Cyr v. J.I. Case Co.

• Citation: 652 A.2d 685,139 N.H. 193
• Decision Date: 14 December 1994
• Docket Number: No. 93-166,93-166
• Parties: , Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,122 Mark CYR v. J.I. CASE COMPANY and Harold D. Smith & Sons, Inc.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Page 685

652 A.2d 685

139 N.H. 193, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,122

Mark CYR v. J.I. CASE COMPANY and Harold D. Smith & Sons, Inc.

No. 93-166.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Dec. 14, 1994.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 19, 1995.

McLane, Graf, Raulerson & Middleton, P.A., Manchester (Bruce W. Felmly and another, on the brief and Mr. Felmly orally), for plaintiff.

Wadleigh, Starr, Peters, Dunn & Chiesa, Manchester (John A. Lassey, on the brief and orally), for defendants.

JOHNSON, Justice.

This products liability case arose when a bulldozer backed into the plaintiff, Mark Cyr, and crushed his leg. Defendant J.I. Case Company (Case) manufactured the bulldozer and sold it to defendant Harold D. Smith & Sons, Inc. (Smith); Smith sold it to Cyr's employer, who used it on the construction site where Cyr was working when the accident happened. Cyr sued the defendants in strict liability and negligence. At trial, causation was a major issue, and the litigation focused on the bulldozer's lack of a back-up alarm and Cyr's failure to notice the vehicle's approach. The jury returned special verdicts for the defendants, and Cyr appealed, alleging the following errors in the Superior Court's (Groff, J.) rulings: (1) admission of evidence that Cyr received workers' compensation benefits; (2) exclusion of lay opinion testimony; (3) exclusion of expert opinion testimony; (4) exclusion of evidence of subsequent modifications; and (5) exclusion of Cyr's requested jury instruction on the defense of "plaintiff's misconduct." We hold that the superior court abused its discretion in admitting evidence that Cyr received workers' compensation benefits, and we reverse on that basis.

I. Admission of Evidence of Cyr's Workers' Compensation Benefits

At trial, Cyr sought damages for the wages he lost while unemployed after the accident. The defendants questioned whether the accident was the sole cause of the unemployment and solicited testimony from Cyr that he had turned down jobs he was capable of performing. Over Cyr's objection, they also asked him about his receipt of workers' compensation benefits, implying that this money had made work unnecessary and had thus contributed to the unemployment. The trial court allowed this questioning and instructed the jury:

Now, if you find during your deliberations that Mr. Cyr's entitled to damages and that you're going to decide how much lost wages he's suffered, you are not allowed to deduct from whatever you determine, would determine his lost wages were, you're not allowed to deduct any benefits he might have received from workman's [sic ] comp. However, you can consider the fact that he received compensation during this period solely for the purpose of determining his motivation to work at that time and basically whether or not you believe or you find that this period of unemployment was due to his disability or to some other reason, and that's the only reason you can consider it and I want to make that quite clear.

The court later twice gave a similar instruction.

On appeal, Cyr relies upon the collateral source rule, which provides that an award of damages may not be reduced by the amount of benefits a plaintiff receives from a collateral source. See Bell v. Primeau, 104 N.H. 227, 228, 183 A.2d 729, 730 (1962); Abbott v. Hayes, 92 N.H. 126, 132-33, 26 A.2d 842, 847 (1942). The defendants do not challenge the validity of this rule. Instead, they argue that the trial court properly admitted the evidence of benefits for the limited purpose of proving a motive not to work and thus impeaching Cyr on the nature and extent of his injuries. Cf. N.H.R.Ev. 105 (evidence inadmissible for one purpose may be admitted for another). We hold that the evidence should not have been admitted because it plainly fails the balancing test contained in New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 403.

Rule 403 states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury...." We find the probative value of the evidence for the defendants' stated purpose to be minimal at best. We accept the defendants' contention that receipt of income may give a person a motive not to work. On the other hand, workers' compensation benefits are only supposed to be paid to those unable to work. See RSA 281-A:28, :28-a, :31, :31-a (Supp.1993). Receipt of benefits could thus support a claim of disability, rather than undermine it, unless one assumes that benefits are generally received dishonestly or in error. Because two contrary conclusions could be drawn from the disputed evidence, the probative value for either one of them is minimal.

As noted above, the defendants asked Cyr whether he had failed to pursue certain jobs he was capable of performing. Cyr's answer was equivocal, but we acknowledge that an admission of work capacity would help the defendants attack Cyr's credibility because it would show, among other things, that he might have received the workers' compensation benefits dishonestly. Proof of benefits received, however, would not itself show lack of disability because--we assume--dishonesty and error are the exception, not the rule. Cf. Blessing v. Boy Scouts of America, 608 S.W.2d 484, 487 (Mo.Ct.App.1980). Thus, evidence of Cyr's workers' compensation benefits was only probative when combined with evidence of work capacity to show a possible dishonesty in his receipt of these benefits. Considering that the defendants could and did attack Cyr's credibility directly by asking about his work capacity during his periods of unemployment, we assign a marginal probative weight to the evidence of benefits.

On the other side of the Rule 403 balance, we find a serious danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, and misleading the jury. When the trial court admitted the evidence in dispute, it could not know whether the jury would find for Cyr on the issue of liability and thus reach the issue of damages. The court therefore had to instruct the jury not to deduct the workers' compensation benefits from any award of damages, while telling them that they could consider the benefits in gauging Cyr's credibility on the issue of damages. This instruction would be confusing to even the most discriminating juror. Although a real distinction exists between the permissible and the impermissible uses of the evidence, it is not easy to grasp. We do not impugn the intelligence of the average juror by concluding that the collateral source rule could have easily been violated in this situation. Cf. Eichel v. New York Central R.R., 375 U.S. 253, 255, 84 S.Ct. 316, 317, 11 L.Ed.2d 307 (1963); Brumley v. Federal Barge Lines, Inc., 78 Ill.App.3d 799, 33 Ill.Dec. 609, 615, 396 N.E.2d 1333, 1340 (Ill.App.Ct.1979); Reinan v. Pacific Motor Trucking Co., 270 Or. 208, 527 P.2d 256, 259 (1974).

As the defendants point out, the jury here never reached the point of calculating damages, instead returning special verdicts for the defendants on liability. We reject, however, the defendants' claim that this renders the trial court's ruling harmless. In similar circumstances, the Supreme Court of Florida cogently reasoned:

Because a jury's fair assessment of liability is fundamental to justice, its verdict on liability must be free from doubt, based on conviction, and not a function of compromise. Evidence of collateral source benefits may lead the jury to believe that the plaintiff is trying to obtain a double or triple payment for one injury, or to believe that compensation already received is sufficient recompense. Despite assertions that collateral source evidence is needed to rebut or impeach, there generally will be other evidence having more probative value and involving less likelihood of prejudice than the victim's receipt of insurance-type benefits.

Gormley v. GTE Products Corp., 587 So.2d 455, 458 (Fla.1991) (citations and quotations omitted); cf. Pryor v. Webber, 23 Ohio St.2d 104, 114-17, 52 O.O.2d 395, 400, 263 N.E.2d 235, 242-43 (1970).

The defendants also contend that admission of the evidence was harmless because one of Cyr's exhibits--a voluminous collection of medical records--contains some references to Cyr's receipt of workers' compensation benefits. In effect, they argue that Cyr waived any objection to their use of the evidence because Cyr introduced it first. Again, we disagree. Contrary to the defendants' suggestion, in context the references are insignificant and in no way imply that Cyr's receipt of benefits contributed to his loss of wages. Cyr's use of the evidence was entirely different from the defendants' and did not "open the door" or create an unfair advantage for him that would justify the later admission. See State v. Bouchard, 138 N.H. 581, 583-86, 643 A.2d 963, 965-66 (1994).

In conclusion, we acknowledge the deference to be accorded a trial court's ruling on the admission of evidence, State v. VanDerHeyden, 136 N.H. 277, 285, 615 A.2d 1246, 1249-50 (1992), but hold that the court plainly abused its discretion in admitting evidence of Cyr's receipt of workers' compensation benefits. The minimal probative value of this evidence to rebut Cyr's claim of lost wages was substantially outweighed by the dangers of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, and misleading the jury. N.H.R.Ev. 403. Cyr has met his burden of showing that the court's ruling was "clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of [his] case," VanDerHeyden, 136 N.H. at 284, 615 A.2d at 1250, and we accordingly vacate the jury's verdicts and remand for a new trial. We address the remaining questions Cyr raises on appeal, as they are likely to arise again on remand.

II. Exclusion of Lay Opinion Testimony

Cyr was injured while he was checking the grade of a road and a bulldozer operator was leveling dirt and gravel. While Cyr knelt on the ground, the bulldozer moved toward him from his left, in reverse gear. Nancy...