Curtis v. State, 353

Citation243 A.2d 656,4 Md.App. 499
Decision Date02 July 1968
Docket NumberNo. 353,353
PartiesOttway Leon CURTIS, Sr. v. STATE of Maryland.
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

George R. Hughes, Cumberland, for appellant.

H. Edgar Lentz, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Arthur A. Marshall, Jr. and Joseph G. Saurwein, State's Atty. and Asst. State's Atty. for Prince George's County respectively, on brief, for appellee.

Before MURPHY, C. J., and ANDERSON, MORTON, ORTH, and THOMPSON, JJ.

ORTH, Judge.

The appellant, charged with murder, was found guilty of murder in the first degree by a jury in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County and sentenced to imprisonment for the remainder of his natural life.

At a bench conference prior to the selection of the jury defense counsel stated an objection to a voir dire question requested by the State 'whether or not anybody has conscientious scruples against capital punishment,' for the reason that 'it is a denial of equal protection of my client * * * He is entitled to have a jury not have anyone excluded from it from any particular belief whatsoever'. The prosecutor explained that the normal procedure was for the court to ask the question 'and follow it up with a subsequent question if in fact they say yes'. The court indicated the inquiry in that event would be 'if that would affect their fair evaluation of the case in arriving at a fair and impartial verdict'. If the reply to that inquiry was in the affirmative 'then he is not an impartial juror and we excuse him. If he says it wouldn't affect it we let him serve provided neither one of you strikes him'. Defense counsel then said, 'I would like to show my objection'.

In selecting the jury it was first ascertained by the court that no member of the panel had prior knowledge of the case, knew the appellant or members of his family, had a preconceived opinion about the case or knew, 'other than seeing them casually', the prosecutor and defense counsel. The transcript of the proceedings then reads:

'Whereupon, twelve jurors were called into the jury box and the defendant advised of his right of peremptory challenge, after which each individual juror was called and asked to arise and examined individually on their voir dire by asking the following questions:

'Have you formed or expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of Ottway Leon Curtis, Sr., prisoner at the bar?

Do you have any conscientious scruples against capital punishment?'

No affirmative answers by any of the jurors were received to the above questions, and as each juror was called counsel exercised their right to peremptory challenge until a full panel of twelve was selected * * *.'

The record does not disclose how many peremptory challenges were made by the State and by the defense. The court asked whether the State and defense were satisfied with the jury as selected. The prosecutor replied, 'The State is satisfied'. Counsel for the appellant replied, 'The defendant is satisfied'. The jury was sworn.

On appeal from the judgment the only contention of the appellant is that he was 'denied due process and equal protection of the laws by the Court's inquiry into the prospective jurors' beliefs regarding capital punishment'.

At the time the jury was selected there was a statutory proscription against the disqualification of any person for service as a juror of this State by reason of his beliefs against capital punishment. 1 Prior to the effective date of the statute it was well settled in this State that a prospective juror who had conscientious scruples against capital punishment could be challenged for cause in a prosecution for a crime for which capitel punishment may be imposed. Culver v. State, 1 Md.App. 406, 416-417, 230 A.2d 361; Graef v. State, 1 Md.App. 161, 169, 228 A.2d 480. As the purpose of the voir dire examination is to ascertain the existence of cause for disqualification and no other purpose, Baker v. State, 3 Md.App. 251, 254, 238 A.2d 561, inquiry to that end in a capital case was then proper. But when this cause for disqualification, established by judicial decision, was removed by legislative enactment, the ground for the inquiry was no longer existent. We think that the question here challenged was not proper as asked after the effective date of the statute. Had the question elicited the fact that a prospective juror entertained a belief against capital punishment he could not have been excluded for that reason. Nor could the information as to such belief properly be sought as the basis for a peremptory challenge. Questions not specifically directed to some reasonable cause for disqualification, and so, merely for peremptory challenge, should not be asked. Handy v. State, 101 Md. 39, 60 A. 452. 'The rule is, then, that questions, not directed to a specific reason for disqualification and exclusion by the court, may be refused in the court's discretion. The nature and extent of the examination are to be decided by the court in each case, in its discretion, and, on appeal the ruling will not be interfered with unless there has been a clear abuse of that discretion'. Whittemore v. State, 151 Md. 309, 315, 134 A. 322, 324. See Day v. State, 2 Md.App. 334, 234 A.2d 894. The question is, therefore, whether, in the facts and circumstances of the instant case, there was such an abuse of the discretion of the lower court in permitting the question so as to require reversal of the judgment.

We construe Art. 51, § 8A according to the ordinary and natural import of its language, there being no different meaning clearly indicated by the context. It provides, 'Hereafter no person shall be disqualified for service as a juror of this State by reason of his beliefs against capital punishment'. We find no imperative reason in the statute for enlarging or restricting its meaning. 2 Height v. State, 225 Md. 251, 257, 170 A.2d 212. In the instant case no prospective juror indicated that he had a belief against capital punishment and thus none was excluded for that reason, either for cause or by peremptory challenge. We find no violation of the statute.

The appellant urges, however, that the mere asking of the question, no matter what the result may have in fact been, violated his constitutional rights. He argues that Schowgurow v. State, 240 Md. 121, 213 A.2d 475, compels this conclusion. We do not agree. Under the Maryland Constitution the exclusion of non-believers from jury service is not only authorized but demanded. In Schowgurow the Court said, 'The resulting danger of abuse, under the decisions of the Supreme Court, at the least, puts the burden upon the State to show that there was no exclusion or discrimination', at 131, 213 A.2d at 482. It found there that the burden was not met. In so finding it noted, at 131, 213 A.2d at 482, 'When the system of jury selection on its face shows discrimination and exclusion, an actual showing of discrimination on the basis of comparative numbers of the excluded and non-excluded classes on the jury lists is unnecessary; it is the danger of abuse resulting from the method of selection which renders it unconstitutional'. It was within this frame of reference that the Court then said, at 131, 213 A.2d at 482, 'Under the decision of the Supreme Court in Torcaso (Torcaso v. Watkins, 67 U.S. 488, 81 S.Ct. 1680, 6 L.Ed.2d 982 (1961)), we are constrained to hold that the provisins of the Maryland Constitution requiring demonstration of belief in God as a qualification for service as a grand or petit juror are in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that any requirement of an oath as to such belief, or inquiry of prospective jurors, oral or written, as to whether they believe in a Supreme Being, is unconstitutional'. But the mere asking of a prospective juror whether he has any conscientious scruples against...

To continue reading

Request your trial
10 cases
  • Curtis v. State
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • 18 Diciembre 1978
    ...capital punishment." Answering this question in the negative, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the conviction. Curtis v. State, 4 Md.App. 499, 243 A.2d 656 (1968). We subsequently denied a petition for a writ of certiorari, Curtis v. State, 252 Md. 730 Thereafter, Curtis, represented b......
  • Hunt v. State
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • 18 Marzo 1997
    ...by counsel. Id. at 141, 395 A.2d at 469. Following affirmance of his conviction on charges of first degree murder, Curtis v. State, 4 Md.App. 499, 243 A.2d 656 (1968), cert. denied, 252 Md. 730(1969), Curtis filed a petition under the Post Conviction Procedure Act. He was denied any relief.......
  • Curtis v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • 13 Octubre 1977
    ...Circuit Court for Prince George's County of murder in the first degree. That conviction was appealed and we affirmed it in Curtis v. State, 4 Md.App. 499, 243 A.2d 656. Certiorari was subsequently denied by the Court of Appeals on January 19, 1969. The appellant then petitioned for post con......
  • Couser v. State
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • 10 Marzo 1978
    ...challenges. Mason v. State,242 Md. 707, 218 A.2d 682 (1966); McGee v. State, 219 Md. 53, 146 A.2d 194 (1959); Curtis v. State, 4 Md.App. 499, 243 A.2d 656 (1968). No authority exists to support the proposal that where a prosecutor has information on prospective jurors of the type involved h......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT