Curtis v. Simpson

• Decision Date: 19 April 1900
• Citation: 72 Vt. 232,47 A. 829
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court
• Parties: CURTIS et al. v. SIMPSON et al.

47 A. 829

72 Vt. 232

CURTIS et al.

v. SIMPSON et al.

Supreme Court of Vermont. Bennington.

April 19, 1900.

Appeal in chancery, Bennington county; Munson, Chancellor.

Suit by Elenora D. Curtis and others against John R. Simpson and others to quiet title. Prom a decree dismissing the bill, the plaintiffs appeal. Reversed.

The bill alleged that the deed considered in the opinion, given by said Martha Simpson to her daughter the said Elenora D. Curtis, by its terms reserved to the grantor the occupancy, and control, rents, and profits, of the premises conveyed during her life, and that the conveyance was in consideration or part consideration that said Elenora and her husband should henceforth render to the grantor such personal services, care, attention, and nursing in sickness as should be necessary to promote her comfort and well-being, and as were commensurate with her station in life. The bill further set out that, from the time of the execution of the deed until the death of the said Martha, the orators performed on their part all the acts and things to be performed as the consideration or part consideration for the deed as above recited. The bill also alleged that a further purpose of the said Martha Simpson in making the conveyance above referred to was to provide something for the grantee, her daughter Elenora, out of the estate of the said Martha, which, as the bill alleged, she had already divided in great part between her other children. The bill was brought to remove a cloud upon the title of the oratrix, Elenora D. Curtis, caused by the claims of the defendants that the said deed was null and void, to restrain the defendants from conveying or attempting to convey the real estate in question or any interest therein, and to have the said deed confirmed and established.

Argued before TAFT, C. J., and ROWELL, TYLER, THOMPSON, and WATSON, JJ.

Batchelder & Bates, for orators.

Charles H. Mason, for defendants.

TAFT, C. J. The question in this case relates to the validity of a deed of real estate executed by Martha Simpson, of whose estate John T. Shurtleff, the defendant, is administrator. At the time of the execution of the deed, she had a husband, John R. Simpson, a defendant. The deed was given by the said Martha to her daughter Elenora D. Curtis, the oratrix. Adelbert E. Simpson, defendant, was the son of Martha, and claims that the property conveyed belongs to his father as surviving husband of Martha, and to Martha's estate, for that under V. S. §§ 2209, 2646, the conveyance from Martha to her daughter, at a time when Martha's husband was living, was void, upon the ground that John R. Simpson, the husband, did not join with his wife in the execution of the deed. Since the death of Martha, Adelbert has purchased the interest of John R. in the premises.

This is a bill in equity, and the oratrix claims that the deed was valid, considering the purposes for which it was given, and that in equity the deed will be upheld upon the ground that Martha, the mother of the oratrix, at the time of the execution of the deed had power to convey the estate for the purpose of her support; that the property was impressed with the character of separate estate. It is not alleged in the bill that the property conveyed by Martha Simpson to the oratrix was, by the terms of the deed to her, held to her sole use. It was not made her separate estate by the terms of the conveyance, and it is a well-settled rule that the instrument of conveyance must contain explicit words of exclusion in order to shut out the husband and his assigns from his marital rights. Frary v. Booth, 37 Vt. 87; Hubbard v. Bugbee, 58 Vt. 172, 2 Atl. 594; Hackett v. Moxley, 68 Vt. 210, 34 Atl. 949. The husband may, by an antenuptial agreement, stipulate that property coming to the wife during coverture should be her separate property, subject to her exclusive disposal. Such agreement in equity will disembarrass the wife from any marital restraints in the disposition of it. And a postnuptial agreement of a similar...