Cweklinsky v. Mobil Chemical Company, 267 Conn. 210 (Conn. 1/6/2004)
| Decision Date | 06 January 2004 |
| Docket Number | (SC 16846) |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | VICTOR CWEKLINSKY <I>v.</I> MOBIL CHEMICAL COMPANY. |
As a general rule, no action for defamation exists if a defendant publishes defamatory statements to only the plaintiff and the plaintiff subsequently disseminates the statements to a third party.
The plaintiff brought an action in the United States District Court asserting various claims, including defamation, arising out of the termination of his employment by the defendant. The plaintiff, who had been employed by the defendant for twenty-five years, had been given six weeks of paid medical leave to undergo carpal tunnel syndrome surgery on his wrist in November, 1998. The plaintiff's treating physician subsequently gave him a letter clearing him to return to work as of December 11, 1998. Rather than returning on that date, however, the plaintiff instead went to his physician's office to request that his return-to-work date be extended to December 14. To accommodate the plaintiff, the physician's office manager altered the plaintiff's copy of the return-to-work letter to reflect the December 14 date. When the plaintiff returned to work on December 14, he gave the altered return-to-work letter to his supervisor. The defendant decided to terminate the plaintiff's employment, concluding that the plaintiff himself had altered the physician's letter. After determining that the physician's office manager had altered the letter, the defendant nevertheless terminated the plaintiff's employment because he had taken paid leave from work without a medical basis. At trial, the plaintiff presented to the jury evidence that the statements by the defendant regarding the reasons for the plaintiff's termination were defamatory and that the plaintiff had felt compelled to publish the statements "over and over" to prospective employers when they asked him why he had been terminated. The jury found for the plaintiff on, inter alia, his defamation claim, and the District Court rendered judgment in his favor. From that judgment, the defendant appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which certified to this court certain questions of law concerning the viability and scope of an employee's action against an employer for compelled self-publication defamation. Held that Connecticut does not recognize a cause of action for defamation based on a former employee's compelled self-publication of a former employer's defamatory statements made by the employer to only the employee; the public policy considerations that favor rejection of the doctrine of compelled self-publication defamation, i.e., the chilling effect on communication in the workplace, outweigh the considerations supporting its recognition, and an action for defamation based on compelled self-publication counters several well established principles of law, including the duty to mitigate damages, compliance with applicable statutes of limitations and the doctrine of employment at will.
Procedural History
Action to recover damages for, inter alia, the defendant's alleged violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, wrongful termination of the plaintiff's employment and defamation, and for other relief, brought to the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, and tried to the jury before Squatrito, J.; verdict and judgment in part for the plaintiff; thereafter, the court granted the plaintiff's motion to set the amount of punitive damages and prejudgment and postjudgment interest and rendered a supplemental judgment for the plaintiff, from which the defendant appealed and the plaintiff cross appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, McLaughlin, Jacobs and Sack, Js., which certified to this court three questions of law concerning the viability and scope of an employee's action against an employer for compelled self-publication defamation.
Jeffrey J. Tinley, with whom was Robert Nastri, Jr., for the appellant (defendant).
Victoria de Toledo, with whom, on the brief, was Rhonna W. Rogol, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Allison M. Bogosian and Robert B. Mitchell filed a brief for the Connecticut Business and Industry Association, Inc., as amicus curiae.
The dispositive issue in this case, which comes to us upon acceptance of three certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199b (d),1 is whether Connecticut recognizes a cause of action for defamation based on a former employee's compelled self-publication of a former employer's defamatory statements made by the employer to only the employee.2 We conclude that Connecticut does not recognize such a cause of action.
The plaintiff, Victor Cweklinsky, brought a multicount complaint against the defendant, Mobil Chemical Company, in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, asserting various claims arising out of the termination of his employment by the defendant.3 The plaintiff's common-law claims for defamation and breach of implied contract, and statutory claims for state and federal retaliatory discharge were tried to a jury, which found for the plaintiff and awarded damages on his defamation and breach of contract claims, but found for the defendant on both of the retaliation claims.4 The defendant subsequently appealed from the judgment of the District Court to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.5 The Court of Appeals then certified to this court three questions of law, which we accepted. See footnote 2 of this opinion.
The following facts, certified by the Court of Appeals, are relevant to our resolution of the certified questions.6 "This case arises out of [the plaintiff's] termination from [the defendant]. [The plaintiff], who had worked as a machinist at [the defendant] for twenty-five years, was given approximately six weeks of paid medical leave in November [of] 1998 to undergo carpal tunnel syndrome surgery on his wrist. In December [of 1998], [the plaintiff's] treating physician, Dr. Gerald F. Cambria, gave [the plaintiff] a return-to-work letter that cleared him to return to full-time, full-duty work on Friday, December 11. On December 11, however, [the plaintiff] did not report to work. Instead, he went back to Dr. Cambria's office, and met with Carol Giacondino, Dr. Cambria's office manager. [The plaintiff] requested that Giacondino extend his return-to-work [date] from December 11 to December 14. [He] did not tell Giacondino that he already had been scheduled to work on Saturday, December 12 and Sunday, December 13.
Cweklinsky v. Mobil Chemical Co., 297 F.3d 154, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2002).
After the plaintiff's denial, the defendant investigated further and determined that it was Giacondino, and not the plaintiff, who had altered the letter. Despite this finding, however, the defendant issued a final termination letter, concluding that although the plaintiff had not falsified his return-to-work letter, his employment should nonetheless be terminated because he had taken paid medical leave without a medical basis. Id., 157-58.
During the trial, the plaintiff provided evidence that the statements made by the defendant were defamatory. With regard to publication, counsel for the plaintiff asked him whether he had published the defamatory statements to prospective employers, and if so, whether he had felt "compelled" to do so. The plaintiff responded:
The question that we must answer is whether Connecticut recognizes a cause of action for defamation based on a former employee's compelled self-publication of a former employer's...
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