Curtis v. State, No. 25319.

CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
Writing for the CourtTOAL, Chief Justice
Citation345 S.C. 557,549 S.E.2d 591
PartiesKenneth E. CURTIS, Individually and d/b/a Privacy Protection Services, Appellant, v. The STATE of South Carolina, The South Carolina General Assembly, Charles Molony Condon, as Attorney General for the State of South Carolina, Robert M. Ariail, as 13 th Judicial Circuit Solicitor, The South Carolina Law Enforcement Division, and Johnny Mack Brown, as Sheriff for Greenville County, Respondents.
Decision Date17 July 2001
Docket NumberNo. 25319.

345 S.C. 557
549 S.E.2d 591

Kenneth E. CURTIS, Individually and d/b/a Privacy Protection Services, Appellant,
v.
The STATE of South Carolina, The South Carolina General Assembly, Charles Molony Condon, as Attorney General for the State of South Carolina, Robert M. Ariail, as 13 th Judicial Circuit Solicitor, The South Carolina Law Enforcement Division, and Johnny Mack Brown, as Sheriff for Greenville County, Respondents

No. 25319.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard October 4, 2000

Decided July 17, 2001

Rehearing Denied August 10, 2001.


345 S.C. 564
Robert C. Childs, III and Laura W.H. Teer, both of Mitchell, Bouton, Yokel & Childs, of Greenville, for appellant

Attorney General Charles M. Condon, Senior Assistant Attorney General Nathan Kaminski, Jr., and Assistant Attorney General Christie Newman Barrett, all of Columbia, for respondents.

TOAL, Chief Justice:

Kenneth E. Curtis ("Curtis") appeals the trial court's denial of a temporary injunction concerning the enforcement of S.C.Code Ann. § 16-13-470 (Supp.2000), which prohibits the selling of urine with the intent to defraud a drug screening test. We affirm.

345 S.C. 565
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1996, Curtis started an internet business known as Privacy Protection Services.1 Through this business, Curtis sells his own urine, which is certified as drug and adulterant free, along with a "urine test substitution kit." Each urine test substitution kit comes with Curtis' urine, a pouch, a tube, and a chemical hand warmer device. Because proper temperature is critical for acceptance at any urine testing site, each kit comes with "chemically reactive supplemental heat sources" and a temperature monitoring system that insures proper acceptance temperature. Furthermore, the kit can be easily concealed on the body and can be used in a natural urinating position, which means it cannot be detected even if directly observed.2 According to Privacy Protection Services' website: "Our complete urine test substitution kits allow anyone, regardless of substance intake, to pass any urinalysis within minutes."3

Based on his website and his June 17, 1999, affidavit, Curtis maintains his primary objection to urine testing by employers is they do not merely test for drugs, they also test for pregnancy, diabetes, cigarette smoking, hypertension, and other diseases or genetic traits. He believes this type of testing by employers constitutes an infringement on the privacy rights of prospective employees and leads to access of private information.

On June 11, 1999, the Governor of South Carolina signed Senate Bill 277, which amended S.C.Code Ann. § 16-13-470

345 S.C. 566
"to provide that selling urine with the intent to defraud a drug screening is a felony." Under section 16-13-470, the penalty for the first offense is a fine of not more than five thousand dollars and imprisonment of not more than three years, or both. The penalty for a second or subsequent offense is a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars or imprisonment of not more than five years, or both. S.C.Code Ann. § 16-13-470 (Supp.2000). Pursuant to the statute, intent is presumed if a heating element or any other device used to thwart a drug-screening test accompanies the sale. Id.

On June 18, 1999, Curtis filed a Motion for an Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order and a Motion for a Temporary Injunction. The trial judge granted the Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order on June 18, 1999. On June 30, 1999, the trial court denied the Motion for a Temporary Injunction and issued a formal Order. Curtis' Motion for Reconsideration was denied and this appeal followed.

On September 20, 2000, the Attorney General filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal as Moot and a Motion to Supplement Record on Appeal with Memorandum in Support Thereof. On August 18, 2000, the trial judge entered an order ruling on the merits of this case, holding section 16-13-470 constitutional and a legitimate exercise of the State's police powers. The Attorney General moves this Court to dismiss the appeal of the denial of a temporary injunction because the appeal is moot. According to the Attorney General's Motion, any order issued by this Court will be advisory and will have no practical effect on an existing controversy.

The following issues are before this Court on appeal:

I. Since the trial court has issued an order on the merits of this case, should this Court dismiss the appeal of the denial of a temporary injunction because the trial court's order renders the appeal moot?

II. Did the trial court err by holding Curtis is not entitled to a temporary injunction against the enforcement of section 16-13-470 when Curtis failed to establish that he will suffer irreparable harm or that he has no adequate remedy at law?

III. Did the trial court err in holding Curtis is not likely to succeed on the merits?

345 S.C. 567
A. Does section 16-13-470 create an impermissible presumption of guilt?
B. Is section 16-13-470 vague, overly broad, and ambiguous?
C. What legitimate public purpose does section 16-13-470 protect?
D. Does section 16-13-470 infringe upon First Amendment rights?
E. Does section 16-13-470 violate equal protection?
F. Does section 16-13-470 constitute cruel and unusual punishment?
G. Does section 16-13-470 impermissibly interfere with interstate commerce?
H. Does section 16-13-470 abridge the right to privacy?
I. Does section 16-13-470 violate the Fourth Amendment?
IV. Did the trial court err in reaching the merits on a motion for temporary relief?

LAW/ANALYSIS

I. Mootness

The Attorney General argues the appeal in this case is moot and any order issued by this Court will be advisory because the trial court has issued an order on the merits.4

An appellate court will not pass on moot and academic questions or make an adjudication where there remains no actual controversy. Jackson v. State, 331 S.C. 486, 489 S.E.2d 915 (1997). Moot appeals differ from unripe appeals in that moot appeals result when intervening events render a case nonjusticiable. See Jean Hoefer Toal, Shahin Vafai & Robert A. Muckenfuss, Appellate Practice in South Carolina 122 (1999). "A case becomes moot when judgment, if rendered, will have no practical legal effect upon [the] existing controversy. This is true when some event occurs making it impossible for [the] reviewing Court to grant effectual relief."

345 S.C. 568
Mathis v. South Carolina State Highway Dep't, 260 S.C. 344, 346, 195 S.E.2d 713, 715 (1973)

In the civil context, there are three general exceptions to the mootness doctrine. First, an appellate court can take jurisdiction, despite mootness, if the issue raised is capable of repetition but evading review. See generally Byrd v. Irmo High Sch., 321 S.C. 426, 468 S.E.2d 861 (1996); Citizen Awareness Regarding Educ. v. Calhoun County Publ'g, Inc., 185 W.Va. 168, 406 S.E.2d 65 (1991) (holding an appellate court could consider newspaper's appeal from trial court's injunction compelling newspaper to publish political action advertisement even though case was moot because issue was capable of repetition yet evaded review). Second, an appellate court may decide questions of imperative and manifest urgency to establish a rule for future conduct in matters of important public interest. See generally Berry v. Zahler, 220 S.C. 86, 66 S.E.2d 459 (1951) (the court recognized that questions of public interest originally encompassed in an action should be decided for future guidance however abstract or moot they may have become in the immediate contest). Finally, if a decision by the trial court may affect future events, or have collateral consequences for the parties, an appeal from that decision is not moot, even though the appellate court cannot give effective relief in the present case. See 5 AM. JUR.2D Appellate Review § 649 (1995).

An order or decree in a court of common pleas granting, continuing, modifying, or refusing an injunction is immediately appealable. S.C.Code Ann. § 14-3-330(4) (Supp. 2000); Appeal of Paslay, 230 S.C. 55, 94 S.E.2d 57 (1956) (appeal lay from the restraining order or temporary injunction). However, "[t]he rule that an appellate court limits its review to the issues necessary to a proper disposition of the appeal, and will not consider immaterial or moot questions, applies when reviewing decrees and orders relating to injunctions." 42 AM.JUR.2D Injunctions § 335 (2000). Where only injunctive relief is sought and the need for that relief has ceased to be a justiciable issue, an appellate court should not review the merits, or consider the granting of a new trial after it has become impossible to have a new trial in the case. See

345 S.C. 569
generally State ex rel. Mathews v. Eastin, 179 Kan. 555, 297 P.2d 170 (1956)

Texas courts have held an appeal of a temporary injunction is moot where a trial court renders final judgment while the appeal is pending. See Lowe v. Farm Credit Bank of Texas, 2 S.W.3d 293 (Tex.Ct.App.1999); Save Our Springs Alliance v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 973 S.W.2d 378 (Tex.Ct.App.1998) (trial court's final judgment rendered the appeal of the temporary injunction moot). According to Texas case law, dismissing an appeal from a temporary injunction after it has been rendered moot by final judgment is necessary to prevent premature review of the merits of the case. Isuani v. Manske-Sheffield Radiology Group, P.A. 802 S.W.2d 235 (Tex.1991).

The trial judge's June 30, 1999, Order renders this case nonjusticiable because any decision by this Court will not have a practical legal effect on the temporary injunction. The sole object of a temporary injunction is to preserve the subject of the controversy in its condition at the time of the order until opportunity is offered for full and deliberate trial investigation. Epps v. Bryant, 218 S.C. 359, 62 S.E.2d 832 (1950). Temporary injunctions are interlocutory, tentative, and impermanent and are superseded by the final judgment rendered on the merits....

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146 practice notes
  • State v. Dykes, No. 27124.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • 24 Julio 2013
    ...of an equal protection claim is showing that similarly situated persons received disparate treatment.”) (emphais added)); Curtis v. State, 345 S.C. 557, 575, 549 S.E.2d 591, 600 (2001) (noting if the case does not involve a suspect classification or a fundamental right, the question is whet......
  • In re Treatment and Care of Luckabaugh, No. 25503.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • 22 Julio 2002
    ...what level of scrutiny to apply. We employ strict scrutiny analysis if a law employs a suspect classification. See Curtis v. State, 345 S.C. 557, 549 S.E.2d 591 (2001); Bibco Corp. v. City of Sumter, 332 S.C. 45, 52, 504 S.E.2d 112, 116 (1998); see also 19 S.C. Juris. Constitutional Law § 8......
  • Sloan v. Greenville County, No. 3704.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of South Carolina
    • 8 Diciembre 2003
    ...Moot appeals differ from unripe appeals in that moot appeals result when intervening events render a case nonjusticiable. Curtis v. State, 345 S.C. 557, 567, 549 S.E.2d 591, 596 (2001). This Court will not pass on moot and academic questions or make an adjudication where there remains no ac......
  • Retail Servs. & Sys., Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue, Appellate Case No. 2014-002728
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • 29 Marzo 2017
    ...to a statute because all statutes are presumed constitutional and, if possible, will be construed to render them valid." Curtis v. State , 345 S.C. 557, 569, 549 S.E.2d 591, 597 (2001) (citing Davis v. Cnty. of Greenville , 322 S.C. 73, 77, 470 S.E.2d 94, 96 (1996) ). While article VIII-A, ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
147 cases
  • State v. Dykes, No. 27124.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • 24 Julio 2013
    ...of an equal protection claim is showing that similarly situated persons received disparate treatment.”) (emphais added)); Curtis v. State, 345 S.C. 557, 575, 549 S.E.2d 591, 600 (2001) (noting if the case does not involve a suspect classification or a fundamental right, the question is whet......
  • In re Treatment and Care of Luckabaugh, No. 25503.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • 22 Julio 2002
    ...what level of scrutiny to apply. We employ strict scrutiny analysis if a law employs a suspect classification. See Curtis v. State, 345 S.C. 557, 549 S.E.2d 591 (2001); Bibco Corp. v. City of Sumter, 332 S.C. 45, 52, 504 S.E.2d 112, 116 (1998); see also 19 S.C. Juris. Constitutional Law § 8......
  • Sloan v. Greenville County, No. 3704.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of South Carolina
    • 8 Diciembre 2003
    ...Moot appeals differ from unripe appeals in that moot appeals result when intervening events render a case nonjusticiable. Curtis v. State, 345 S.C. 557, 567, 549 S.E.2d 591, 596 (2001). This Court will not pass on moot and academic questions or make an adjudication where there remains no ac......
  • Retail Servs. & Sys., Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue, Appellate Case No. 2014-002728
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • 29 Marzo 2017
    ...to a statute because all statutes are presumed constitutional and, if possible, will be construed to render them valid." Curtis v. State , 345 S.C. 557, 569, 549 S.E.2d 591, 597 (2001) (citing Davis v. Cnty. of Greenville , 322 S.C. 73, 77, 470 S.E.2d 94, 96 (1996) ). While article VIII-A, ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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