Cyr v. Mcdermott's Inc
Decision Date | 05 March 2010 |
Docket Number | No. 08-290.,08-290. |
Citation | 2010 VT 19,996 A.2d 709 |
Parties | Henri CYRv.McDERMOTT'S, INC. |
Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
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Gregory P. Howe and Jennifer A. Wood, Law Office of Gregory P. Howe, Newport, and Axelrod & Adler, P.L.L.C., St. Johnsbury, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
John A. Serafino of Ryan Smith & Carbine, Ltd., Rutland, for Defendant-Appellee.
Caroline S. Earle, Assistant Attorney General, Montpelier, for Vermont Attorney General's Office.
Present: REIBER, C.J., DOOLEY, JOHNSON, SKOGLUND and BURGESS, JJ.
¶ 1.
The workers' compensation structure in Vermont is meant to provide employees with reliable compensation for work-related injuries while limiting employer liability to legitimate harm arising out of, and in the course of, employment. Claimant Henri Cyr worked for McDermott's, Inc., a hauling company that transports milk in bulk from farms to creameries. He was employed as a part-time mechanic's helper, keeping the maintenance garage clean and occasionally servicing trucks. After accidentally drinking a caustic agent used to clean the milk trucks, he suffered severe internal chemical burns. He filed a claim for workers' compensation under Title 21, chapter 9 of the Vermont Statutes. The Commissioner of Labor granted summary judgment to employer, finding claimant was intoxicated at the time his injury occurred and, thus, compensation was not allowed under 21 V.S.A. § 649. On appeal, claimant contends the Commissioner misapplied § 649. We conclude that the Commissioner erred in failing to address the threshold question of whether there was a valid claim for workers' compensation and in barring the claim under § 649. We reverse the Commissioner's grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.
¶ 2. In reviewing the facts of this case, we take them in the light most favorable to claimant, the nonmoving party below. See Thompson v. Hi Tech Motor Sports, Inc., 2008 VT 15, ¶ 4, 183 Vt. 218, 945 A.2d 368. Claimant had been employed by employer for about ten years before the accident. In late April 2006, one of claimant's co-workers observed a full, apparently abandoned Mountain Dew bottle on the counter in the office and offered it to claimant. Claimant accepted the bottle, which was eventually moved to employer's refrigerator. Approximately a week later, when that refrigerator was being cleaned, the co-worker again offered the bottle to claimant, as was apparently the general custom with unclaimed food or beverages in the company's lunch-area refrigerator; claimant then brought it home and placed it in his refrigerator. Several days later, on May 2, 2006, claimant came home from work and drank two cans of beer. He then took the Mountain Dew bottle out of his refrigerator, opened the cap and drank deeply from it. Immediately, his mouth, throat, and stomach began burning, and he was unable to swallow. He went into his bathroom and vomited and then went into his bedroom to lie down. Shortly thereafter, claimant called for his apartment neighbors to get an ambulance; he was rushed to the hospital. He was treated for extensive caustic burns to his hypopharynx, the entire length of his esophagus, and approximately two-thirds of his stomach.
¶ 3. During the course of his emergency-room treatment, hospital staff conducted blood work and a urinalysis. Although claimant denied that he was intoxicated when he drank from the Mountain Dew bottle, an expert for employer reviewed claimant's medical records and concluded that claimant's blood alcohol content (BAC) at the time he drank the caustic substance was approximately 0.15 to 0.16, roughly double the legal limit for operating a motor vehicle. 23 V.S.A. § 1204(a)(2) ( ). In rebuttal, claimant produced the affidavits of two witnesses-the neighbor who called the ambulance and the treating EMT-both stating that claimant was not exhibiting signs of intoxication around the time he ingested the caustic substance. Based on the evidence presented, the Commissioner determined that claimant was legally intoxicated when he drank from the Mountain Dew bottle. The issue of claimant's BAC is undisputed. 1
¶ 4. On June 7, 2006, claimant filed a Notice of Injury and Claim for Compensation. Employer initially denied the claim on June 27 because claimant's injury did not “aris[e] out of employment” nor was it “sustained in [the] course and scope of employment.” On October 30, employer again denied the claim on the same basis and added that In the subsequent appeal before the Department of Labor, both parties moved for summary judgment. In its motion, employer reasserted its position that claimant's injury did not arise out of his employment and that his intoxication was an absolute bar to any recovery. The Commissioner did not reach the issue of whether the injury arose out of and in the course of employment pursuant to 21 V.S.A. § 618(a)(1). Rather, as noted, the Commissioner found that when claimant ingested the chemical agent, his BAC was in excess of the Department's 0.08 standard for determining whether an employee is intoxicated, and, therefore, his intoxication barred recovery under the statutory defense provided by § 649. Section 649 provides three affirmative defenses for employers to avoid compensation to injured workers:
Compensation shall not be allowed for an injury caused by an employee's wilful intention to injure himself, herself, or another or by or during his or her intoxication or by an employee's failure to use a safety appliance provided for his or her use. The burden of proof shall be upon the employer if he or she claims the benefit of the provisions of this section.
21 V.S.A. § 649.
¶ 5. On appeal, claimant argues that a compensable injury occurred when he was given the bottle containing a caustic chemical at work, and, thus, the Commissioner erred in looking to the exemptions in § 649, there being no allegation that he was intoxicated when he received the bottle. He further argues that, even if his injury occurred when he drank from the bottle, his rebuttal evidence put the fact of his contemporaneous intoxication in dispute. 2 Employer counters that claimant's injury occurred when he drank from the bottle while intoxicated, barring recovery under § 649, and that claimant's rebuttal evidence was insufficient to undermine the Commissioner's determination of intoxication.
¶ 6. For our review, the Commissioner certified only the issue of whether claimant's claim was barred by § 649. See 21 V.S.A. § 672 ( ). In answering this question, we first recognize that the Commissioner erred by not resolving what must be the initial inquiry in a claim for workers' compensation-whether the worker had received a personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment. Having addressed as much of this issue as we are able on the record before us, we further conclude as a matter of law that under the facts of this case § 649 is not a bar to claimant's recovery.
¶ 7. Our Workers' Compensation Act, 21 V.S.A. §§ 601-711, requires employers to compensate employees for accidental injuries “arising out of and in the course of employment.” 21 V.S.A. § 618. As remedial legislation, the Act is interpreted broadly to achieve the goal of affording coverage to as many workers as possible. In re Chatham Woods Holdings, LLC, 2008 VT 70, ¶ 8, 184 Vt. 163, 955 A.2d 1183; St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Surdam, 156 Vt. 585, 590, 595 A.2d 264, 266 (1991) (). Generally, the injured employee is entitled to recover workers' compensation benefits regardless of fault. See Shaw v. Dutton Berry Farm, 160 Vt. 594, 597, 632 A.2d 18, 19 (1993) (); 2007, No. 208 (Adj. Sess.), § 1(a)(1) ().
¶ 8. The principle, and initial, requirement for compensation eligibility is found in 21 V.S.A. § 618, which conditions the payment of compensation to a worker on a finding that the claimed personal injury arose out of and in the course of employment. See State v. Great Ne. Prods., Inc., 2008 VT 13, ¶ 11, 183 Vt. 579, 945 A.2d 897 (mem.) (“[An employer] is liable for workers' compensation benefits ... only if a claimant can prove that the injury was the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of the claimant's employment.”). In this case, employer initially denied the claim because claimant's injury did not arise out of employment. This is the correct starting point in a workers' compensation case. Whether there is a valid claim must be determined before one looks at the statutory exemptions to compensation.
¶ 9. It is the claimant, as plaintiff in the action, who shoulders the burden of proving that both the elements of compensation eligibility are met in the first instance. Miller v. IBM Corp., 161 Vt. 213, 214, 637 A.2d 1072, 1072-73 (1993) (); Greenfield v. Cent. Vt. Ry., 114 Vt. 440, 442, 48 A.2d 854, 855 (1946) ( ...
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...the deference afforded to the Commissioner's interpretation of statutory terms still plays an important role. Cyr v. McDermott's, Inc., 2010 VT 19, ¶ 13, 187 Vt. 392, 996 A.2d 709. Because "the Commissioner has been entrusted by the Legislature with the administration of the workers' compen......
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...nonetheless the deference afforded to the Commissioner's interpretation of statutory terms still plays an important role. Cyr v.McDermott's, Inc., 2010 VT 19, ¶ 13, 187 Vt. 392, 996 A.2d 709. Because "the Commissioner has been entrusted by the Legislature with the administration of the work......
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