Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Exhaust Parts, Inc., CURTISS-WRIGHT

• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Before PEARSON, TILLMAN; HORTON; PEARSON, TILLMAN
• Citation: Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Exhaust Parts, Inc., 144 So.2d 822 (Fla. App. 1962)
• Decision Date: 02 October 1962
• Docket Number: CURTISS-WRIGHT,No. 61-861,61-861
• Parties: CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, Appellant, v. EXHAUST PARTS, INC., a Florida corporation, as successor to Aviation Industries Corp., a New Jersey corporation, and Sigmund Berlant, individually and as president of Exhaust Parts, Inc., a Flroida corporation, Appellees.

Page 822

144 So.2d 822

CURTISS-WRIGHT CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, Appellant, v. EXHAUST PARTS, INC., a Florida corporation, as successor to Aviation Industries Corp., a New Jersey corporation, and Sigmund Berlant, individually and as president of Exhaust Parts, Inc., a Flroida corporation, Appellees.

No. 61-861.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Oct. 2, 1962.

Worley, Gautier & Dawes and Lynn F. Lummus, Miami, for appellant.

Max L. Rosentein and William E. Gladstone, Miami, for appellees.

Before PEARSON, TILLMAN, C. J., and HORTON and BARKDULL, JJ.

HORTON, Judge

Appellant, plaintiff below, seeks review of an adverse final order dismissing its cause and complaint with prejudice.

In 1958, plaintiff brought an action in New Jersey against Aviation Products Corporation (the predecessor of defendant Exhaust Parts Corporation), the defendant Berlant and others. This action culminated in a consent judgment which, in pertinent part, provided:

'* * * and it appearing that the complaint has been duly filed and served, and that issue has been joined, and it further appearing that this judgment bears the subscribed consent of the defendants;

'IT IS, on this 10th day of October, 1958, ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the defendants, * * * and their officers, * * * successors, and assigns, be and they are hereby jointly and severally, perpetually restrained and enjoined from disclosing to persons, firms, or corporations other than the plaintiff, * * *data, brawings, specifications or other information or copies or reproductions thereof furnished to them by the plaintiff, * * * and from using and disclosing, directly or indirectly, such data, drawings, specifications or other information furnished to them by the plaintiff, * * * in manufacturing, advertising for sale and selling aircraft engine component parts for (plaintiff's) aircraft engines.

'AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the defendants, * * * and their officers, * * * successors and assigns, be and they are hereby jointly and severally, perpetually restrained and enjoined from manufacturing, advertising for sale and selling the following aircraft engine component parts * * * made from or using, employing or embodying drawings, specifications or other information of plaintiff:

[here followed a list of some 18 specific aircraft engine component parts].

'AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the defendants * * * are hereby ordered * * * to forthwith surrender to the plaintiff, * * * all data, drawings, specifications and other information, including copies thereof, furnished to the defendants, * * * by the plaintiff.' [Emphasis supplied]

On October 6, 1959, plaintiff instituted this action by filing a complaint seeking an injunction, damages and other such relief as the court might deem proper. The complaint alleged that shortly after the entry of the New Jersey consent judgment, a copy of which was attached to the complaint, defendant Berlant moved to Florida and organized Exhaust Parts which was actively engaged in flagrantly violating the terms of the consent judgment with resultant irreparable damage to the plaintiff. The defendant answered admitting some of the allegations contained in the complaint and denying others. As an affirmative defense, defendants alleged, in substance, that they had fully complied with the terms of the consent judgment by returning all of the plaintiff's plans and data. They further alleged that those parts they were then manufacturing and selling were made from information and data commonly known and available in the business and not from information and data furnished to them by the plaintiff. In due course the cause came on for final hearing. The chancellor construed the consent judgment as being preclusive only of the manufacture and sale of parts by the defendants from information furnished to them by the plaintiff. From the evidence before him he concluded that the plaintiff had not proved this was being done. Accordin...