Cuzzort v. State, S99A1120.

Decision Date13 September 1999
Docket NumberNo. S99A1120.,S99A1120.
Citation271 Ga. 464,519 S.E.2d 687
PartiesCUZZORT v. The STATE.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Christopher A. Townley, Rossville, for appellant.

Herbert E. Franklin, Jr., District Attorney, for appellee.

HUNSTEIN, Justice.

Appellant Terry Lee Cuzzort was indicted in the Lookout Mountain Judicial Circuit on charges of aggravated stalking. According to the method of case assignment established in that circuit, Cuzzort's case was assigned to a judge and placed on the court calendar by the district attorney. Cuzzort filed a series of pretrial motions challenging the system of assigning judges and calendaring cases presently employed in the Lookout Mountain Judicial Circuit, all of which were denied in a consolidated order. The trial court issued a certificate of immediate review and this Court granted Cuzzort's application for interlocutory appeal to determine whether the case assignment method employed in the Lookout Mountain Judicial Circuit violates Uniform Superior Court Rule 3.1. Finding that it does, we reverse.

1. Uniform Superior Court Rule 3.1 provides, in pertinent part,

3.1 Method of Assignment. In multi-judge circuits, unless a majority of the judges in a circuit elect to adopt a different system, all actions, civil and criminal shall be assigned by the clerk of each superior court according to a plan approved by such judges to the end that each judge is allocated an equal number of cases.

The State contends the case assignment system used in the Lookout Mountain Judicial Circuit is the most efficient for a rural circuit with multiple counties and judges, and the random case assignment method proposed in USCR 3.1 is impracticable. Under the plain language of the rule, multi-judge circuits may adopt a different method subject to the approval of a majority of the circuit's judges. Lumpkin v. Johnson, 270 Ga. 392(1), 509 S.E.2d 621 (1998); Cobb County v. Campbell, 256 Ga. 519, 350 S.E.2d 466 (1986) (applying Rule 3.1 of the Uniform State Court Rules). Certainly, "judges, in their capacity as members of the judiciary, have the inherent authority to determine their own internal operating procedure for the selection of which of them shall hear cases.... [Cit.]" Lumpkin, supra at 394, 509 S.E.2d 621. Accordingly, we do not take issue with the Lookout Mountain Judicial Circuit's decision to adopt a more efficient system. The precise method of assigning and calendaring cases adopted by a multi-judge circuit, however, must comport with the notion of due process under the State and Federal constitutions, as well as the spirit and purpose of the uniform rules and applicable statutes. See id.

2. The purpose of the assignment system in multi-judge circuits is to "prevent any person's choosing the judge to whom an action is to be assigned." USCR 3.1. In this regard, we have approved of a system in which the chief judge makes assignments in accordance with a method specifically approved by a majority of the other judges because the chief judge is not such a "person" as described in the Rule. Lumpkin, supra at 394, 509 S.E.2d 621. In the Lookout Mountain Judicial Circuit, however, it is not the chief or other circuit judge who makes case assignments and sets the calendar but the district attorney. Because the district attorney is clearly within the category of persons directed to refrain from affecting case...

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16 cases
  • State v. Gales
    • United States
    • Nebraska Court of Appeals
    • March 18, 2005
    ...to comport with due process, by preventing any person from choosing the judge to whom an action is to be assigned. Cf. Cuzzort v. State, 271 Ga. 464, 519 S.E.2d 687 (1999). In short, the law clearly provides that selection of the members of the three-judge sentencing panel will be random, a......
  • Mondy v. Magnolia Advanced Materials, Inc.
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • June 4, 2018
    ...of USCR 21); Foster v. Gidewon, 280 Ga. 21 (1), 622 S.E.2d 357 (2005) (evaluating plain meaning of USCR 17.1); Cuzzort v. State, 271 Ga. 464 (1), 519 S.E.2d 687 (1999) (evaluating plain meaning of USCR 3.1). When we construe such authority on appeal, our review is de novo. Hankla v. Postell......
  • Undisclosed LLC v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • October 30, 2017
    ...to its terms [and] to give words their plain and ordinary meaning [.]" (citation and punctuation omitted)); Cuzzort v. State, 271 Ga. 464, 464, 519 S.E.2d 687 (1999) (evaluating plain meaning of a Uniform Superior Court Rule). The State contends that such consideration will show that the de......
  • Stewart v. the State.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • July 6, 2011
    ...the State is ready, but the ultimate decision of whether or not to do so rests solely with the trial judge. See Cuzzort v. State, 271 Ga. 464, 464(3), 519 S.E.2d 687 (1999) (“While a trial judge may in his discretion call cases out of order, under [OCGA] § 17–8–1, the district attorney is w......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Criminal Law - Franklin J. Hogue and Laura D. Hogue
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 52-1, September 2000
    • Invalid date
    ...37. Id. at 244, 527 S.E.2d at 196. 38. Id. at 245, 527 S.E.2d at 197 (Sears, J., dissenting). 39. Id. at 246, 527 S.E.2d at 197-98. 40. 271 Ga. 464, 519 S.E.2d 687 (1999). 41. Id. at 464, 519 S.E.2d at 688. 42. Unif. Super. Ct. R. 3.1 (2000). 43. 271 Ga. at 465, 519 S.E.2d at 689. 44. Id. (......

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