Czarnikow-Rionda Company v. United States
| Decision Date | 08 June 1971 |
| Docket Number | C.D. 4229,68/39658-18980.,Protest No. 68/39657-18979 |
| Citation | Czarnikow-Rionda Company v. United States, 328 F.Supp. 487, 66 Cust. Ct. 431 (Cust. Ct. 1971) |
| Parties | CZARNIKOW-RIONDA COMPANY v. UNITED STATES. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) |
Barnes, Richardson & Colburn, New York City(Rufus E. Jarman, Jr., New York City, of counsel), for plaintiff.
L. Patrick Gray, III, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Andrew P. Vance and Frederick L. Ikenson, New York City, trial attorneys), for defendant.
Before RICHARDSON and LANDIS, Judges, and ROSENSTEIN, Senior Judge.
The merchandise involved in the two consolidated protests herein consists of two shipments, totaling 13,247,590 pounds, of raw Philippine sugar entered at the port of New Orleans in November 1964.Plaintiff does not dispute the classification and assessment for duty of the importations under TSUS item 155.20 as "Sugars * * *" at $0.0010173 and $0.0010184 per pound based upon the sugar degree content as determined by polariscopic test; however, it challenges the assessment of additional duties of $0.0053 per pound under TSUS item 901.00 which provides for "Sugars, * * * provided for in items 155.20 * * *, if not to be further refined or otherwise improved in quality, * *", at a rate of duty 1
Defendant's position is that item 901.00 is governed by General InterpretativeRule 10(e)(ii) of TSUS, which states:
and that plaintiff failed to comply with this rule by furnishing within the prescribed three year period proof that the merchandise was further refined or otherwise improved.Defendant also contends that, even if the rule were inapplicable hereto, plaintiff has failed to prove that the sugar was in fact further processed after importation.
Plaintiff claims that Rule 10(e)(ii) is not applicable to item 901.00; that it has established, via stipulation (set out infra) and evidence adduced at the trial, that the merchandise was further processed after importation; and that the government's position herein, if sustained would result in "double taxation".
Plaintiff conceded at the hearing that no processing certificate was filed within three years after the date of entry with respect to 12,356,870 pounds of sugar and, after submission of the case, conceded in the brief that it had presented no proof of such filing within that same period for the remaining 890,720 pounds of sugar under protest.
Plaintiff called four witnesses who testified relative to the purchase, shipment, and treatment subsequent to importation of the subject merchandise, and to the payment of internal revenue tax thereon.Defendant placed in evidence copies of two receipts, a voucher and a tax return, all dated 1965, of Godchaux Sugar Refining Company, which had purchased some of the raw sugar from the importer.
The pertinent provisions of the Tariff Schedules of the United States are as follows:
901.00 Sugars, sirups, and molasses provided for in items 155.20 to 155.31 inclusive, of part 10A of schedule 1, if not to be further refined or otherwise improved in quality, and articles of sugars, sirups and molasses of the kinds described in such items, all the foregoing (except sugars, sirups molasses, or articles to be used as livestock feed, or in the production of livestock feed or for the distillation of alcohol) ................ The same as the tax imposed under sec. 4501 I.R.C.
Plaintiff asserts the inapplicability of Rule 10(e)(ii) on the grounds that the challenged assessment is an excise tax and not a "regular" customs duty, and that item 901.00 is neither a "tariff classification" nor an "actual use" provision (brief, 14, 16).
We do not agree.
Item 901.00 is derived, as plaintiff notes, from I.R.C. § 4501(b)(26 U.S.C. § 4501(b)), which imposed a tax on manufactured sugar,2 or articles in chief value thereof, imported into the United States.This provision, which was a nonpermanent legislative measure, was assimilated with other temporary legislation in the appendix to the tariff schedules as part of the Tariff Commission's scheme to merge into a single document the provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930"and all related provisions found in the Internal Revenue Code and elsewhere under which imported articles are classified for tariff purposes, * * *."3
Whether the revenue obtained under item 901.00 be denominated a "duty," as it is in the tariff schedules (Appendix, Part 1, Subpart A headnotes, supra) or a "tax," as plaintiff refers to it, is irrelevant for customs purposes.Regardless of how taxes may be designated by Congress, if they are imposed on goods while in customs custody, i. e., while they retain their distinctive character as imports, they are essentially customs duties, Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc. v. United States, 97 F.2d 115, 26 CCPA 95, T.D. 49638 (1938);Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc. v. United States, 19 CCPA 8, T.D. 44851 (1931);Shaw & Co. et al. v. United States, 11 Ct.Cust.Appls. 226, T.D. 38990(1922);United States v. Shallus &Co., 9 Ct.Cust.Appls. 168, T.D. 37999(1919);The Best Foods, Inc. v. United States, 50 Cust.Ct. 94, C.D. 2396, 218 F.Supp. 576(1963), modified on other grounds, 51 CCPA 1, C.A.D. 827 (1963); and they are treated procedurally as duties.4Harold S. Lazar v. United States, 38 Cust.Ct. 23, C.D. 1838(1957);Bercut-Vandervoort & Co., Inc. v. United States, 35 Cust.Ct. 113, C.D. 1730(1955).See alsoMarianao Sugar Trading Corp. v. United States, 41 CCPA 236, C.A.D. 557 (1954).
Furthermore, a determination as to assessment of duties under item 901.00 involves a classifying function which is based upon the character of the merchandise and its use subsequent to importation.An analogous situation arose in Bradford Co. et al. (United States impleaded)v. American LithographicCo., 12 Ct.Cust.Appls. 318, T.D. 40318(1924), wherein the appellant-importer contended that the collector's determination as to whether or not merchandise was legally marked under the provisions of section 304(a) of the Tariff Act of 1922 did not amount to classification of the merchandise and, therefore, was not a protestable action under section 516(b) of that act which allowed an American manufacturer under certain conditions to protest the classification of imported merchandise and the rate of duty assessed thereon.The appellate court disposed of this argument thusly:
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