Cutchember v. Payne

Citation466 A.2d 1240
Decision Date19 September 1983
Docket NumberNo. 81-1045.,81-1045.
PartiesKathy M. CUTCHEMBER, Appellant, v. Joseph PAYNE, Jr., Appellee.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Columbia District

Diana M. Savit, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Washington, D.C., with whom Judith W. Rogers, Corp. Counsel, and Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corp. Counsel, Washington, D.C., were on brief, for appellant. Philip T. VanZile III, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Washington, D.C., also entered an appearance for appellant.

David A. Lee, Washington, D.C., for appellee.

Before NEBEKER, PRYOR and TERRY, Associate Judges.

NEBEKER, Associate Judge:

This is an appeal of a trial court ruling disallowing the introduction of the results of a human leukocyte antigen (HLA) test into evidence. These results would have demonstrated a high degree of probability that appellee fathered appellant's child. Implicit in the trial court's ruling is the determination that an HLA test is a blood test within the purview of D.C.Code § 16-2343 (1981), the results of which are, therefore, inadmissible as affirmative proof of paternity over appellee's objection. We hold that an HLA test is not a blood test within the meaning of § 16-2343 and that the results were improperly excluded. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

Appellant, Kathy M. Cutchember, filed a petition for support for her minor child, Kesha, in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, Maryland, pursuant to the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA). See Uniform Support Act, D.C.Code §§ 30-301 to -324 (1981); URESA, Md.Ann.Code, art. 89C, §§ 1-30 (1957). The petition for support alleged that appellee, Joseph Payne, Jr., a District of Columbia resident, is Kesha's father. Kesha was born to appellant out of wedlock on February 23, 1974. As the initiating state under URESA, Maryland transferred the petition to the District of Columbia to obtain jurisdiction over Payne, and to determine whether he owed Kesha a duty of support and, if so, in what amount. Appellee denies paternity.

During discovery, both parties, through counsel, agreed to submit to an HLA test and to blood grouping tests. The results of the HLA test demonstrated that 99.96 percent of the population could not have fathered this child and that Payne is within the small remaining class of men who carry the necessary HLA markers. At trial, however, Payne objected to the admission of the HLA results, based upon relevancy and the provisions of § 16-2343. This statute provides in pertinent part:

Blood tests.

When it is relevant to an action over which the Division has jurisdiction under section 11-1101, the court may direct that the child, respondent and the other parent if available submit to one or more blood tests to determine whether or not the respondent can be excluded as being the father or mother, as the case may be, of the child, but the results of the test may be admitted as evidence only in cases where the respondent does not object to its admissibility.

The trial court acknowledged relevance but ruled that the language of the statute precluded the introduction of the test results over the objection of Payne. Based upon the remaining evidence in the case, the trial court found that Cutchember had failed to prove that Payne was Kesha's father. This appeal followed.

The District of Columbia's first blood test statute, substantially similar to § 16-2343, was enacted in 1951. See Pub.L. No. 81-917, 64 Stat. 1225 (1951). At that time, the only known blood tests used for paternity testing were the ABO, MN and Rh-Hr tests. These tests, commonly known as the Lansteiner blood grouping tests, utilize factors found within red blood cells. Red blood cell groupings involve only a small number of variables and, while they may conclusively eliminate the possibility of paternity, they are inconclusive proof of parentage because the probability of paternity based solely upon nonexclusion is usually not very high. See Terasaki, Resolution by HLA Testing of 1000 Paternity Cases Not Excluded by ABO Testing, 16 J.Fam.L. 543 (1977-78). Statutes such as D.C.Code § 16-2343 which limit the use of blood test results to cases in which paternity can be excluded were enacted in order to prevent the improper and prejudicial use of a finding of non-exclusion based upon blood grouping tests.

There is a great difference, however, between red blood cell grouping tests and HLA tissue tests. The HLA test was developed around 1966 to aid in matching tissue types for organ transplant operations. For practical reasons, HLA testing is generally performed upon white blood cells, although a component, leukocyte cells, is found throughout the body's...

To continue reading

Request your trial
13 cases
  • Com. v. Beausoleil
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • 3 Abril 1986
    ...used the term "blood types" which is associated with the Landsteiner series of red cell blood grouping tests); Cutchember v. Payne, 466 A.2d 1240, 1241-1242 (D.C.1983) (HLA test is not a blood test within the statutory meaning, but a tissue test for which blood is merely a convenient testin......
  • Kofford v. Flora
    • United States
    • Utah Supreme Court
    • 30 Septiembre 1987
    ...concerned with HLA testing for the purpose of proving paternity. Moore v. McNamara, 201 Conn. 16, 513 A.2d 660 (1986); Cutchember v. Payne, 466 A.2d 1240 (D.C.1983); Carlyon v. Weeks, 387 So.2d 465 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980); Crain v. Crain, 104 Idaho 666, 662 P.2d 538 (1983); Davis v. State, 4......
  • Moore v. McNamara
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 12 Agosto 1986
    ... ... the available scientific and medicolegal commentary that the HLA system is not a blood grouping test, but is a tissue typing system"); Cutchember v. Payne, 466 A.2d 1240, 1241-42 ... Page 667 ... (D.C.1983) (HLA test is not a blood test within the statutory meaning, but a tissue test for ... ...
  • S.A. v. M.A.
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • 6 Octubre 1987
    ...paternity operate, but both parties conceded sexual relations during the presumptive period of conception. See Cutchember v. Payne, supra note 2, 466 A.2d at 1242 ("access remains of critical significance"). Moreover, appellee testified under oath that she engaged in no other sexual relatio......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT