Cutsinger v. Spears Mfg. Co., Inc., 26089.
Decision Date | 28 June 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 26089.,26089. |
Citation | 50 P.3d 479,137 Idaho 464 |
Parties | Charles E. CUTSINGER, Claimant-Appellant, v. SPEARS MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., Employer and AIU Insurance Company, Surety, Defendants-Respondents. |
Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Petersen & Parkinson, P.C., Idaho Falls, for appellant. James Arnold argued.
Anderson, Julian & Hull, Boise, for respondents. Natalie Camacho Mendoza argued.
Claimant Charles E. Cutsinger (Cutsinger) appeals the Industrial Commission's (Commission) decision in which the Commission denied him benefits for the aggravation of his preexisting condition. We affirm.
Cutsinger suffered a left elbow injury in the eighth grade while he was playing football. Cutsinger subsequently sought medical treatment for the injury, and he had several surgeries to correct the injury between 1980 and 1990.
In 1994, Cutsinger went to work as a fabricator at Spears Manufacturing (Spears), a manufacturer of pipe fittings and valves. While working for Spears, Cutsinger's left arm and wrist began to bother him again. He continued to work for Spears until November of 1996, when he temporarily left to pursue another employment opportunity. He returned to work for Spears in February of 1997, and resumed his previous job duties. Following his return, Cutsinger complained of pain and swelling in his wrist, and he sought further medical attention, including another surgery. On April 8, 1998, a medical doctor, Dr. Porter, linked Cutsinger's wrist problem to his elbow injury and surgical attempts to correct the elbow injury. Dr. Michael Phillips, an orthopedic surgeon, examined Cutsinger on December 28, 1998, and he stated that in his opinion, the wrist problem was totally attributable to Cutsinger's elbow injury.
Cutsinger was given a release to return to work in January 1999, and he sought worker's compensation for his wrist injury. The referee found that Cutsinger's work activities, involving repetitive wrist movement, aggravated and/or accelerated his preexisting condition.
The referee, however, found that Cutsinger had not proven to a reasonable degree of medical probability that an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment caused the aggravation or acceleration of his preexisting condition. The referee noted that even though Cutsinger had testified about two industrial accidents involving his left wrist, he had not presented medical evidence supporting a causal relationship between either of the alleged accidents and the aggravation of his condition. The referee further observed that Dr. Porter had cited the repetitive nature of Cutsinger's work activity, and not a specific incident, as the cause of the symptoms. The referee thus concluded:
[E]ven assuming Claimant has met his burden of proving an occupational disease, his claim remains non-compensable under Nistad, Nelson, [Nelson v. Ponsness-Warren Idgas Enters., 126 Idaho 129, 879 P.2d 592 (1994)] and its progeny because proof of a precipitating accident is lacking. Thus, the remaining issues of occupational disease, medical benefits, temporary disability, permanent partial impairment, and attorney fees are rendered moot.
The Industrial Commission subsequently adopted the referee's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Cutsinger filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court on December 13, 1999.
On appeal, the sole issue raised is whether the legislature intended to overrule Nelson v. Ponsness-Warren Idgas Enter., 126 Idaho 129, 879 P.2d 592 (1994), and its progeny when it amended Idaho Code § 72-439 in 1997. Nelson required that there be an accident before a preexisting condition, which becomes aggravated, is covered by worker's compensation benefits. This very issue was recently decided, in February 2002, by this Court in Koch v. Micron Technology, 136 Idaho 885, 42 P.3d 678. In Koch we wrote:
Id. at 887, 42 P.3d 678. We therefore affirm the Industrial Commission's denial of Cutsinger worker's compensation benefits because there is substantial and competent evidence to support the Commission's finding of fact, that Cutsinger did not suffer an accident that aggravated his preexisting condition and that finding is not challenged on appeal.
We affirm the Industrial Commission's ruling and award costs to Spears on appeal.
Upon consideration, I believe it is time to realistically interpret this problem area of the worker's compensation law. I have been faithful to stare decisis in this troublesome and anti-worker statutory interpretation in past cases, but continuing to sign on to the idea that an accident must occur to establish an occupational disease defies logic. Therefore, I dissent with a full analysis.
The Industrial Commission's conclusions of law are freely reviewable by this Court. Taylor v. Soran Rest., Inc., 131 Idaho 525, 527, 960 P.2d 1254, 1256 (1998). Factual findings will be upheld if supported by substantial, competent evidence. Id. Constitutional issues as well as the construction and application of legislative acts are questions of law subject to free review by this Court. Struhs v. Prot. Tech.'s, Inc., 133 Idaho 715, 722, 992 P.2d 164, 171 (1999).
A. Proving That A Specific Accident Aggravated Or Accelerated A Preexisting Condition Or Disease Should No Longer Be Required For Recovery Under The Occupational Disease Theory.
According to Idaho's worker's compensation law, a claimant needs to establish that an "accident" aggravated or accelerated a preexisting condition or disease, to be entitled to compensation under an occupational disease theory. Reyes v. Kit Mfg. Co., 131 Idaho 239, 953 P.2d 989 (1998). In Nelson v. Ponsness-Warren Idgas Enters., 126 Idaho 129, 879 P.2d 592 (1994), this Court set forth a rigid definition of "accident" that has had far-reaching effects to claimants seeking recovery under Idaho's worker's compensation law. See, e.g., Combes v. State Indus. Special Indem. Fund, 130 Idaho 430, 942 P.2d 554 (1997)
; McGee v. J.D. Lumber Co., 135 Idaho 328, 17 P.3d 272 (2000); DeMain v. Bruce McLaughlin Logging Co., 132 Idaho 782, 979 P.2d 655 (1999); Reyes v. Kit Mfg. Co., 131 Idaho 239, 953 P.2d 989 (1998).
One particular group of claimants that has been adversely affected by this ruling is that group seeking relief under an occupational disease theory. Claimants pursuing relief under this theory for the aggravation or acceleration of a preexisting condition caused by repetitive trauma or the sudden onset of symptoms experienced in the workplace, absent a showing of one specific event, are denied recovery under this Court's current case law.
After carefully reviewing the cases upon which Nelson is based, I find that a claimant need not establish that an accident, as previously defined by this Court, accelerated or aggravated a preexisting condition to pursue a claim under an occupational disease theory. This position furthers the legislative intent behind the relevant code provisions and is in accord with the worker's compensation cases that formed the foundation for our current law. I begin my task of supporting this position by examining this Court's holding in the case which solidified the "accident" requirement in the context of an occupational disease case, Nelson v. Ponsness-Warren Idgas Enterprises.
In Nelson, the claimant was diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome and possible thoracic outlet syndrome in 1980. Id. at 130, 879 P.2d at 593. In 1988, she began working on an assembly line at Ponsness-Warren Idgas Enterprises. Id. The job required repetitive tightening of screws and thus twisting and turning of her hands throughout the day. Id. Nelson's symptoms became worse and carpal tunnel release surgery was performed on both hands in May of 1989. Id. Her treating physician, Dr. Pike, believed that she suffered from a work-related aggravated condition. Id. Although Nelson experienced pain in her left hand after surgery, she briefly returned to work at Ponsness-Warren in July of 1989. Id. Throughout 1989, Nelson complained of pain in her left arm and shoulder. Id. As of October of 1989, Dr. Pike believed that her carpal tunnel syndrome was stable and resolved and she should not be rated as permanently impaired from the condition. Id. A panel of physicians hired by Ponsness-Warren examined Nelson and determined that she suffered no permanent partial impairment from carpal tunnel syndrome. I...
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