Czajka v. Hickman, 82-1269

• Decision Date: 30 March 1983
• Docket Number: No. 82-1269,82-1269
• Citation: 703 F.2d 317
• Parties: 12 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1492 John S. CZAJKA, Appellant, v. James HICKMAN, Sheriff; Clint Coplin, Deputy Sheriff; Al Turley, Deputy Sheriff, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 317

703 F.2d 317

12 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1492

John S. CZAJKA, Appellant, v. James HICKMAN, Sheriff; Clint Coplin, Deputy Sheriff; Al Turley, Deputy Sheriff, Appellees.

No. 82-1269.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Feb. 14, 1983.

Decided March 30, 1983.

John J. Allan, St. Louis, Mo., for appellant.

Thomas L. Ray, Jr., Asst. Pros. Atty., Farmington, Mo., for appellees.

Before HEANEY, McMILLIAN and ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

HEANEY, Circuit Judge.

John S. Czajka appeals from a judgment entered against him pursuant to a jury verdict in a civil action for damages against a Missouri sheriff and two deputy sheriffs. He challenges several evidentiary rulings made by the district court. We affirm.

On October 7, 1980, Czajka was confined in the St. Francois County, Missouri, jail. That evening, he and two other inmates, Ray Barton and Mike Spaeder, attempted to escape by overpowering a guard. The attempt was foiled when Deputy Sheriff Clint Coplin, one of the defendants, interrupted the attack. Czajka testified that when Coplin appeared, he and the two other inmates walked back into their cells; that some few minutes later, Coplin and defendant Deputy Sheriff Al Turley returned to his cell and beat him with a slap jack when he refused to answer questions about the escape attempt; that later, he was taken to an interrogation room where he was beaten with a flashlight by defendant Sheriff James Hickman; and that he was then locked in a cell, chained to the bed for two days and forced to urinate on the floor. Czajka filed suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 arguing that he had been deprived of his constitutional rights under color of state law. The defendants denied that Czajka had been beaten and asserted that the force they used against him was limited to that required for self-protection and to prevent an escape. After trial, a jury found for the defendants and the district court entered judgment accordingly.

On appeal, Czajka argues that the trial court made five evidentiary errors which warrant reversal. We will discuss each in turn.

Czajka first urges that the trial court erred in allowing the defendants to cross-examine him on his previous convictions for rape and sexual assault. He argues that the district court failed to balance the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial impact as required by Fed.R.Evid. 403. Czajka contends that the lack of probative value of, and the high degree of prejudice resulting from, evidence of his convictions for sexual offenses warrant exclusion of that evidence. Further, he argues that rape is a crime which shows only propensity to engage in criminal behavior, not propensity to lie. The defendants contend that Fed.R.Evid. 609(a) expressly allows impeachment by felony conviction.

Rule 609(a)(1) provides for the admissibility of prior criminal convictions. ¹ It provides:

(a) General rule. For the purposes of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by public record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant[.]

Some commentators have argued that Rule 609(a)(1)'s balancing test was intended to protect only criminal defendants and not civil litigants. See S. Saltzburg & K. Redden, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual, 365 (3d ed. 1982). We need not resolve this issue, because Rule 609 does not foreclose the district court's duty under Fed.R.Evid. 403 to weigh the probative value of the evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice. Shows v. M/V Red Eagle, 695 F.2d 114, 118-119 (5th Cir.1983). Even if the intended focus of Rule 609 is avoidance of prejudice to criminal defendants, the Rule does not mandate a "mechanical and restrictive result when the party facing the potential prejudice is one other than a criminal defendant." Tussel v. Witco Chemical Corp., 555 F.Supp. 979 at 983 (W.D.Pa.1983) (order granting motion in limine). Rule 403 is "a rule of exclusion that cuts across the rules of evidence," and it must be applied in civil cases when a party seeks to cross-examine another about criminal convictions. Shows v. M/V Red Eagle, supra, 695 F.2d at 118.

In this case, the district court did not balance the probative value of the evidence against the potential for prejudice. Rather, the court merely determined the convictions were felonies and allowed the cross-examination. Although the district court erred in failing to respond to Czajka's attorney's claims of prejudice, this error was harmless.

Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 61, the admission of improper evidence is harmless when "the substantial rights of the parties" are not affected. See 7 Moore's Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 61.07 (2d ed. 1982); Skogen v. Dow Chemical Corp., 375 F.2d 692, 701 (8th Cir.1967). We believe that the limited cross-examination of Czajka regarding his rape conviction did not significantly detract from his credibility in this case. Czajka was extensively cross-examined, and his credibility impeached on several grounds: he gave written statements to FBI agents that were inconsistent with his courtroom testimony; he failed to report the alleged beatings to doctors he saw within two weeks of the escape attempt; and he failed to call a newspaper reporter he asserted witnessed one of the beatings.

Under these circumstances, one question involving his rape conviction and his sentence did not seriously harm his case. The defense attorney merely asked Czajka to acknowledge the conviction and did not place undue emphasis on it. No details were requested or given. Cf. Shows v. M/V Red Eagle, supra, 695 F.2d at 119 (plaintiff in civil case cross-examined in detail about prior conviction). Any error in failing to exclude the evidence was harmless.

Czajka also contends that the district court erroneously refused to allow him to testify as to the physical condition of Ray Barton, who had attempted the escape with Czajka. Czajka would have testified that Barton had not been hit during the escape attempt but that after an interrogation by the defendants, Barton appeared to have ...