Cutner v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 03 June 2022
• Docket Number: C. A. 9:20-cv-04119-JMC-MHC
• Parties: Lamont W. Cutner, Plaintiff, v. Sheik Johnson, South Carolina Department of Corrections, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

Lamont W. Cutner, Plaintiff,
v.
Sheik Johnson, South Carolina Department of Corrections, Defendants.

C. A. No. 9:20-cv-04119-JMC-MHC

United States District Court, D. South Carolina

June 3, 2022

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Molly H. Cherry United States Magistrate Judge

Before the Court are two Motions to Dismiss, or in the alternative for Summary Judgment, filed separately by Defendants South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) and Sheik Johnson (collectively “Defendants”). ECF Nos. 20, 21. Plaintiff Lamont W. Cutner (“Plaintiff”) filed Responses in Opposition (ECF Nos. 22, 23), and Defendant SCDC filed a Reply (ECF No. 24). The Motions are ripe for review.

All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.). Because Defendants' Motions are dispositive, this Report and Recommendation is entered for review by the District Judge. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends granting the Motions in part and denying the Motions in part.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (SCTCA), alleging violations of his constitutional rights while he was incarcerated at Lieber Correctional Institution, a facility run by Defendant SCDC. ECF No. 1. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges an Eighth Amendment claim for excessive force and a SCTCA claim for gross negligence.

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The facts are largely derived from an SCDC investigative report compiled by Agent Richard Darling, who investigated this incident. In his report, Agent Darling compiled SCDC incident reports and interviewed Plaintiff, Defendant Johnson, Lieutenant Alton Brown, Sergeant Dana Knowlin, and Nurse Tara Sullivan. ECF No. 21-2. Defendant Johnson was a correctional officer at Lieber Correctional Institution at the time of the incident, but he is no longer employed by Defendant SCDC.^[1]

On October 18, 2018, Plaintiff was in an area where inmates are allowed to conduct telephone calls with their attorneys. ECF No. 21-2 at 1-2, 4. Plaintiff was escorted by Lieutenant Brown. ECF No. 21-2 at 1-2, 4. Plaintiff was in handcuffs and leg irons at the time. ECF No. 206 at 2.

At some point, Defendant Johnson entered the same room, and Plaintiff became agitated because he was upset with Defendant Johnson, as Defendant Johnson had been involved in the use of chemical munitions against Plaintiff a few days prior. ECF No. 21-2 at 1-2, 4. Plaintiff verbally confronted Defendant Johnson about the incident, asking Defendant Johnson whether he wanted to go “another round.” ECF No. 21-2 at 2, 4. According to Defendant Johnson, he initially ignored Plaintiff. ECF No. 21-2 at 3-4.

Words continued to be exchanged, and eventually Plaintiff stood up from his chair. According to Lieutenant Brown, once Plaintiff stood up, Lieutenant Brown told Defendant Johnson to leave the room. ECF No. 21-2 at 2, 7. Defendant Johnson did not leave. Instead, he

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verbally engaged with Plaintiff and told Plaintiff to sit down. ECF No. 21-2 at 2, 7. Plaintiff did not sit down. According to Defendant Johnson, Lieutenant Brown and Sergeant Knowlin stood between him and Plaintiff. ECF No. 21-2 at 4.

What happened next is unclear. Lieutenant Brown claimed he fell backward over his chair and did not see what happened next. ECF No. 21-2 at 7. According to Defendant Johnson, Plaintiff stood, made eye contact, and “walked closer.” ECF No. 21-2 at 4. Sergeant Knowlin stated that Plaintiff “made a step trying to charge at [Defendant] Johnson.” ECF No. 21-2 at 5. Plaintiff stated that Defendant Johnson pushed Lieutenant Brown and Sergeant Knowlin out of the way to get to him, which resulted in Lieutenant Brown falling over. ECF No. 21-2 at 8.

According to Sergeant Knowlin's and Defendant Johnson's incident reports, when Plaintiff refused to sit down in his chair, Defendant Johnson went and “placed” Plaintiff back into his chair. ECF No. 21-2 at 4-5. In a statement given to Agent Darling, Plaintiff stated that Defendant Johnson punched him in the head and face with a closed fist two times. ECF No. 21-1 at 8. In Agent Darling's report on the use of force incident, he recounts that Sergeant Knowlin stated in a phone interview that Defendant Johnson “did not hit [Plaintiff] at all.” ECF No. 21-2 at 3. Lieutenant Brown heard Plaintiff say that Defendant Johnson hit him in the head several times, but he did not actually witness Defendant Johnson hit Plaintiff because he had fallen backward over his chair. ECF No. 21-2 at 2, 7.

Once Lieutenant Brown got back to his feet, he escorted Defendant Johnson out of the room and called medical staff to tend to Plaintiff. ECF No. 21-2 at 2, 7. Nurse Sullivan examined Plaintiff. ECF No. 21-2 at 6. Her initial evaluation at approximately 1:00 pm did not reveal any visible injury. ECF No. 21-2 at 6. However, when she checked Plaintiff at 5:30 pm later that day, she noted “some swelling on right side of head.” ECF No. 21-2 at 6. Her orders were to give

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Plaintiff an ice pack and Tylenol for pain, and she provided Neuro checks every fifteen minutes at Plaintiff's cell. ECF No. 21-2 at 6.

Plaintiff initially filed this action in the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas for Dorchester County. ECF No. 1. The action was removed to this Court by Defendants. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages from Defendants.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.^[2] ECF Nos. 20, 21. Summary judgment is appropriate if a party “shows there is no genuine dispute as to any issue of material fact” and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Under the framework established in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), the party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the Court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, must demonstrate that specific, material facts exist which give rise to a genuine issue. Id. at 324.

Under this standard, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, although the Court views all the underlying facts and inferences in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the non-moving “party nonetheless must offer some ‘concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his [or her] favor.'” Williams v. Genex Servs., LLC, 809 F.3d 103, 109 (4th Cir. 2015)

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(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256). That is to say, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory or speculative allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment motion. Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. To survive summary judgment, the non-movant must provide evidence of every element essential to his action on which he will bear the burden of proving at a trial on the merits. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff brings his federal claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and his state law claim under the SCTCA, SC Code Ann. § 15-78-10, et seq. For the reasons below, the undersigned recommends granting summary judgment to Defendant SCDC on Plaintiff's § 1983 claim, but not on Plaintiff's state law claim, and recommends granting summary judgment to Defendant Johnson on Plaintiff's state law claim, but not on Plaintiff's § 1983 claim.

A. Federal claim under § 1983

Plaintiff does not differentiate between Defendant SCDC or Defendant Johnson for purposes of his § 1983 excessive force claim, as he only refers to “Defendants” generally in his allegations. See ECF No. 1-3 at 7. Defendants assert that they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's § 1983 claims because, inter alia: (1) Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies before filing this action, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); (2) they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment Immunity; (3) Defendant

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Johnson's actions did not violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights; and (4) Defendant Johnson is entitled to qualified immunity. The Court addresses each argument in turn.

1. Failure to exhaust under the PLRA

The PLRA requires an inmate to exhaust “such administrative remedies as are available” before bringing suit under § 1983 to challenge prison conditions. Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 635 (2016) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)). “[T]he PLRA's exhaustion requirement is mandatory.” Anderson v. XYZ Corr. Health Servs., Inc., 407 F.3d 674, 677 (4th Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Custis v. Davis, 851 F.3d 358, 363 (4th Cir. 2017); see also Graham v. Gentry, 413 Fed.Appx. 660, 663 (4th Cir. 2011) (“The exhaustion requirement is mandatory, and courts lack the authority to waive that requirement.”). Section 1997e mandates “proper” exhaustion; thus, a “procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal” does not satisfy the mandatory exhaustion requirement. Woodfordv. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 83-84 (2006).

The PLRA “applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general...