Curtis v. Kirkpatrick

• Decision Date: 16 February 1904
• Citation: 75 P. 760,9 Idaho 629
• Parties: CURTIS, ADMINISTRATOR, v. KIRKPATRICK
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

75 P. 760

9 Idaho 629

CURTIS, ADMINISTRATOR, v. KIRKPATRICK

Supreme Court of Idaho

February 16, 1904

MENTAL CAPACITY-WHEN COMPETENT TO TRANSACT BUSINESS-UNDUE INFLUENCE-FINDINGS OF THE COURT WILL NOT BE DISTURBED WHEN-INTOXICATING LIQUORS-SPIRITUALISM.

1. When it is shown that the party conveying property by warranty deed, or executing and delivering a mortgage on property understood and knew the nature and effect of such conveyances, at the time of their execution, he is competent to make such conveyances.

2. Undue influence must be shown to have existed at the time of the execution and delivery of the instrument complained of or it will not be set aside or canceled in a court of equity.

3. Excessive use of intoxicating liquors is not alone sufficient to disqualify one from transacting business, or conveying real estate, unless it be shown that at the time of the transaction he did not fully understand the nature of the transaction.

4. The fact that one is a believer in spiritualism and makes many statements apparently unreasonable is not evidence of insanity.

5. Findings of a jury in an equity case are only advisory, and may be adopted, or amended and adopted as the findings of the court, or the court may make its findings independent of the findings of the jury.

(Syllabus by the court.)

JUDGMENT for respondent, defendant below, from which plaintiff below, appellant here, appeals. Judgment affirmed.

Judgment affirmed. Costs awarded to respondent.

F. S. Dietrich and E. E. Chalmers, for Appellant.

A conveyance or other contract of a person of unsound mind, but not entirely without understanding, made before his incapacity has been judicially determiend, is subject to rescission. (Idaho Rev. Stats., sec. 2411.) One who deals in property matters with an aged and feeble person is bound to prove the fairness of the transaction. (Bigelow on Fraud, 282; Wartemberg v. Spiegel, 31 Mich. 400; Ellis v. Mathews, 19 Tex. 390, 70 Am. Dec. 353.) Equity will set aside a contract for the sale of real estate and a conveyance thereunder when it appears that the capacity for business on the part of the grantor has been greatly weakened by trouble and distress of mind, and the price was grossly inadequate. (Bigelow on Fraud, p. 283; Perkins v. Scott, 23 Iowa 237.) Where inadequacy of consideration or undue influence is joined to imbecility or weakness of mind, arising from old age, sickness, intemperance, or other cause, equity will set aside the transaction at the suit of the injured party. (Bigelow on Fraud, p. 283, et seq.; Tracey v. Sacket, 1 Ohio St. 54, 59 Am. Dec. 610; Crawford v. Hoeft, 58 Mich. 1, 23 N.W. 27, 24 N.W. 645, 25 N.W. 567, 26 N.W. 870; Cooley on Torts, 515, 516; Oakey v. Ritchis 69 Iowa 69, 28 N.W. 448; In re Disbrow's Estate, 58 Mich. 96, 24 N.W. 624.) Where the insanity is known to the other party to the contract, or where he has information such as would lead a prudent man to such knowledge, the contract is invalid. (Lincoln v. Buckmaster, 32 Vt. 652; Henry v. Fine, 23 Ark. 417; Matthiessen etc. Co. v. McMahon, 38 N.J.L. 536; Lancaster etc. Bank v. Moore, 78 Pa. 407, 21 Am. Rep. 24.) Whenever there is a great weakness of mind, arising from age, sickness or other cause, in a person executing a conveyance of land, though not amounting to absolute disqualification, and the consideration given for the property is grossly inadequate, a court of equity will, upon proper and seasonable application of the injured party, or his representatives or heirs, transfer and set the conveyance aside. (Allore v. Jewell, 94 U.S. 506, 24 L.Ed. 260, and notes; Fisher v. Bishop, 108 N.Y. 25, 2 Am. St. Rep. 357, 15 N.E. 331, and notes; Moore v. Moore, 56 Cal. 89; Scovill v. Barney, 4 Or. 288; Archer v. Lapp, 12 Or. 196, 6 P. 672; Carnagie v. Diven, 31 Or. 366, 49 P. 891; Klose v. Hillenbrand, 88 Cal. 473, 26 P. 353.)

N. H. Clark, S. J. Rich, John A. Bagley and K. I. Perky, for Respondent.

There being no evidence that Garrett was intoxicated at the time of the execution of the deed, but it appearing, on the contrary, that he knew what he was doing, and the effect of his act, the vital inquiry is as to his capacity, not when he was intoxicated, but when the deed was executed, and under this rule the contention of appellant should be denied. (Conley v. Nailor, 118 U.S. 127, 6 S.Ct. 1001, 30 L.Ed. 112; Ralston v. Turpin, 129 U.S. 663, 9 S.Ct. 420, 32 L.Ed. 747.) Occasional insanity arising from intemperance does not affect a contract made by a subject while in possession of his faculties. (Lewis v. Baird, 3 McLean, 56, Fed Cas. No. 8316; Bliss v. Connecticut etc. R. R. Co., 24 Vt. 424.) Mere drunkenness of itself does not disqualify a man from making contracts, unless it exists to such a degree as to deprive him of his reason, and render him incapable of giving a true consent. (Pickett v. Sutter, 5 Cal. 412; Wright v. Waller, 127 Ala. 557, 29 So. 57; Bates v. Ball, 72 Ill. 108; Wilcox v. Jackson, 51 Iowa 208, 1 N.W. 513; Wright v. Fisher, 65 Mich. 275, 8 Am. St. Rep. 886, 32 N.W. 605; Cavender v. Wadingham, 5 Mo.App. 457; Parker v. Marco (C. C.), 76 F. 510; Worthington v. Worthington (Md.App.), 20 A. 911; Van Wyck v. Brasher, 81 N.Y. 260; Noel v. Karper, 53 Pa. 97; Ritter's Appeal, 59 Pa. 9; Conant v. Jackson, 16 Vt. 335.) A belief in spiritual manifestations and in having had communication with deceased persons is not necessarily evidence of such a disordered mental condition as to make one incompetent to make a conveyance of real estate. (Lewis v. Arbuckle, etc., 85 Iowa 335, 52 N.W. 237, 16 L. R. A. 677; Robinson v. Adams, 62 Me. 369, 16 Am. Rep. 473, and authorities cited in note to Lewis v. Arbuckle; Otto v. Doty, 61 Iowa 23, 15 N.W. 578; Brown v. Ward, 53 Md. 376, 36 Am. Rep. 422; La Bau v. Vanderbilt, 3 Redf. (N. Y.) 384. See note, 16 L. R. A. 678.) We submit that the evidence was sufficient to warrant the verdict and judgment in this case, and again call attention to the fact that the evidence is conflicting upon the question of competency, having been disposed of by the court, and should not be interfered with by the appellate court. (Kelly v. Perrault, 5 Idaho 221, 48 P. 45.) The rule in this class of cases is, Had the contracting party sufficient mental capacity to reasonably understand the value and effect of what he was doing? (Trimbo v. Trimbo, 47 Minn. 389, 50 N.W. 350; Aiman v. Stout, 42 Pa. 114; Frances v. Wilkinson, 147 Ill. 370, 35 N.E. 150; Meeker v. Meeker, 75 Ill. 260; Trish v. Newell, 62 Ill. 197, 14 Am. Rep. 79; Carpenter v. Calvert, 83 Ill. 62; Pickerell v. Morss, 97 Ill. 220; Stone v. Wilburn, 83 Ill. 105; Redfield on Wills, 98-100; English v. Porter, 109 Ill. 285; Argo v. Coffin, 142 Ill. 368, 34 Am. St. Rep. 86, 32 N.E. 679; Whitney v. Townbly, 136 Mass. 145.) To raise a presumption of undue influence, inadequacy of consideration must be so gross that it shocks the conscience. (Shaddle v. Disbrough, 30 N. J. Eq. 370; Erwin v. Parham, 12 How. (U. S.) 197, 13 L.Ed. 952; Bowman v. Patrick (C. C.), 36 F. 138; Galloway v. Barr, 12 Ohio 354; Tabott's Devisees v. Hooser, 12 Bush (Ky.), 408; Conaway v. Sweeney, 24 W.Va. 643; Conrad v. Schwamb, 53 Wis. 372, 10 N.W. 395; note to Jackson v. King, 15 Am. Dec. 362, citing Creagh v. Blood, 2 Jones & L. 509.) It is well settled, therefore, that unless there is inadequacy of consideration, or some other evidence of fraud, imposition or overreaching, any degree of imbecility or insanity short of total business incapacity will not suffice to avoid a contract. (Note to Jackson v. King, 15 Am. Dec. 363, and authorities cited.) The court did not err in adding to the answers to questions 26, 31, 41 of the findings of the jury before he adopted such findings of the court. The verdict was merely advisory to the court. (Kelly v. Perrault, 5 Idaho 221, 48 P. 45; Daley v. Josselyn, 7 Idaho 657, 65 P. 442; 11 Ency. of Pl. & Pr. 302.) As to the weight to be given to the testimony of an expert witness as against those personally acquainted with the party and: the transaction. (Ruthford v. Morris, 77 Ill. 397; Burley v. McGough, 115 Ill. 11, 3 N.E. 738; Guild v. Hull, 127 Ill. 523, 20 N.E. 665; Richenbach v. Ruddach, 127 Pa. 564, 18 A. 432.) Influence through affection, etc., will not avoid a deed. (Burt v. Quisenberry 132 Ill. 385, 24 N.E. 622; Children's Aid Soc. v. Loveridge, 70 N.Y. 387; Hale v. Cole, 31 W.Va. 576, 8 S.E. 516; Nicholas v. Kerschner, 20 W.Va. 251.) Undue influence must not be the influence of attachment, affection, etc., and must amount to force or coercion. (Goodwin v. Goodwin, 59 Cal. 561; Howe v. Howe, 99 Mass. 88; Carpenter v. Bailey, 94 Cal. 406, 29 P. 1101.) Undue influence must destroy the will of the grantor completely, take away his wishes and thwart his purposes. (Marx v. McGlynn, 88 N.Y. 357.) So long as one possesses requisite mental faculties to transact rationally the ordinary affairs of life, he will not be relieved from the responsibility of the ordinary citizen. (Titcomb v. Vantyle, 84 Ill. 371; Devlin on Deeds, secs. 68, 69; Baldwin v. Dunton, 40 Ill. 188; Hovey v. Chase, 52 Me. 304, 83 Am. Dec. 514; Galpin v. Wilson, 40 Iowa 90.)

STOCKSLAGER, J. Sullivan, C. J., and Ailshie, J., Concur.

OPINION

The facts are stated in the opinion.

STOCKSLAGER, J.

This is an appeal from the district court of Bingham county defendant had judgment in the lower court; from the whole of the judgment the appeal is taken. Plaintiff, as the administrator of the estate of John Garrett, deceased commenced his action to cancel and set aside a certain mortgage, dated the sixth day of November, 1895, and a deed from said Garrett to John E. Kirkpatrick, dated the tenth day of November, 1898, for the reason and upon the grounds that grantor, John Garrett, was incompetent to...