Cutliff v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.

• Decision Date: 02 September 1977
• Docket Number: No. 75-2770,75-2770
• Citation: 558 F.2d 803
• Parties: 15 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 671, 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 7805 Ula CUTLIFF et al., Plaintiffs, Kenneth Shaw, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GREYHOUND LINES, INCORPORATED, a Foreign Corporation, Local Lodge 570, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, and Max M. Daniel, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 803

558 F.2d 803

15 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 671, 14 Empl. Prac.

Dec. P 7805

Ula CUTLIFF et al., Plaintiffs, Kenneth Shaw, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GREYHOUND LINES, INCORPORATED, a Foreign Corporation, Local

Lodge 570, International Association of Machinists and

Aerospace Workers, International Association of Machinists

and Aerospace Workers, and Max M. Daniel, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 75-2770.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Sept. 2, 1977.

Morris W. Milton, St. Petersburg, Fla., for plaintiff-appellant.

Frank E. Hamilton, III (Rep. Local 570 et al.), Fort Lauderdale, Fla., William E. Sizemore, Tampa, Fla., for Greyhound.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Before GEWIN, AINSWORTH and SIMPSON, Circuit Judges.

SIMPSON, Circuit Judge:

Three blacks, the sole appellant Shaw and two others not parties to this appeal ¹ brought action in the district court under Title 42, U.S.C. § 1981 and under Title 42, U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, jurisdiction being asserted under Title 28, U.S.C. § 1343(4).

The amended complaint sought damages and mandatory and prohibitory injunctions, charging Greyhound Lines, Inc. (Greyhound or the Company), International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (the International) and Local Lodge 570, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO (the Local) ² with racial discrimination in Greyhound's St. Petersburg, Florida, facility against blacks in employment, promotion and furlough (lay-off) practices.

The trial court denied motions to dismiss the amended complaint and other pretrial motions, and held a bench trial on the issues raised by the amended complaint and the amended answers of Greyhound and the Union as merged into and restated by the Pre-trial Stipulation. The court entered judgments on the merits for each of the defendants, and filed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which supported the judgments.

Both by appropriate motions and by their amended answers all defendants raised statute of limitation defenses. All were disallowed by the trial court. For reasons briefly indicated below, we conclude that both § 1981 claims were barred by the applicable Statute of Limitations. We further conclude that the court should have dismissed the Title VII claims for failure to prove subject matter jurisdiction, as urged by motions filed by all defendants at the close of the evidence. We therefore affirm the judgments below without reaching the merits.

A § 1981 claim was asserted against each defendant, while, under the issues as finally framed for trial, the § 2000e-5 violation was charged against the two Unions only.

On December 9, 1971, because of a reduction in force, Shaw was furloughed from his mechanic classification with Greyhound. He had held the classification since 1963, following since 1955 employment as a Cleaner, a lower classification. A job as mechanic was added by Greyhound in early August 1972, was opened to bids, and was awarded on August 15, 1972, to Max M. Daniel, a former white mechanic employee who had been furloughed on October 4, 1971. The position of Greyhound and the Unions at trial was that the award to Daniel was required by the collective bargaining agreement between Greyhound and the International, under the terms of which Daniel was the senior bidder. ³ The trial court's upholding of this contention was the undergirding for its decision on the merits.

I. THE § 1981 CLAIMS

The original complaint in this action was filed October 17, 1973, alleging racial discrimination in the August 1972 denial of promotion to Shaw, both under Title VII and under § 1981.

Since Shaw had not filed charges against Greyhound with the EEOC, a jurisdictional prerequisite to an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, the Title VII claim against Greyhound was properly dismissed by the district court, as conceded here by appellant.

As § 1981 contains no statute of limitations, we have held that federal courts will follow the most "closely analogous" state limitation statute. Franks v. Bowen Transport, 495 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1974). We held in Johnson v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, 491 F.2d 1364, 1379 (5th Cir. 1974) that Florida Statutes § 95.11(7)(b)'s ⁴ one year proscription was the applicable Florida limitation statute in § 1981 employment discrimination cases. As more than one year elapsed between the denial of promotion to Shaw on August 15, 1972 and the filing of suit on October 17, 1973, the § 1981 claim as to Greyhound was time-barred. ⁵

The § 1981 action as to the Unions was likewise brought out of time under Fla. Statutes § 95.11(7)(b). The rule prevailing in this circuit, prior to Johnson v. American Railway Express ⁶ was that the timely filing of a Title VII complaint with the EEOC tolled ⁷ the Statute of Limitations as to a corresponding § 1981 claim. See Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974); Boudreaux v. Baton Rouge Marine Contracting Co., 437 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1971). But in Johnson the Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations applicable to an action under § 1981 is not tolled during the pendency of proceedings before the EEOC, since for purposes of limitation the two types of claim are separate and distinct. Johnson left unanswered whether its holding was to be applied retroactively. ⁸ The answer for this circuit has been supplied: Johnson does apply retroactively. See Williams v. Phil Rich Fan Manufacturing Co., Inc., 552 F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1977), Dupree v. Hutchins Brothers, 521 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1975).

Under retroactive application of Johnson, the one year Florida limitation was a bar to the § 1981 claim against both the International and Local Lodge 570.

II. THE TITLE VII CLAIMS

The collective bargaining agreement (and prior agreements) under which Daniel was given preference in filling the mechanic position at St. Petersburg in August 1972, was entered into between the International Union and Greyhound Motor Lines-East, a Division of Greyhound Motor Lines, Inc. Local Lodge 1831 was the local union designated to represent Greyhound's employees at its St. Petersburg, Florida maintenance facility, until its membership was merged into Local 570 in June 1973. Prior to that time, Local 570 was a stranger to Greyhound and to its St. Petersburg operation. (Findings of Fact of trial court Nos. 8 and 9, App. 251).

Local Lodge 570, along with the International and Greyhound, was named as a defendant in the court suit below. Local 1831 was not sued. Both the original complaint and the amended complaint alleged in Paragraph XII that:

"On January 9, 1973, Plaintiffs filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging violations by the Defendants union of Plaintiffs' rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. 2000 (2000e) et seq. On or about July 26, 1973 Plaintiffs were advised that the charges were still pending investigation by the Commission, but that since 180 days had elapsed from the filing of the charges, Plaintiffs were entitled to initiate a civil action in the United States District Court as provided by 42 U.S.C.A. 2000e-5(f) of the Act." (underscoring ours).

The Answers of both Local Lodge 570 and the International Union joined issue as to these averments:

"12. The allegations of Paragraph XII are denied."

Neither Union defendant receded from this position throughout the course of subsequent pleadings and pretrial statements of position. The point was reiterated by each on motions for directed verdict at the close of the trial, supported by detailed written memoranda, asserting plaintiff's failure to prove jurisdiction under Title VII by proof of timely filing before the EEOC of the charges of discrimination asserted in the lawsuit. On this basis each asserts that since the sole proof at trial of filing of the contents of the claimed charges before the EEOC was the "Right to Sue" letters introduced in evidence, jurisdiction was never established and the respective motions for directed verdicts were due to be granted by the trial court.

We agree that the allegations of Paragraph XII were jurisdictional, and that if plaintiff Shaw did not discharge his burden of proving them, the complaint was due to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

The filing of a charge with the EEOC is one of two conditions precedent or jurisdictional prerequisites to suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Beverly v. Lone Star Lead Const. Corp., 437 F.2d 1136, 1139 (5th Cir. 1971); Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283, 291 (5th Cir. 1969).

The other jurisdictional prerequisite is proof of receipt of the statutory notice of right to sue. Beverly v. Lone Star Lead Const. Corp., supra; Miller v. International Paper Co., supra; Carr v. Conoco Plastics, Inc., 423 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. 1970).

The only proofs plaintiff offered at trial were the filing of the two "Right to Sue" letters, one as to International Association of Machinists, and the other as to Local 1831, not as to Local 570. Plaintiff did not testify as to filing any charge with EEOC, or when he had filed any charge, or the subject of the discrimination asserted (assuming that charges were filed).

Both Union defendants were entitled to directed verdicts or some equivalent relief for failure to establish jurisdiction before the district court. The district court held as a matter of law that:

The failure of defendant (1) International or (2) Local 570 to object to the introduction of a "right to sue letter" establishes that the jurisdictional prerequisites to bringing this action under 42 U.S.C. 2000e, et seq., were established as to them.

Conclusions of Law, 3, App. p. 257.

This was an acceptance by the district court of the plaintiff-appellant's position below (and before us) that "a...