Curtiss v. GSX Corp. of Colorado, 88SA114

Citation774 P.2d 873
Decision Date30 May 1989
Docket NumberNo. 88SA114,88SA114
PartiesRobert B. CURTISS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GSX CORPORATION OF COLORADO, formerly known as SCA Services of Colorado, Inc., a Colorado corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtSupreme Court of Colorado

Earl S. Wylder, Lakewood, Sullivan and Sullivan, P.C., Barrie G. Sullivan, II, Denver, for plaintiff-appellant.

Anderson, Campbell and Laugesen, P.C., Robert L. McGahey, Jr., Denver, for defendant-appellee.

QUINN, Chief Justice.

The question in this case is whether the statutory employer provisions of the Colorado Workers' Compensation Act, which immunize a company that contracts out any part of the work to a contractor from a common law action in tort for work-related injuries sustained by a worker-employee of the contractor, are violative of the state constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws, Colo. Const. art. II, § 25, the constitutional right of access to the courts, Colo. Const. art. II, § 6, and the constitutional prohibition against special legislation, Colo. Const. art. V, § 25. 1 The district court upheld the constitutionality of the statutory employer provisions and granted summary judgment in favor of the "contracting out" company on a tort claim filed against it by an injured employee of the contractor. We affirm the judgment of the district court.

I.

Colorado's Workers' Compensation Act represents a comprehensive administrative scheme for compensating workers for job-related injuries. Compensation under the statute does not require proof of fault, and an employee's recovery of benefits is intended to be the employee's exclusive remedy against an employer. Kandt v. Evans, 645 P.2d 1300, 1302 (Colo.1982). "These exclusivity provisions constitute part of the quid pro quo of workmen's compensation schemes, under which the employer assumes liability for work-related injuries irrespective of fault, and in return, employees are precluded from bringing actions at common law." Kandt, 645 P.2d at 1302. Compliance by the employer with the statute is construed as a surrender by both the employer and the employee of any other cause of action or common-law right or remedy for or on account of personal injuries sustained by the employee. § 8-43-104, 3B C.R.S. (1986); see Kandt, 645 P.2d at 1302. If an employer fails to comply with the insurance provisions of the statutory scheme, an employee is entitled to a fifty percent increase in benefits for any work-related injury. § 8-44-107(1), 3B C.R.S. (1986).

Section 8-48-101(1), 3B C.R.S. (1986), states that any company operating or engaged in conducting any business by contracting out any part or all of its work to a contractor or subcontractor, irrespective of the number of employees engaged in such work, is considered a statutory employer and is thus liable to pay workers' compensation benefits for any work-related injury to an employee of the contractor or subcontractor. 2 Pursuant to section 8-48-101(2), 3B C.R.S. (1986), if the contractor or subcontractor to which the company's work is contracted out is also an employer and maintains workers' compensation insurance, then the employee of the contractor or subcontractor has no action of any kind against the company contracting out any part of its work. 3 The purpose of these statutory employer provisions is to prevent an employer from evading compensation coverage by contracting out work instead of directly hiring the worker. San Isabel Electric Association v. Bramer, 182 Colo. 15, 19, 510 P.2d 438, 440 (1973).

A company contracting out any part of its work is considered a statutory employer even though the contractor or subcontractor to which the work is contracted out is also insured for workers' compensation benefits and actually provides the benefits to the injured worker. E.g., Edwards v. Price, 191 Colo. 46, 51, 550 P.2d 856, 859 (1976). Since under these circumstances the "contracting out" company would be liable for workers' compensation benefits in the event the contractor or subcontractor had failed to obtain workers' compensation insurance coverage, the "contracting out" company is entitled to invoke the tort immunity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act. Id.

II.

In this case, Robert B. Curtiss, the plaintiff, filed a tort claim against GSX Corporation (GSX), alleging that on April 4, 1984, he was employed by Chuck's Contract Labor, Inc. (Chuck's) and was assigned to work as a helper on a garbage truck owned and operated by GSX and that, while so employed, the driver of the garbage truck negligently drove over his right foot and the foot had to be surgically amputated. In its answer to the complaint GSX asserted that Curtiss' claim was barred by the Colorado Workers' Compensation Act because GSX was Curtiss' statutory employer at the time of the injury and was thus immune from suit.

GSX filed a motion for summary judgment based on a stipulation of facts executed by both GSX and Curtiss. The stipulated facts were as follows. Curtiss was employed as a laborer and paid by Chuck's, which was engaged in the business of providing temporary labor to other businesses. GSX was engaged in the business of collecting garbage, and Chuck's assigned Curtiss to work as a helper on a garbage truck owned and operated by GSX. 4 Chuck's paid Curtiss for the work, but Curtiss reported daily to GSX. On April 4, 1984, Curtiss was injured when a driver of a GSX truck drove the truck over Curtiss' right foot. Curtiss filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits and received medical and temporary disability from Chuck's workers' compensation insurer, the State Compensation Insurance Fund. On January 10, 1985, Curtiss settled his workers' compensation claim for $24,000. It was conceded by Curtiss that on the date of the injury GSX qualified as his statutory employer under the Workers' Compensation Act. Curtiss, however, defended against the motion for summary judgment by arguing that the tort immunity granted to statutory employers is unconstitutional as violative of the Colorado constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws, Colo. Const. art. II, § 25, the right of access to the courts, Colo. Const. art. II, § 6, and the constitutional prohibition against special legislation, Colo. Const. art. V, § 25.

The district court granted GSX's motion for summary judgment, ruling that GSX was Curtiss' statutory employer, that the Colorado Workers' Compensation Act precluded Curtiss' claim for injuries against a statutory employer, and that the tort immunity created by the statutory scheme did not violate the Colorado Constitution. Curtiss thereafter filed this appeal.

III.

We will address separately Curtiss' constitutional challenges to the statutory employer and immunity provisions of the Colorado Workers' Compensation Act.

A.

Curtiss initially asserts that the statutory employer provisions violate equal protection of the laws under the Colorado Constitution because they bar an employee of a contractor from suing in tort a "contracting out" company for work-related injuries, while no such statutory prohibition exists in other situations, such as, for example, a tort claim by a "loaned employee" against a "borrowing employer" for work-related injuries. See Continental Sales Corporation v. Stookesbury, 170 Colo. 16, 459 P.2d 566 (1969). In 1976 this court considered and rejected a similar challenge in Edwards v. Price, 191 Colo. 46, 550 P.2d 856 (1976). The court in Edwards held that the statutory scheme prohibiting an employee of a subcontractor from filing a tort action against a general contractor for work-related injuries did not violate equal protection of the laws, even though these same provisions did not prevent an employee of a subcontractor from bringing a tort claim against another subcontractor or an employee of a general contractor from bringing a tort claim against a subcontractor. The statutory classification that included within the category of "statutory employer" any general contractor that contracted out any part of its business to a subcontractor was reasonable because, according to the Edwards court, the general contractor was generally more financially secure than the subcontractor and thus better able to provide workers' compensation coverage for work-related injuries sustained by an employee of the subcontractor. The court also ruled in Edwards that this classification was reasonably related to the legitimate governmental objective of providing monetary relief for injured employees, without regard to fault, by making the more financially solvent general contractor ultimately responsible for workers' compensation benefits to the employees of all subcontractors. Id.; see also ...

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