Cuvo v. De Bias
| Citation | 339 F.Supp.2d 650 |
| Decision Date | 30 September 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. Civ.A.03-CV-5799.,Civ.A.03-CV-5799. |
| Parties | Jack Walter CUVO, and Jennifer Cuvo, Plaintiffs v. Christopher DE BIAS, Officer, Individually and in his Official Capacity as a Member of the Palmer Township Police Department, Daniel Monek, Detective, Individually and in his Official Capacity as a Member of the Palmer Township Police Department, Bruce Fretz, Chief of Police, Individually and in his Official and Supervisory Capacity as Chief of the Palmer Township Police Department, and the Township of Palmer, Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
John P. Karoly, Jr., Allentown, PA, for Plaintiffs.
James M. Flood, and Joseph F. McNulty, Jr., Allentown, PA, for Defendants.
This matter is before the court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) filed January 26, 2004.1 For the reasons expressed below, we grant defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' Complaint.
Because we conclude that probable cause existed to arrest plaintiff Jack Walter Cuvo, we dismiss Counts I, II, III, V and VI for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Furthermore, we dismiss Counts I and II of plaintiff's Complaint, as those counts may be interpreted to aver that that defendants violated the substantive due process rights of plaintiff Jack Walter Cuvo when defendants disseminated information concerning the seizure of Mr. Cuvo. In addition, we conclude that plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted in Counts IV and VII. Therefore, we dismiss Counts IV and VII in their entirety as well.
Moreover, we conclude that defendants in their individual capacities are entitled to qualified immunity in Counts I, II, III, V and VI. Accordingly, defendants De Bias, Monek and Fretz are each dismissed from those counts to the extent that those counts aver federal claims.
Finally, because we have dismissed all claims raising federal question jurisdiction, we decline to exercise our supplemental state jurisdiction. Therefore, we dismiss the pendent state law claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.2
On October 20, 2003 plaintiff filed an eight-count Complaint in this matter.3 In Count I, plaintiff Jack Walter Cuvo avers that all defendants violated his right to be free from illegal seizures pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and claims that his substantive due process rights were violated by certain publications made by defendants concerning the allegedly illegal seizure of Mr. Cuvo. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.4
In Count II Mr. Cuvo alleges that all defendants intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon him. In Count III Mr. Cuvo asserts assault and battery claims against all defendants. In Count IV he contends that all defendants negligently inflicted emotional distress upon him.
In Count V, plaintiff Jack Cuvo claims that all defendants falsely arrested him. In Count VI Mr. Cuvo asserts a claim of false imprisonment against all defendants. In Count VII he avers a claim of malicious prosecution against all defendants. In Count VIII, plaintiff Jennifer Cuvo alleges a loss-of-consortium claim against all defendants.5
The action is before the court on federal question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343. We may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' pendant state law claims if federal question jurisdiction exists. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Venue is appropriate because plaintiffs allege that the facts and circumstances giving rise to their causes of action occurred in Northampton County, a county within the geographical boundaries of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 118, 1391. Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury.
Based upon the allegations in plaintiffs' Complaint, which we must accept as true for the purposes of this motion, the pertinent facts are as follows. On or about October 9, 2001, plaintiff Jack Walter Cuvo was beaten by members of the City of Easton Police Department.6 Mr. Cuvo suffered serious injuries including head trauma. Because Mr. Cuvo is a well-known athlete and businessman in the Easton, Pennsylvania, area, the beating was generally known there.7
Defendant Daniel Monek is a Detective on the police department of defendant The Township of Palmer. Palmer Township is immediately adjacent to the City of Easton.8 In addition to the generally known information regarding the beating, Defendant Monek was also aware of an ongoing situation between Mr. Cuvo and the City of Easton Police Department that predated the October 9, 2001 beating.9
On or about October 19, 2001, Mr. Cuvo was driving his automobile when he experienced a momentary loss of consciousness.10 While Mr. Cuvo was unconscious his vehicle left the road and struck a posted sign and a fire hydrant, before coming to rest on a curb or sidewalk.11 At that time, it appeared that Mr. Cuvo required medical treatment.12
Defendant Christopher De Bias, a member of the Palmer Township Police Department arrived at the scene.13 Thereafter, Officer De Bias took Mr. Cuvo into custody.14 Officer De Bias then transported Mr. Cuvo to Easton Hospital.15 At Easton Hospital, Officer De Bias and Mr. Cuvo were joined by Detective Monek.16
While at the hospital, representatives of plaintiff's counsel met with defendants De Bias and Monek.17 Representatives of plaintiff's counsel asserted that the cause of Mr. Cuvo's accident was a loss of consciousness resulting from the October 9, 2001 beating.18 In response, defendants De Bias and Monek replied that Mr. Cuvo was under arrest for Driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substance in violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3731.19
Defendants De Bias and Monek published information consistent with their assertion that Mr. Cuvo was arrested for driving under the influence of a controlled substance.20 Defendants De Bias and Monek knew that Mr. Cuvo was not under the influence of a controlled substance when they took him into custody and committed these acts to curry favor with the Easton Police Department.21 Defendant Bruce Fretz, the Palmer Township Chief of Police, did not stop defendants De Bias or Monek from making these statements and, in fact, tacitly approved of the statements.22
No criminal or traffic offense charges were brought against Mr. Cuvo as a result of these incidents.23
When considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and construe all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jurimex Kommerz Transit G.m.b.H. v. Case Corp., 65 Fed.Appx. 803, 805, 2003 WL 1919361 (3d Cir.2003) (quoting Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1411 (3d Cir.1993)). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion should be granted "if it appears to a certainty that no relief could be granted under any set of facts which could be proved." Morse v. Lower Merion School District, 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir.1997) (citing D.P. Enter. Inc. v. Bucks County Community College, 725 F.2d 943, 944 (3d Cir.1984)). But a court need not credit a complaint's "bald assertions" or "legal conclusions" when deciding a motion to dismiss. Morse, 132 F.3d at 906. (Citations omitted.)
In their Complaint, plaintiffs aver that defendants violated Mr. Cuvo's rights by illegally seizing him at the accident scene and for continuing to keep him in custody while Mr. Cuvo was at the hospital. Plaintiffs contend that Palmer Township is also liable for the allegedly unlawful seizure because the Township developed and implemented a policy, practice or procedure which permitted the unlawful seizure. Plaintiffs also aver that the allegedly illegal seizure gives rise to Pennsylvania state causes of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery, false arrest, and false imprisonment averred in Counts II, III, V and VI, respectively.
Defendants counter that the seizure of Mr. Cuvo was conducted pursuant to a lawful statutory regime and supported by probable cause. Defendants contend that, under Pennsylvania law, any person who operates a vehicle has given implied consent for the police to examine the driver's blood alcohol content under certain circumstances. Defendants contend that when Officer De Bias found Mr. Cuvo in the driver's seat of his automobile, crashed on the side of the road after having struck a traffic sign and fire hydrant, seemingly requiring medical attention, reasonable grounds existed to take Mr. Cuvo into custody.
For the reasons expressed below, we conclude that probable cause existed to detain and arrest plaintiff Jack Walter Cuvo pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution24 and the statutory regime created by the implied consent law of Pennsylvania.
A police officer may effectuate an arrest for a misdemeanor charge if there is reasonable cause to suspect that the detained person committed the offense and the officer believes that the suspect presents a danger of harm to himself or others. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; American Law Institute, Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure § 120.1(1)(b)(ii)(1975); Cf. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2711; 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1547(a); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001). In order for reasonable cause to exist for an arrest, the arrest must be based upon probable cause.25 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34-35, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 1630, 10 L.Ed.2d 726, 739 (1963).
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