CW Simpson Co. v. Langley

• Decision Date: 09 November 1942
• Docket Number: No. 8142.,8142.
• Parties: C. W. SIMPSON CO., Inc., v. LANGLEY.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

76 US App. DC 365, 131 F.2d 869 (1942)

C. W. SIMPSON CO., Inc., v. LANGLEY.

No. 8142.

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.

Argued October 13, 1942.

Decided November 9, 1942.

Mr. Henry I. Quinn, of Washington, D. C., for appellant.

Mr. John J. O'Brien, of Washington, D. C., for appellee.

Before GRONER, Chief Justice, and EDGERTON and RUTLEDGE, Associate Justices.

GRONER, C. J.

Appellee brought this action against appellant, as owner, to recover damages for injuries sustained by her as the result of a fall in descending the steps of appellant's apartment house in the District of Columbia. Appellee, at the time in question, was a tenant of appellant in the building.

The evidence discloses that January 11th, the day preceding the accident, was warm and clear. Some time in the early morning of January 12th the weather changed, and around five o'clock rain and sleet began to fall. When appellee left the building at approximately seven, a coating of ice had formed on the four steps leading to the pavement, and as she tried to go down them her feet slipped and she fell. There was a trial to a jury and a verdict and judgment for appellee. At the close of the case appellant unsuccessfully moved for binding instructions, and upon the return of the verdict moved for judgment, notwithstanding the verdict. The single question is whether the evidence justified a submission of the case to the jury.

The trial judge felt that he was bound by the rule adopted by us in Pessagno v. Euclid Inv. Co.¹ We think the two cases are distinguishable. In the Pessagno case the injury occurred at 9:30 in the evening. The weather had been cold and rainy all day, and the walks and streets were slippery and dangerous, with ice forming as the rain fell. The superintendent of the building at which the injury occurred had not only known of the dangerous condition, but had attempted to remedy it by sanding the entrances on four different occasions from 6 o'clock in the morning until 5 o'clock in the afternoon. At the time of the injury, some four hours later, there was no evidence of sand on the walk. Under these circumstances we held that it was for a jury to determine whether what was done earlier in the day and after notice of the continuing danger was the exercise of reasonable care.

In this case the janitor, who was a witness for appellee, and who presumably was charged with the duty of keeping the apartment and approaches clean, occupied a sleeping room in the basement of the building and arose, as was his custom, around 5 o'clock in the morning. He proceeded at once to attend the furnaces located in the basement, to provide heat for the building. Having done this he went to the upstairs halls and cleaned them. Up to this time he had no notice of the change in the weather. Somewhere between half past six and a quarter to seven, he went back to the basement where he met the ice man, of whom he inquired as to conditions outside. The latter told him that it was raining and sleeting. Within fifteen minutes he started to get his bucket to fill it with ashes to take to the front entrance of the building. While he was in the act of doing this his bell rang and he went upstairs to find that appellee had fallen.

In the Pessagno case we did not make the owner of an apartment building an insurer of the safety of the approaches and entrances over which he...