatisfied with Guaranty Trust's refusal to provide coverage, Jennifer's parents brought suit in the superior court, alleging that Guaranty Trust had breached the terms of the student accident insurance policy in effect at the time of Jennifer's injury.

Although the defendant agreed that, absent the exclusionary language currently in dispute, the insurance policy would have covered Jennifer's medical expenses, the parties disagreed as to the proper interpretation of the subject exclusion. The plaintiffs argued that the exclusion was ambiguous in that it appeared to exclude coverage for accidents involving motor vehicles, while at the same time appearing not to exclude coverage for accidents caused by motor vehicles when not propelled by engines or motors. In the alternative, they argued that the exclusion did not apply in their case because the runaway car was not propelled by motor at the time of the accident. The defendant, on the other hand, claimed that the plain language of the exclusionary provision excluded coverage if a motor vehicle was involved, that the language at issue was employed in order to broaden the scope of the exclusion to include more than just automobiles, and that a reasonable insured, reading the exclusion, would understand it to apply in this case.

The matter was heard on cross motions for summary judgment. By order dated May 24, 1988, the trial court granted the defendant's motion and ruled, as a matter of law, that the relevant policy exclusion was not ambiguous. In concluding that it was perfectly clear from the language used that the policy did not provide medical coverage for Jennifer's injuries, the court found that the mere fact the vehicle at issue, although normally propelled by an engine or motor, was propelled by gravity at the time of the accident, had no bearing on whether or not the exclusion applied.

The plaintiffs now appeal from the adverse decision of the trial court, relying on the same arguments made below; i.e., that the exclusionary provision is ambiguous and, alternatively, that it does not apply given the unique factual scenario of the present controversy. It is well-settled that this court "has no jurisdiction over questions of fact determined in the superior court by a presiding judge, our function being only to consider whether there is any evidence from which the court below could draw its conclusions." V & V Corp. v. American Policyholders' Ins. Co., 127 N.H. 372, 379, 500 A.2d 695, 700 (1985). In the case of insurance contracts, however, although the trial court is free to interpret policies and make findings of fact relative to ambiguity, Gelinas v. Metropolitan Prop. & Liability Ins. Co., 131 N.H. 154, 170, 551 A.2d 962, 972 (1988), final interpretation of the language in an insurance policy is a question of law, one left to this court to decide, Thone v. Cairo, 130 N.H. 157, 159, 536 A.2d 183, 184 (1987). Therefore, it is ultimately for this court to determine whether or not the exclusionary language is ambiguous and whether or not the plaintiffs could reasonably expect insurance coverage for the injuries that resulted from their daughter's accident.

Issues pertaining to insurance policies and their interpretation have been much litigated. In our earlier cases we recognized "the right of an insurer to contractually limit the extent of its liability," American Policyholders' Ins. Co. v. Smith, 120 N.H. 202, 205, 412 A.2d 749, 751 (1980), holding that it must do so "through 'clear and unambiguous policy language.' " State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Desfosses, 130 N.H. 260, 264, 536 A.2d 205, 208 (1987) (quoting Cacavas v. Maine Bonding & Casualty Co., 128 N.H. 204, 208, 512 A.2d 423, 425 (1986)). Furthermore, the law of this State provides that an ambiguous policy provision must "be construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer." Trombly v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 120 N.H. 764, 771-72, 423 A.2d 980, 985 (1980); see also Desfosses, supra, 130 N.H. at 263, 536 A.2d at 208; Haley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 129 N.H. 512, 514, 529 A.2d 394, 396 (1987); Cacavas, supra, 128 N.H. at 207, 512 A.2d at 425. It is important to note, however, that "this is not a rule of general applicability to all coverage cases but will apply only in cases of ambiguity in policy language." Trombly, supra, 120 N.H. at 772, 423 A.2d at 985. Finally, under New Hampshire law, the burden of proving that no insurance coverage exists rests squarely with the insurer. Laconia Rod & Gun Club v. Hartford Acc. & Indemn. Co., 123 N.H. 179, 182, 459 A.2d 249, 250 (1983); see also Robbins Auto Parts, Inc. v. Granite State Ins. Co., 121 N.H. 760, 762, 435 A.2d 507, 509 (1981); RSA 491:22-a (1983).

With the above discussion in mind, we now turn our attention to the specific exclusionary provision at issue and the particular facts of this case. The relevant provision of the exclusion rider clearly provides that the

"Policy does not cover injury resulting from:

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6. Riding in; riding on; entering into; mounting; alighting from; being struck by any vehicle or device propelled by an engine or motor."

Although the plaintiffs did not receive a copy of the actual policy issued to the Concord School District by Guaranty Trust, they were given an illustration of the Student Accident Insurance Policy, which described, in summary fashion, the coverages available to them under the policy. The parties agree that the exclusion section set forth in the illustration is virtually identical to that delineated in the actual policy, and that the minor textual differences that do...