CVAS 2, LLC v. City of Fredericksburg
Decision Date | 08 January 2015 |
Docket Number | Record No. 140505. |
Citation | 766 S.E.2d 912,289 Va. 100 |
Parties | CVAS 2, LLC v. CITY OF FREDERICKSBURG. |
Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
Jamie B. Wisegarver (John R. Walk ; Hirschler Fleischer, on briefs), for appellant.
R. Lucas Hobbs (Jeffrey A. Scharf; Mark k. Ames ; John A. Rife ; Elliott Lawson & Minor, Bristol, Taxing Authority Consulting Services, on brief), for appellee.
Present: LEMONS, C.J, GOODWYN, MILLETTE, MIMS, McCLANAHAN, and POWELL, JJ., and KOONTZ, S.J.
In this appeal we consider whether a circuit court had authority to enter a decree of sale of real estate pursuant to a locality's suit to collect delinquent real estate taxes and delinquent special assessments.
The City of Fredericksburg (the “City”) created the Celebrate Virginia South Community Development Authority (the “CDA”) in 2000 by resolution, and ratified and amended that resolution in 2005. CVAS 2, LLC owns real estate located within the City's geographic area. The City has levied that real estate with taxes, and the local governing body has levied that real estate with special assessments for the CDA's benefit. CVAS 2 has not paid all these taxes and special assessments. CVAS 2 has outstanding real estate taxes dating back to the 2012 fiscal year, and has outstanding special assessments dating back to the 2009 fiscal year.
On June 13, 2013, the City brought suit against CVAS 2. The City sought to have CVAS 2's real estate sold in order to collect CVAS 2's outstanding payments for the delinquent real estate taxes and special assessments. The City's complaint and the City's motion for decree of sale cited Article 4 of Chapter 39 of Title 58.1 as the basis for its complaint and the authority for the decree of sale.1
CVAS 2 filed a motion to dismiss along with its amended answer. The motion to dismiss asserted in relevant part that the City failed to comply with Code § 58.1–3965, and therefore its complaint could not result in a decree of sale to recover the delinquent real estate taxes and special assessments. After a hearing on the matter, the circuit court granted the City's motion for the sale of CVAS 2's real estate. The court subsequently entered a decree of sale, in which the court (1) denied CVAS 2's motion to dismiss, (2) ordered that CVAS 2's real estate be sold in gross to pay “the taxes, penalties, interest, special assessments, fees, costs, and any liens whatever thereon” pursuant to Code §§ 15.2–5158, 58.1–3965, and 58.1–3969, and (3) appointed a special commissioner to oversee the sale of CVAS 2's real estate and to disburse the funds from that sale.
CVAS 2 timely filed a petition for appeal with this Court. We granted CVAS 2's single assignment of error:
1. The trial court erred in its construction of Virginia Code §§ 15.2–5158 and 58.1–3965(A) by ordering the sale of CVAS 2's [real estate] when taxes are less than two (2) years delinquent.
Whether this Court has jurisdiction of an appeal is a question of law we review de novo. See Henderson v. Ayres & Hartnett, P.C., 285 Va. 556, 563, 740 S.E.2d 518, 521 (2013). Issues of statutory interpretation are questions of law we review de novo. Commonwealth v. Herring, 288 Va. 59, 66, 758 S.E.2d 225, 229 (2014).
Pursuant to Rule 5:4, the City filed a motion to dismiss CVAS 2's appeal to this Court on the basis that the circuit court's entry of the decree of sale was not a final order giving rise to this Court's jurisdiction under Code § 8.01–670(A). It is a familiar principle that a “court always has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction.” Rutter v. Oakwood Living Ctrs. of Va., Inc., 282 Va. 4, 13, 710 S.E.2d 460, 464 (2011) (collecting cases) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Final orders, as envisioned by Code § 8.01–670(A), are not the only types of orders giving rise to this Court's jurisdiction. “[F]or [this] Court to have jurisdiction of [an] appeal, the order from which [a petitioner] appealed must be either a final order or an interlocutory order from which an appeal is statutorily authorized.” Comcast of Chesterfield Cnty., Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 277 Va. 293, 300, 672 S.E.2d 870, 873 (2009). Title 8.01 of the Code of Virginia establishes civil remedies and procedures. The General Assembly has provided that, except in cases involving an administrative agency, the Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission, or domestic relations, which would vest jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals, this Court has jurisdiction of an appeal from an interlocutory decree or order “in any case on an equitable claim” in three enumerated situations, one of which applies here. Code § 8.01–670(B)(2) ; see also Code § 17.1–405.
The decree of sale from which CVAS 2 appeals is an interlocutory decree in a case on an equitable claim, even though that claim is statutory in nature. The General Assembly has the power to define the statutory rights it creates to be of a legal or equitable nature.2 See, e.g., Campbell v. Harmon, 271 Va. 590, 597, 628 S.E.2d 308, 311 (2006) ( ); City of Portsmouth v. City of Chesapeake, 232 Va. 158, 164, 349 S.E.2d 351, 354 (1986) ( ). The City filed suit against CVAS 2 to sell CVAS 2's real estate for delinquent real estate taxes and special assessments. The statutory scheme upon which the City filed suit, and the authority relied upon by the circuit court to enter the decree of sale, was Article 4 of Chapter 39 of Title 58.1. The General Assembly explained that “[p]roceedings under this article for ... the sale of real estate on which county, city, or town taxes are delinquent shall be by bill in equity. ” Code § 58.1–3967 (emphasis added).
As the City's case is a and does not involve an administrative agency, the Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission, or domestic relations, this Court has jurisdiction to resolve this appeal from the interlocutory order “[r]equiring ... title of property to be changed.” Code § 8.01–670(B)(2). We therefore deny the City's motion to dismiss CVAS 2's appeal.
This appeal requires us to address how different governmental entities may levy and collect certain taxes and assessments on real estate. In particular, five statutory provisions allowing for such action are implicated in this dispute. “Because we do not read statutes in isolation, and because statutes dealing with a specific subject must be construed together in order to arrive at the object sought to be accomplished,” we first review these relevant statutes so that we can more readily resolve the issues on appeal. Bailey v. Loudoun Cnty. Sheriff's Office, 288 Va. 159, 169–70, 762 S.E.2d 763, 765 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In compliance with the Constitution of Virginia, the General Assembly directs that certain real estate “shall be assessed for local taxation in accordance with the provisions of [Chapter 32 of Title 58.1, Code § 58.1–3200 et seq.,] and other provisions of law.” Code § 58.1–3200 ; see also Va. Const. art. X, § 4. In Code § 58.1–3965, the General Assembly established the method for a locality to collect delinquent taxes by selling the subject real estate.3 In relevant part, the “officer charged with the duty of collecting taxes for the locality” must abide by the following:
Also, the General Assembly allows a city to reduce the two year delay in Code § 58.1–3965(A) to a single year. That is, a city—but not a county or town-may pass an ordinance allowing it to file suit, for the purposes of having real estate sold to collect delinquent taxes on such property, on the December 31 one year after such outstanding taxes become due. Code § 58.1–3965.1.
Localities may, “by ordinance or resolution[,] create a community development authority.” Code § 15.2–5155(A). The General Assembly has provided numerous powers to any community development authority created by a locality. See Code §§ 15.2–5114 ; 15.2–5158. In order “to finance the services and facilities provided by the authority,” one such power is the ability to “[r]equest annually that the locality levy and collect a special tax on taxable real property within the development authority's jurisdiction.” Code § 15.2–5158(A)(3). Thus, the community development authority may not levy and collect the special tax itself, but may request that the locality do so on its behalf. Then, once the locality receives the revenues from the special tax, those revenues are directed to “be paid over to the development authority for its use pursuant to this chapter.” Id.
The General Assembly has established the following method for a locality to collect such special taxes:
The special taxes shall be collected at the same time and in the same manner as the locality's...
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