Custody of Walters, In re

• Decision Date: 30 September 1988
• Docket Number: No. 3-88-0003,3-88-0003
• Citation: Custody of Walters, In re, 529 N.E.2d 308, 174 Ill.App.3d 949, 124 Ill.Dec. 488 (Ill. App. 1988)
• Parties: , 124 Ill.Dec. 488 In re CUSTODY OF Charity Morgan WALTERS (Kimberly Bell Hanford, Petitioner- Appellant, v. Mary Walters, Respondent-Appellee, and Frank Wilhite, Respondent).
• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 308

529 N.E.2d 308

174 Ill.App.3d 949, 124 Ill.Dec. 488

In re CUSTODY OF Charity Morgan WALTERS (Kimberly Bell Hanford, Petitioner- Appellant, v. Mary Walters Respondent-Appellee, and Frank Wilhite Respondent).

No. 3-88-0003.

Appellate Court of Illinois Third District.

Sept. 30, 1988.

Ronald E. Boyer, Watseka, for Kimberly Bell Hanford.

Gordon Lustfeldt, Watseka, for Charity Morgan Walters, Frank Wilhite.

Justice BARRY delivered the opinion of the court.

Petitioner, Kimberly Bell Hanford, appeals from judgment entered by the circuit court of Iroquois County denying her petition for custody of her minor daughter, Charity Morgan Walters. Charity has been in the physical custody of her maternal grandmother, respondent Mary Walters, since infancy. In 1979, when Charity was two years old, a decree was entered by the circuit court of Benton County, Indiana, granting custody to Mrs. Walters as prayed for in her uncontested petition. Petitioner brought this action in August, 1986, alleging a substantial change in her own living arrangements and praying for a modification of custody pursuant to sections 601 and 2104 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriages Act. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 40, pars. 601 and 2104.) The matter was tried in March, 1987, at which point counsel for petitioner took the position that the provisions for modification of custody under the Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 40, par. 610) did not apply because the Indiana decree was not entered as a result of dissolution proceedings. The trial judge ultimately recited that he believed that section 610 applied and that the petitioner, having invoked the Act in her pleadings, could not claim otherwise; and that, "even assuming the burden to be on defendant to present evidence overcoming the presumption raised by the 'Natural Right Doctrine,' the evidence overwhelmingly supports the continued custody in defendant."

In this appeal, petitioner contends that the trial court improperly held her to the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that a modification of a prior custody order was in the child's best interest; and that the trial court's determination that continued custody in defendant was in the child's best interest was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. For reasons that follow, we affirm.

Petitioner relies primarily on In re Custody of Townsend (1981), 86 Ill.2d 502, 56 Ill.Dec. 685, 427 N.E.2d 1231, as support for her position that the trial court should have placed the burden upon respondent to establish good cause to overcome the presumption that petitioner, as the natural parent, had a superior right to the custody of her daughter. We have reviewed Townsend, as well as numerous cases cited by respondent, and find that petitioner's point is well taken. But our determination on this issue does not mandate prolonging this litigation.

In Townsend, as here, the minor child (Christy) was born to parents who were not married to each other. There, the natural mother (Dorothy Salmons) was incarcerated for the murder of the wife of Christy's natural father (Townsend) when Christy was two years old. At the time, Christy was in the physical custody of her half-sister (Brenda Poling). Townsend immediately brought suit seeking custody of his daughter. Brenda resisted the petition and counter-petitioned for custody. The trial court ruled that the parties had equal burdens to prove that the child's best interests would be served by granting custody to them. The court found both petitioners fit and held that it was in the child's best interests to award custody to Poling. This determination was reversed by a divided court on review, the majority holding that Brenda had failed to show a "compelling reason why custody should not be placed with the natural parent." In re Custody of Townsend (4th Dist.1980), 90 Ill.App.3d 292, 45 Ill.Dec. 950, 953, 413 N.E.2d 428, 431. The appellate court's decision was, in turn, reversed by a divided supreme court. The court declared that a third party petitioner (Brenda) has the burden "to establish good cause or reason to overcome the presumption that ... the natural [parent] had the first and superior right to the custody of his [child]." The trial court had erred in failing to give the natural parent's first and superior right to custody of his daughter appropriate consideration. The court further noted that remand was necessary for consideration of subsequent extenuating circumstances--namely the respective marriages of Dorothy, Brenda and Townsend--during the pendency of the cause on review. Whether the child would be welcomed into her new step-mother's home was an important question to be factored into the ultimate custody determination. 86 Ill.2d at 515, 427 N.E.2d at 1238.

The Townsend court acknowledged that guidelines for determining custody in a situation involving neither adoption, nor a dissolution of marriage, nor an intervention by the State nor the death of a parent must nonetheless be gleaned from statutory provisions applicable to those situations. The court found particularly instructive the court's discussion in People ex rel. Edwards v. Livingston (1969), 42 Ill.2d 201, 247 N.E.2d 417. There, the natural parent's "superior right" was presumed as against a third party seeking to obtain or retain custody and could be overcome only for good cause or reason; and, further, the third party "must show that it was in the child's best interests that the third person be awarded the care, custody and control of the minor." Although the natural parent's unfitness was not established, the circumstances demonstrated little if any communication with the child for the better part of 12 years. During that time, the child had lived with his grandfather where he found affection, understanding, guidance, security and a generally wholesome atmosphere. The child appeared to be happy and well-adjusted in his grandfather's home. On these facts, the Livingston court...