Cutcomp v. Utt

• Court: Iowa Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: ROTHROCK, J.
• Citation: Cutcomp v. Utt, 60 Iowa 156, 14 N.W. 214 (Iowa 1882)
• Decision Date: 08 December 1882
• Parties: CUTCOMP v. UTT, MAYOR, ETC

14 N.W. 214

60 Iowa 156

CUTCOMP v. UTT, MAYOR, ETC

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

December 8, 1882

Appeal from Louisa District Court.

THIS is an action of mandamus by which it is sought to compel the defendant, who is mayor of Columbus City, to issue to the plaintiff a license authorizing him to sell wine and beer and also to keep billiard tables, for the period of one year from the thirteenth day of April, 1881. Upon a trial the District Court refused to grant the writ prayed for by plaintiff, and he appeals.

AFFIRMED.

Sprague & Springer, for appellant.

E. W Tatlock, for appellee.

OPINION

ROTHROCK, J.

I.

It appears from the record and evidence in the case that, at the time of the city election, in March, 1881, there was an ordinance in force by which the keepers of beer saloons were required to pay an annual license of twenty dollars, and the keepers of billiard saloons were required to pay a like amount for each billiard table kept by them. At said election there appears to have been a change made in the city council upon the question of licenses, and on the eighth day of April, 1881, the council met, and an ordinance was introduced changing the license fee to $ 1,000 on beer saloons, and $ 60 on each billiard table. The offered ordinance passed to its first reading by a majority, and the council adjourned to the ninth of April when, by a majority, the ordinance was read a second time, and the council again adjourned until the eleventh of the same month, when the ordinance was read a third time and passed by a majority, to take effect April 17th, 1881. The plaintiff, on the thirteenth day of April, paid his money to the treasurer of the city for license under the old ordinance and demanded that license should be issued to him for one year from that day. The defendant refused to issue the license, and this action to compel him to do so was commenced on the seventeenth of the same month.

It is contended that the new ordinance is void, because the adjourned meetings of the council at which it was read a second and third times and passed, without there being at any time a majority vote of three-fourths of the council, was illegal, and that the adjourned meetings were nothing but a continuation of the regular meeting, and authorities are cited which appear to hold that an adjourned meeting of the trustees or council of a municipal corporation is but a continuation of the regular...